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ABSTRACT
The Value of Value-Added: Science, Technology and Policy in Educational Evaluation
by
Daniel Douglas

Advisor: Paul Attewell
In the first decade of the 21st century, researchers and policymakers in K-12 education began to
focus on evaluating teacher and school performance based on students’ standardized test scores.
One evaluative technique, value-added assessment (VAA), has been given particular attention.
This research presents a comprehensive study of the theoretical, technical, historical and political
dimensions VAA. Theoretically, the assumptions that underlie value-added diverge significantly
from the observed operations of the schools and classrooms these models are supposed to
evaluate. Technically, even if the theoretical assumptions are accepted, teachers’ actual valueadded rankings are shown to be unstable across time periods and classrooms for individual
teachers based on publicly-available data from New York City schools. Historical discourse
analysis shows how the political and technical evolution of VAA fit a pattern common to prior
technical innovations in educational assessment. Finally, making a case study of the Vergara v.
California trial, this research demonstrates the political force of VAA data in spite of its known
limitations. These findings are considered in the context of sociological theories of science and
policy.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
As society becomes more dependent on scientific and technical processes to identify and address
perceived social problems, it is necessary to better understand how the logic of science and
technology interacts with other social logics. The debate over value-added assessment (VAA) of
schools and teachers affords an interesting contemporary case precisely because it so
prominently features the idea of scientific rigor. In the sense of historian of technology Bertrand
Gille (1986), value-added is a technical ‘invention’ that has become an ‘innovation’ – it has
proceeded from being a matter of scholarly interest to having consequences for broader social
life. Using value-added assessment as a case study, I ask: what is the role of science in the
political sphere when scientific method itself is part of the policy?
Teacher assessments based on growth in students’ standardized test scores have become a major
point of contention in the long struggle over standards-based public education reform. They
were at the center of President Obama’s $4.35B Race to the Top (RttT) program which,
beginning in 2009, pushed state governments to compete against one another to change the way
schooling is evaluated. The Chicago Teachers Union cited these evaluations as one of the key
reasons for a long strike which began and ended in 2012. New York City and Los Angeles both
had very tense legal battles over the release of teacher ratings in 2011 and 2010, respectively; the
release in Los Angeles reportedly led one teacher to commit suicide. These assessments have
been cited as influences in widespread institutional cheating scandals in Washington, DC; El
Paso, Texas; and Atlanta, Georgia. More recently, this use of testing has been the driving force
behind a successful test boycott by Seattle high school students, a lawsuit against the Florida

department of education by teachers in that state, and a growing opt-out movement staged by
parents across the country.
Value-Added Assessment (VAA) is the term commonly associated with these measures of teacher
quality.1 Originally imported from agricultural science, value-added assessment was developed
as an educational evaluation tool in the early 1990s by William Sanders, then a researcher at the
University of Tennessee. Its history can be traced back further to the work of economists,
especially Erik Hanushek, who has researched and advocated for outcomes-based assessment of
this sort since the beginning of his career in 1968.2 But it wasn’t until the last decade, with the
passage of No Child Left Behind Act and the Education Sciences Reform Act that the valueadded system began to be considered as a legitimate tool.
The Tennessee Value Added Assessment System (TVAAS) was the first evaluation program to
rely on the education production function concept. TVAAS data, its architects claimed, showed
that teacher quality predicts students’ academic growth better than race, socioeconomic status,
classroom diversity or class size. It is notable, however, that in the beginning, Sanders was
careful to say that value-added data should not be used to make decisions about individual
teachers (Hill D. , 2000). Other important technical caveats were later made clear by other
researchers including statisticians (McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, Louis, & Hamilton, 2004)
testing experts (Koretz, 2000)and other economists (Kupermintz, 2003).

1

The term Value-Added is used in this proposal as a catch-all to include several different types
of assessment which purport to measure teacher ability based on year-to-year growth of student
test scores. Other versions, notably Student Growth Percentiles (SGPs) have come into use in
some state education systems. I use the term Value-Added to refer to these various methods
taken as a whole.
2
See for example Hanushek (1970; 1971; 1992). Another early (though more critical) discussion
of this model is advanced by Samuel Bowles (1970).
2

Value-Added assessment did not have a great deal of political currency (or the necessary
longitudinal tracking data) in the 1990s and early 2000s – though it was the subject of much
academic discussion during those years. Mandatory testing had been implemented for schools
receiving Title I funding since the 2001 implementation of No Child Left Behind, and thus
provided the necessary test score data. But evaluations still took place only at the school or
district level, rather at that of individual teachers, and did not focus on growth measures like
VAA. Indeed, before 2009, only four states had any systematic test-based evaluations of
individual teachers. But since Race to the Top in 2009, value-added has become a central part of
the national school reform debate.
At that time, we also observe a broad shift in the rhetoric around teacher evaluations. A 2009
report by The New Teacher Project, based on surveys of school districts in four states, claimed
that the public school system was essentially indifferent to teacher performance except in rare
cases when a teacher was marked for removal. The authors called this indifference the “Widget
Effect,” referring to the idea that all teachers were seen as equal and interchangeable. 3 Based on

3

This shift in rhetoric, which implicitly bemoans the interchangeability of teachers and the
similarity of effectiveness ratings, is historically ironic. Curriculum reform movements since the
1960s have attempted to “teacher-proof” classroom experiences – especially those of poor and
minority students. The most explicit of these is “direct instruction,” an approach developed and
championed by behavioral psychologist Siegfried Engelmann. Direct instruction is conducted by
script, affording teachers little if any autonomy in deciding what to teach and when, let alone
how. There is a vast literature and a decades-long debate about the efficacy of this method of
teaching (National Institute for Direct Instruction, 2011). As with the evaluation reform
movements discussed in the work that follows (particularly chapter 3) Direct Instruction was
variously resisted in its explicit application, but still has an important impact on American public
schooling (Kozol, The Shame of the Nation, 2005). Given this, it is unsurprising that teachers
would be found to have similar levels of effectiveness. Value-Added assessment, despite the
claim that it leaves teachers free to choose their methods, still results in standardization of
instruction by making the test the sole arbiter of quality. Since test questions appear in specific
format, and a single approach to each test question is likely to be optimal, instruction in content
is reduced to rote delivery of what I would call solution routes. Instead of teaching the concepts
3

surveys, the study showed that an overwhelming proportion of teachers were given satisfactory
ratings, despite teachers’ and administrators’ reported awareness of ‘ineffective’ colleagues.
While the report did not specifically call for value-added measures of teacher quality, the
differentiations they recommend – distinguishing poor from fair, fair from good, and good from
great – are a direct nod to those called for by advocates of test-based assessments (Weisberg,
Sexton, Mulhern, & Keeling, 2009, p. 29).
A group of well-known economists (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, The Long-Term Impacts of
Teachers: Teacher Value-Added and Student Outcomes in Adulthood, 2011a) went further,
making the headline-grabbing claim that differences in elementary school teachers’ effectiveness
can have profound effects on students’ adult incomes. Their study, titled “The Long-term
impacts of teachers,” claimed that a one standard-deviation increase in teacher value-added
during one school year correlated with an increased annual income of $182 per student at age 28
(Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, The Long-Term Impacts of Teachers: Teacher Value-Added and
Student Outcomes in Adulthood, 2011a, p. 4). They extrapolated this correlation to argue that
teacher replacement policies that used value-added assessment could add $1.4 million in lifetime
earnings per classroom per grade. Although subsequent research made severe challenges to these
claims (Adler, 2013; Rothstein J. , 2015), Chetty et al.’s findings were mentioned by President
Obama in his 2013 state of the Union Address.
In another politically important moment for VAA, researchers funded by the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation conducted a massive multi-year study on test-based assessment, called the
Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) study. The MET study attempted to randomly assign

upon which test questions are based, one teaches the ways to the wanted answer. Teaching to the
test is discussed further in chapter one below.
4

students to teachers – one of the statistical assumptions required for value-added assessment – in
order to resolve the question of whether value-added actually measures are invalidated by
selection bias. A second component of the study attempted to correlate different types of teacher
assessment with value-added measures (Kane, McCaffrey, Miller, & Staiger, 2013). The MET
study authors admitted that the experiments were compromised by attrition, non-random sorting
of students into classrooms and the voluntary nature of school participation (p.15). A critical
review of the MET study further observed that different measures of teacher ability – valueadded, peer observation, and student surveys – were only weakly correlated (Rothstein & Mathis,
2013). Both of these findings suggest that the answer to the question asked in the MET report’s
title – Have We Measured Effective Teaching? – is no.
But from the standpoint of educational policymakers, it seems as if value-added measures are
unproblematic. The above reports – but not the corresponding critical responses – gained
significant attention. They have been used to argue that 1) current means of evaluating schooling
are ineffective, and 2) that teacher quality can be accurately measured by value-added
assessment systems. Notable mentions in speeches by former US Secretary of Education Arne
Duncan and President Obama, as well as the text of Race to the Top itself, have pushed these
techniques to the front of the education reform menu.
Calls for test-based accountability also have to be considered against the backdrop of national
education policy writ large. Since the Great Recession, lawmakers across the political spectrum
have called for austerity measures which have impacted services ranging from social security to
NSF funding to mail delivery. In this frame, calls for ‘efficient,’ ‘accountable’ public schooling
can be considered part of a strategy for dismantling teachers’ unions in an effort to lower states’
labor costs. While many point out the direct threat that accountability measures pose to teaching
5

as a profession (Ravitch, 2010) some suggest that these broad-reaching spending cuts constitute a
crisis of public values and moral deregulation (Giroux, 2012).
Up until now, Value-Added Assessment has been discussed primarily in terms of its ability (or
not) to assess teachers’ and schools’ contribution to student learning. 4 That discussion continues
in academic circles, but we nonetheless see a continued roll-out of these policies. Value-added
forms of assessment may indeed expand from K-12 to higher education (Chingos, 2013) and to
teacher education programs (Guarino, Reckase, & Woolridge, 2012). The task of this project is
to understand how and why this happens. Doing so requires treating the phenomenon at the
historical and political-economic levels, as well as understanding the social-scientific debate
which serves as ammunition in the political battle.
Accountability, Efficiency, and School Reform

The goal of Value-Added Assessment and its predecessors in education is to make schools,
teachers, and the whole system of education “more efficient” and “more accountable.” But these
words are so often used that they can lose their meanings. Efficient at what? Accountable to
whom? Further, the nature of education – or even the narrower concept of ‘teaching and
learning’ – is too complex either to augment efficiency or to hold any person or institution
accountable by means of quantitative metrics. But it is the evolution of the historical meaning of
efficiency in education which motivates this research.

4

A few researchers have begun to examine some political aspects of these evaluations; Gabriel
and Lester (2013)used discourse analysis of public committee meetings to understand how
Value-Added moved from a technology to a practiced policy in Tennessee. Both Baker et. al.
(2013) and Pullin (2013) discuss the potential legal challenges that would accompany the use of
student test scores in teacher evaluation.
6

Raymond Callahan’s (1962) Education and the Cult of Efficiency looks at the attempt in the
early 20th century to bring Taylorism into public schools. Callahan analyzed the rise of ‘scientific
management’ in public education, but the policy emphasis was clearly on the latter term in the
phrase. Strong management was then seen as the key to school reform; science – in the Taylorist
sense – was only intended to inform the changes. For this reason, much of Callahan’s data refers
to early classroom management texts by administratively-oriented progressives such as Ellwood
Cubberly and John Franklin Bobbitt. Indeed, as historian David Labaree (2010) points out,
educational progressives’ key successes in this period were the centralization and
professionalization of school administration.
Callahan argues that the vulnerability of school administrators relative to the other political
actors – business and political leaders, as well as the media – led to a contradictory attempt to
apply the principles of scientific management to schools. What is more sociologically interesting
is the book’s assessment of the array of political forces which pushed efficiency and productivity
into education, how that agenda was resisted by educators, and the extent to which each side
succeeded. At one level, the situation in the early 20th century described by Callahan is much like
what we see today; business leaders and elected officials sought to make public education more
efficient by asserting control over the way school administration and assessment. Thus, one
aspect of this project is to update Callahan’s story in terms of existing political forces.
Diane Ravitch’s (2010)broad treatment of current school reform efforts, including test-based
assessment, identifies at least some of the principle political actors in education reform and some
of the ideological assumptions that motivate them. She argues that policy is being driven by a
coalition of lawmakers concerned with ‘educational standards’ and private foundations interested
in data-driven decision-making and the privatization of public schooling. In her work on the
7

history of No Child Left Behind, DeBray (2006) suggests that education policy has been a
particular focus of the growing efforts of conservative think-tanks since the mid-1990s. 5 But
these accounts leave unexamined the roles of politicians and social scientists (of all political
leanings) in the process of creating and enacting this particular version of assessment. 6
Science, Technology and Policy

But the technologies of assessment have also clearly evolved since the period described in The
Cult of Efficiency, as has the perception of technology’s role in education. The capacity to collect
and analyze numeric data at unprecedented levels of complexity places education research and
statistics in a much more central place than was the case at the turn of the 20 th century.
Accountability and efficiency have been “buzzwords” in public school reform for as long as
there have been public schools to reform. But the growing capacity to quantify the process of
teaching and learning – or the belief that such a capacity exists – changes the meaning of these
terms. Political commentator Evgeny Morozov (2013) makes the broad point that as technology
advances, policymakers increasingly rely on ‘quick fixes’ afforded by computers, risking what

Elizabeth DeBray’s Politics, Ideology and Education (2006) notes that the accountability
architecture for NCLB comes from a cadre of “New Democrats” and that the Bush
Administration passed this legislation against the opposition of Congressional Republicans.
6
The role of the teachers’ unions in shaping evaluation policy is certainly as important, if not
more so, than that of social scientists. Given its implications for school labor practices, whatever
its impacts on student learning, the Obama administration’s ‘Race to the Top’ is for teachers a
‘race to the bottom.’ Brill (2010) has portrayed these evaluation policies as ‘The teachers union’s
last stand.’ Thus, it is critical to analyze how unions and their leaders have made sense of and
either struggled against or embraced these policies. Stanley Aronowitz (2014) examined the
different variations of organized labor’s response to technical innovations as ‘adaptive’ or
‘interventionist’ strategies. The former approach accepts technological change as inevitable and
seeks to bargain for the existing membership, come what may in the future. The latter seeks an
active role in determining whether and how technology will be implemented in the workplace.
The role of teachers’ unions is considered at various points in the research below, but a thorough
examination of this aspect of education policy creation is beyond the scope of this study.
5

8

he calls “the folly of technological solutionism.” The political dimension of education reform
must be understood in light of these technical changes.
Thus, while Callahan’s research questions how ‘scientific’ principles inform the management of
schooling in the early 20th century,7 in the contemporary situation, science seems at least as
important to understand as management (if not more so). The relationship between science and
policy has been theorized following two broad themes.
One broad position regards science as a value-free enterprise. This perspective on science can be
traced back as far as Plato, but is first brought to the social sciences in the work of August Comte
(1853/1998) and Emile Durkheim (1895/1982) under the heading of positivism – the position
that scientific method can provide us with unmediated access to truth. While positivism has been
widely criticized and updated in the field of philosophy (Phillips & Burbules, 2000), it continues
to constitute the implicit assumption of much social scientific work. In this frame, scientists
stand apart from political interest provided they closely adhere to methodological principles, and
science itself is only politicized when the knowledge it generates is coopted by interested parties
(for example see Henig, 2008).
Theorists in more critical traditions argue on the other hand that science contains its own implicit
values. The Frankfurt school views scientific reason and the technology it produces as
reinforcing a logic domination which is connected to the commodity form posited by Marx
(Horkheimer & Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 1944/2002; Marcuse, One-Dimensional

7

Reese (2013) also examines the question of testing and its impact on educational reform, but
begins his investigation in the mid-19th century and focuses on Massachusetts. He too suggests
that the primary motivation of progressive reformers was to change the structure of schooling,
but notes that the emphasis on written tests was animated by a fascination with the nascent
science of statistics.
9

Man, 1964/1991). French social theorists, under the broad heading of post-structuralism,
emphasize the socially constructed nature of scientific knowledge and view science as a
dominant regime of truth which consequently shapes the consciousness of both scientists and
non-scientists (Foucault, The Order of Things, 1970/1994; Althusser, 1990/2012). Still another
strand of critical theory drawing from diverse perspectives focuses on scientific method as the
mechanism that allows science to become dominant over other forms of discourse (Feyerabend,
Against Method, 1993). Theorists in this tradition propose that challenges to this dominance
must disrupt the pervasive belief in value-free, objective science and return science to the field of
discourse (Aronowitz, 1988).
Proceeding from these theoretical perspectives, and taking value-added assessment as a
contemporary case study, this research asks two basic questions: How does a technique like
value-added, initially conceived as a tool of academic inquiry, become a policy tool? Further,
once this transformation takes place, what is the role of science and scientists in the public
sphere when their techniques become policy tools with social consequences? I address these
questions in the following chapters.
Chapter one looks at value-added assessment in theory and practice and thereby summarizes the
technique, its basic justification, and some of the main threads of technical criticism. The
questions addressed here are: how do the theoretical assumptions of value added modeling in its
various incarnations align (or not) with the ways in which schooling actually happens? Further,
what might a schooling system that aligns with such a technique look like? I argue that key VAA
assumptions about classrooms and schools – random assignment of students to classrooms,
stable student retention, annual pre- and post-testing, and most importantly attribution of students
score gains solely to teacher quality – vastly misrepresent what actually happens in schools.
10

Further, relying on Willard Waller’s (1932/2014) Sociology of Teaching, I contend that the
emphasis on test-taking required by VAA presents serious challenges for both classroom
management and for the larger moral project of schooling.
Chapter two examines New York City VAA data and demonstrates some major problems with
the technique. The data for New York City were made publically available by a 2012 freedom of
information act (FOIA) request by some of the city’s major news outlets. They have since been
the subject of a few journalistic treatments, but none have merged the data with school-level
characteristics, which are also publicly available and are included in my analysis. The question
answered here is: how do value-added assessments actually behave in practice? Analysis of these
data first reveals that VA measures fluctuate from one year to the next. Next, relying on a subset
of teachers who teach the same subject to more than one group of students in a single year, I find
that even within the same year and subject a single teacher’s rating can be vastly different
between classrooms – suggesting that VA is not a stable trait within individual teachers. Finally,
I use regression analysis to show that teachers’ VA scores are significantly impacted by certain
school characteristics although VA models claim to have adjusted for school-level influences.
Chapter three investigates how the history of evaluations research and education policy led to the
practice of evaluating teachers on the basis of students’ test scores. This chapter is a synthetic
treatment of existing work on both social science methodology and on the history of ‘scientific’
education policy. I analyze the early genesis of paper-based testing in Massachusetts in the mid19th century, the push for scientific management of education documented by Callahan (1962),
the rise of standardized achievement testing between World War I and the 1950s, and the
expansion of systems analysis techniques into social and education policy in the 1960s and 70s.
This historical treatment of educational assessment innovation shows that repeatedly when new
11

evaluation technologies are introduced into the field of education, they appear as both ‘panic’
and ‘panacea.’ They are first used to diagnose familiar problems of schooling, albeit at new
levels of detail, and with increased vigor. They are also accompanied by unreasonable
expectations for solving supposed education problems. Ultimately, however, the enthusiasm for
these technological fixes wanes either due to political resistance by educators, or when new
techniques supersede them.
Chapter four takes the social science literature on value-added itself as an object of a discourse
analysis. The science behind value-added has been mustered as evidence by critics and
proponents alike. This chapter answers the following question: how does the discourse around a
technique like value added evolve as it moves from a matter of academic interest in the invention
stage to one of political relevance in its innovation stage? I treat the scholarly work on VAA in
two phases: first from 1994 until roughly 2008, when discussion of using student test score gains
to evaluate teachers was primarily occurring within academic circles; then, from 2009 to the
present, when the federal Race to the Top Program thrust VAA into the forefront of policy
development. This analysis shows that as VAA transformed from a research method to a policy
tool, critical discourse about its fitness for the task of teacher evaluation was drown out by more
zealous advocacy of VA as a policy tool.
Chapter five seeks to clarify the use of scientific knowledge of Value Added Assessment in
recent struggles over its implementation as policy. I do this by analyzing the 2014 Vergara v.
California case, which made value-added assessment the centerpiece of expert testimony in a
lawsuit which sought to overturn teacher tenure protections in that state. This chapter explores
how value-added research was understood in a courtroom setting and, further, how is the ideal of
science used in pursuit of political objectives. I find that expert testimony by proponents of VAA
12

understated the dubious assumptions required for modeling teacher effectiveness in this way.
Further, when opposing experts sought to explain and critique these assumptions, they were
regarded as less scientifically rigorous than those who presented ‘objective data’ from VAA
research.
The sixth and final chapter brings these findings together and attempts square them with broader
perspectives on science and technology articulated in social theory. Specifically, this chapter
traces the literature on positivism in the social sciences and critical theories which argue that
science is constituent of power in modern society. I conclude by arguing that the dominant belief
in science as a value-free enterprise has peculiar consequences when the tools of research
become tools of policy.
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Chapter 2: Value-Added in Theory and Practice
On February 24th 2012, the New York City Department of Education released value-added
performance rankings of 18,000 teachers in schools across the city’s five boroughs, which were
subsequently published (in some form) in all the city’s major newspapers. This came after a
lawsuit by the United Federation of Teachers failed to prevent the release of the data on grounds
of privacy. In the days and weeks following, commentary came flowing in from corporate
philanthropists (Gates, 2012), city officials (Walcott, 2012), and well-known education
researchers (Hanushek E. , 2012; Darling-Hammond, 2012). For most of these commentators,
what was at issue was not whether or not there should be a system in place to evaluate teachers,
but the public nature of the data release and the uses to which the data will be put.
New York was not the first school system to make its teacher ratings public. In April of 2011, the
Los Angeles Unified School District released value-added rankings of schools, and followed that
with the release of teacher value-added scores in May. This release was prompted by the Los
Angeles Times conducting their own value-added assessment in August of 2010 and publishing
teachers’ names and rankings, an event that reportedly led one teacher to commit suicide after
receiving a low ranking (Zavis & Barboza, 2010).
While the public release of rankings was notable in these two major cities, the use of ValueAdded Assessment (VA) has spread to school systems across the country. Indeed, it has become
the preferred method of teacher evaluation for states interested in the federal “race to the top”
program which mandates that districts competing to receive funding tie teacher evaluation to
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student performance. Further, many states and school systems have begun using these teacher
assessments to make decisions on promotion, tenure, compensation and dismissal of teachers. 8
Since the development of the first functional value-added assessment system in Tennessee in the
early 1990s, economists, sociologists, statisticians and policy analysts of all stripes have debated
the validity and proper use of this approach to assessing school and teacher performance. While
this chapter intends to make some contribution to those debates, the larger purpose is to put value
added assessments in an historical context of education policy and assessment technology. We
begin by looking at some theories of work measurement; then we will consider the technique and
political roots of value added assessments in this context. Next, we will compare the theoretical
assumptions of VA to the reality of its application in schools, thereby highlighting some of the
methodological criticisms. Finally, we look at the use, misuse and potentially hazardous effects
of these assessments to the extent that they resemble and differ from those of other forms of
workplace accountability.
The Technology and Politics of Work Measurement

While Value-Added models are a relatively new development in the history of education, the
basic principle of measuring work by outcomes is really quite old, perhaps as old as economics
itself. Sociologists often consider work measurement through the lenses offered Max Weber and
Karl Marx.
Max Weber’s concern with rationalization was a macro-historical argument about a shift in
worldview and belief (one that replaced non-rational explanations of natural and social

8

By 2014, 45 of the 50 states were on track to have the necessary data systems for VA
assessment (National Council on Teacher Quality, 2014).
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phenomena with a rational or scientific attitude towards cause and effect, means and ends) and
simultaneously an argument about the emergence of new institutional forms. Bureaucracy
enhanced top-down authority, improved information transparency and ‘accountability,’ and
facilitated rational means/ends decision-making. According to Weber, written records, rules and
standardized operating procedures, defined responsibilities and duties within a hierarchy, and
employment of credentialed experts, were all mechanisms that made administration more
predictable, accountable, and enduring, and therefore more effective than earlier forms of social
organization. Simultaneously, Weber highlighted the development of tools for rational
organizational decision-making, in particular emphasizing capital accounting and double-entry
bookkeeping (Carruthers & Espeland, 1991).

Scholars have followed in Weber’s footsteps by documenting the evolution of managerial and
organizational technologies that enhance information flow and decision-making. Chandler
(1977) and Yates (1993) examined the rise of professional management in the US, identified
shifts in organizational forms and – in Yates’ case – new tools for organizational
communication. Drucker (1954) pioneered ‘management by objectives’- a technique for
aligning organizational activities with desired goals. World War Two saw the development of
statistical quality-control techniques that also increased predictability and uniformity in
production (Deming W. E., 1982). Much of modern management theory can also be viewed as
efforts to improve the rationality of planning, decision-making and control within bureaucratic
organizations, through a variety of structural and procedural innovations (Micklethwait &
Wooldridge, 1996).
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From a Weberian perspective, the movement towards value-added assessment of teachers and
schools can be read as a recent example of a centuries-old effort to extend bureaucratic methods
of accountability into previously exempt settings, a small step forward in the rationalization of
education. Value-added assessment might prove as important a new tool in education as doubleentry bookkeeping once was for industry. What the Weberian perspective does not consider,
however, is that efforts at increasing managerial control may go well beyond the rational use of
information for decision-making.
Another tradition in industrial sociology draws its inspiration from Marx, and emphasizes
managerial control over employees rather than rationalization. Marx noted that employers
purchase the labor power of employees, their potential for work. It therefore falls upon
management to ensure that this potential is actually transformed into work done, into marketable
products and services – for capitalism to survive, exploitation must proceed. Since this
perspective views workers’ employment in capitalist firms as necessarily alienated, a struggle
ensues between management and labor over the degree of effort expended, the pace and intensity
of work, and the degree of autonomy and self-direction of workers (Bendix, 1954). Scholars in
this tradition have documented different types of control over employees, and different forms of
resistance and/or acquiescence that vary either historically or across different occupational
niches in the economy (Burawoy, 1979; Edwards, 1979).
Measuring the work done by individual employees and paying them according to measured
output is one of several managerial control strategies that have waxed and waned over time. In
the early 20th century, Frederick Taylor (1911) championed a strategy called “scientific
management” that involved studying manufacturing jobs in order to discover the most efficient
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methods to (say) machine a particular metal component.9 Workers were then shown the “one
best way” of accomplishing their task; their output was measured, and they were incentivized to
follow that behavioral recipe through piece-rate and related payment-by-results schemes. The
Gilbreths applied similar techniques to routinized office work.
Taylorism had unanticipated consequences that blunted its spread. It intensified industrial
conflict by making the struggle between labor and management very visible: setting the piece
rate affected workers’ ability to earn. Management frequently cut rates when they discovered
employees earning too much, a response that Taylor himself viewed as irrational because it
focused on managerial prerogative and status distinctions rather than the maximization of output.
Workers then developed various strategies for subverting work measurement, including output
restriction. Worker turnover, unionization, and strikes increased (Aitken, 1960). In practice,
Taylorism intensified struggles over control at the workplace, undercutting tacit effort bargains
that tended to emerge between employees and management.
Computerization of clerical work in the 1960s and 1970s led to predictions that computer
surveillance would lead to a revival of work-measurement, piece-rates and payment-by-results.
Attewell (1987) reviewed the evidence and concluded that this development was unlikely except
in jobs that were highly routine and required little employee discretion, and where employees
were in such abundant supply that high turnover rates (and possibly unionization) were
acceptable to managers. Today however, to the degree that so-called “Big Data” can be used to
document professional work like that of doctors and teachers, it seems possible that this could
change.

9

Scientific management is considered in great detail in Chapter 3.
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In the past, payment-by-results has not been common in non-routinized and professional jobs,
except situations where there is a clear numerical measure of individual output. Some
salespeople are paid commissions or bonuses based on their sales volume, and some lawyers
receive bonuses based on billable hours, but these are exceptions to the more common situation,
where professionals are paid a salary, and where individual work measurement is not
prominent.10
One personnel practice that emerged and spread since the 1960s is the practice of having an
annual review of a professional or white-collar employee’s performance, usually undertaken
during a meeting between the employer and a supervisor. One variant, associated with large
firms like IBM and General Electric involved assigning a letter grade to the performance of
white collar employees, based on the qualitative judgment of the supervisor, rather than using
objective work measurement. In its most punitive versions, writers suggested that these grades
would be curved, so that (for example) the bottom quarter of employees who received a low
grade in the annual assessment would be fired (Deming W. E., 1982, pp. 101-106). There is no
evidence that this punitive version of performance evaluation was widely adopted; it seems
unlikely that large proportions of employees would have been laid off annually based on such
reviews without this being noted by the business media. Moreover, the expense of recruiting and
retraining one quarter of employees, not to mention the intensification of conflict in the
workplace, would be considerable.
A related development, facilitated by computerization of transactions and records was a
proliferation of sales and production “targets,” creating multiple performance measures.

10

Attempts to reward teachers and other professionals are also considered in Chapter 3.
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Employees could then be held responsible for whether they were reaching their targets on several
of these measures. W. Edwards Deming, the father of quality control, was highly critical of this
kind of assessment because it pressured employees to improve performance without giving them
any understanding of how to better meet those targets. It held individuals responsible for
outcomes over which they may have had limited control. As he put it: “…management by
numerical goal is an attempt to manage without knowledge of what to do, and in fact is usually
management by fear” (Deming W. E., 1982, p. 76).
Linking assessment and/or pay of teachers to value-added measures of student performance is in
one sense an extension of this type of control via targets. But it is novel insofar as it seeks to
measure and reward the quality of a professional’s work performance, rather than measuring
effort or output indicators like numbers of children taught. And it aims to do so through
“objective” quantifiable measurement, rather than using a supervisor’s judgments. Since this
application of value-added measures is in its infancy, and current systems are linked to modest
bonuses rather than large scale layoffs, it is hard to judge where this new form of workplace
control might go. However, if we draw an analogy to the findings of industrial sociology of the
past, we would expect that using value-added measures as a form of “high stakes” assessment of
teachers with substantial penalties and rewards would lead to gaming and cheating on assessment
measures, cause increased tension and labor conflict within schools, and could thrive only in
contexts with a plentiful supply of new teachers to replace those leaving.
Evidence has already emerged of widespread cheating on high stakes tests in schools, carried out
by teachers and principals, even before a value-added assessment has been deployed for
assessing individual teachers (Vogell, Perry, Judd, & Pell, 2012; Boyette, 2011). In the current
economic climate, there may be a steady supply of new teachers seeking jobs. But there is
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already a high level of voluntary teacher turnover, especially in schools that serve low-income
students, where recruitment is sufficiently problematic that many staff members teach outside
their areas of specialization (Ingersoll, 2003). Moreover, projections of teacher retirements have
led commentators to predict looming teacher shortages.11 Based on past research on workplace
control, these features would limit a control regime in which teachers were strongly rewarded or
sanctioned according to value-added assessments of individual teachers.12
The immediate problem for doing work measurement of teachers is: how does one measure the
work? Unlike industrial labor and some clerical tasks, teaching can’t be rated simply according
to speed or accuracy of execution at the level of the process. Moreover, the hurdle is raised even
further if one wants to be ‘objective’ and measure that work based on outcomes rather than on
teacher performance. The outcome of teaching – educated students – is not at first glance
something inherently measurable. Thus, to argue that teachers’ work can be measured in the way
of other work processes, two major uncertainties must either be overcome or avoided: first, that
some measureable student outcome faithfully represents her educational achievement; second,
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Jesse Rothstein (2012) discusses the implications of value-added measures of teacher
effectiveness in the context of teacher labor force shortages. That paper and other statements
related to teacher labor force issues are discussed in chapter five below.
12
There are also diverging views on whether turnover is a problem. Teaching is a “back-loaded”
profession, in which many of the most enticing benefits come at the end of one’s career – salary
increases and often generous pensions. Professional autonomy also increases for veteran teachers
who are afforded tenure protections (also see chapter 5 below for more on this issue). Given
these structural factors, many education reformers see high teacher turnover as a feature, rather
than an unintended consequence, of heavy-handed evaluation policies – as they removes teachers
before they become expensive and relatively hard to control. Gordon Kane, and Staiger (2006)
argue that ‘reducing barriers to entering teaching’ should accompany the introduction of testbased evaluation systems. A similar impulse animates programs like Teach For America, which
has eager recent college graduates enter the classroom for a short time (usually two to three
years) with the expectation that they will move on rather than become career educators.
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that some part of this achievement can be precisely and correctly attributed to the work done by
an individual teacher.
First Difference Models
At the most basic level, value-added assessment relies on a technique called “first difference
models. 13” For educational assessment, the ‘difference’ in question is between a pretest score
and a posttest score on some measure of student achievement. Between the two tests is the
intervention – teaching – and the difference between the two scores is said to be the effect of that
intervention. James Coleman and his colleagues (1966) utilized first difference models to
examine the impact of school segregation on the academic outcomes of minority students and
later on the differences between public and private schools (Coleman et al 1982). This work
stands at the beginning of a long line of research that has used some form of value-added
assessment, but at the level of the school rather than of the individual teacher. The difference
between evaluating an individual and an aggregate (like a school) is of both practical and
theoretical consequence, which will be addressed in the following sections. Nonetheless, in
theory, by using a first difference model, Value Added Assessment is able to ‘objectively’ – that
is based on outcomes rather than on ‘subjective’ observation of teaching – assess school or
teacher effects on student learning growth.

Methodologically, Allison (1990) looks specifically at the use of first differences or “changescores” as dependent variables in regression models, and outlines the use of first differences in
‘fixed effect’ models with longitudinal data (Allison 2009). Liker and his coauthors (1985) offer
a good comparison between two wave panel data – which looks at different cohorts over time to
measure trends – and first differences, which look at the same cohort over time.
13

22

Teacher Quality
Given that a tool exists to measure – however accurately – the ability of teachers to affect
students’ achievement, the data collection needed to make such evaluation possible is both costly
and complicated. Furthermore, attempting to impose such an intrusive measurement system is
likely to generate resistance, as it has in other workplaces. Thus, some amount of political will
and intellectual justification must be present to initiate the process. Economist Eric Hanushek has
advocated for identifying effective teachers based on student achievement since the 1970s. 14
Other economists have recently made this case drawing on larger data sources and newer more
sophisticated methods (Gordon, Kane, & Staiger, Identifying Effective Teachers Using
Performance on the Job, 2006; Rockoff, 2004). The common thread among these studies is that
they seek to place an effective teacher – measured by her ability to produce high score gains on
standardized tests – as the centerpiece of an economically efficient classroom while
simultaneously challenging assertions about the positive effects of decreasing class size (Milesi
& Gamoran, 2006), better teacher training and credentialing (Ballou & Podgursky, Reforming
Teacher Preparation and Licensing: What is the Evidence?, 1997; Aaronson, Barrow, & Sandler,
2003), and more generally increasing school funding (Hanushek E. , 1997).
A Very Brief Primer on Value Added Assessment

Value added assessments are said to measure teacher effectiveness based on student achievement
growth. In the past, school performance has been evaluated by changes in grade-level test scores
from one cohort of students to the next – comparing this year’s third graders to last year’s.
Thoughtful supporters of value-added systems criticize this older system as unfair (Harris D. N.,
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Hanushek’s contributions to Value-Added will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 4.
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2011), as it penalizes schools – and teachers – for having students who start out with lower test
scores and thus will always be seen as lagging behind despite efforts made to improve. As a
growth model, value added attempts to account for where students start, measures changes in
those students, and judges progress and effectiveness of instruction on that basis.
How value-added assessment works in theory is quite simple. Here, we imagine a single teacher,
in a single-grade classroom, teaching only one subject to a group of students. Even this last point
can muddy the terrain; we make a serious leap by saying that any subject can be taught without
reliance on the others. But, that is one of many discussions for later; for now, we are speaking
about – and perhaps clarifying – the ideal conditions under which this form of evaluation would
be conducted.
To measure value-added for this teacher, one needs two tests: a pretest which is administered
before the teacher works with the class, and a posttest which is administered after that teacher
has finished working with the class. Each student has a score on both tests, and the difference
between each student’s two scores – posttest minus pretest – is that student’s “gainscore.” Then,
we average the gainscores of all the students in the teacher’s class, and we have an average
gainscore. This is the measure of what the teacher contributed, by his instruction, to the class’
learning in that subject in that timeframe. But the average value-added, on its own, does not tell
one very much about the quality of that teacher, as it’s just a single point.
Once this average is taken, it is compared to other teachers who teach the same grade and subject
to their classes. Each of them also has an average gainscore for the year. With enough teachers
and classes, the data points begin to form a distribution of average gainscores. The distribution of
average gainscores has a mean, which is said to be the effect of the “average teacher” on student

24

achievement growth in that grade and subject. Our original teacher would then be compared to
the average teacher. Based on this, he could fall into three categories: below average, average,
and above average; using the same system, our teacher could also be assigned a percentile
ranking. In this way, value-added becomes a relative measure. This is important because in such
a relative system, there will always be some group of people performing below the average level
of effectiveness.
To summarize: we now have, based on pretest and posttest measures for an entire class (or
classes), an estimate of an effect for our teacher; we have used it to compare our teacher to others
teaching the same subject at the same grade level.15
Selected Criticisms of Value Added Assessment

Having established the basic principles of how value-added assessment utilizes a first difference
model to attempt an ‘objective’ measurement of teacher effectiveness based on student
outcomes, we now move to consider some of the salient criticisms of value-added assessment as
a technical process. What all the criticisms in this section share is that they address the mismatch
between the theoretical principles of value-added and the realities of the work to which they are
applied. For each criticism mentioned, we will address any modifications that have been made in
practice or have been suggested by the research. For some of the criticisms, we also share our
own correctives which we have not seen addressed in the literature.
Value Added Models are ideally based on random assignment of students into classes, but
students are almost never randomly placed in either classes or schools (Kupermintz, 2003;
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In the Appendix to this chapter, I provide a diagram which shows the many points of
interaction which Value-Added leaps over in inferring teacher quality from student test scores.
25

Rothstein J. , Teacher Quality in Educational Production: Tracking, Decay, and Student
Achievement, 2010)– and in most school systems in the country, precisely the opposite is true. In
large school systems, students are placed in schools based on both residence and preference.
Within schools, there is usually some degree of tracking into general education, gifted programs,
and various forms of developmental education, which is to say nothing of the various programs
for which students are pulled out of their ‘regular’ classes during the day. Now, let’s imagine a
gifted classroom to see a different angle. The students in this class have likely scored high on the
pretest and will likely do well on the posttest, demonstrating achievement growth. But how much
of that gain is attributable to the teacher and how much to the relatively more diligent students he
teaches and to their families? Further, what ought to be said about peer group effects? Here, the
issue of separating measured teacher effects from actual teacher effectiveness may end up giving
the teacher too much credit. It is thus little surprise that in New York City after the release of
teacher VA ratings, the Daily News was able to print a subhead which read “Surprise: the best
teachers are at the best schools” (Sandoval, Lesser, & Chapman, 2012). An analogy to factory
work would be to compare the efficiency of two groups of sheet metal workers, giving one group
pre-measured sheets and the other not, and evaluating the teams as if they were equal on all
fronts. This is not to say that Value Added treats everyone equal and makes no attempt to adjust
statistically for the non-random assignment of students into classes; it is simply that given the
degree of non-randomness that exists in most school settings, statistical adjustments may not be
enough.
One variant of non-random distribution of students is that certain variables – for example race
and socioeconomic status – have long been linked in sociological and educational research to
lower performance on tests. If teachers are to be held to account for achievement growth, it
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seems important that these characteristics should be included in a quantitative assessment of a
teacher’s ability based on test scores. While the value-added system developed by Sanders uses a
pure first-difference model which assumes that controlling for a students’ ability in the pretest is
enough to obviate the inclusion of student characteristics, another system developed for the
Dallas schools primarily by William Webster and Robert Mendro (1995; 1997) utilizes
Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) and multiple statistical controls for student characteristics
in addition to controlling for prior achievement. The fairness variable model originally used by
the Dallas schools has gained favor in some municipalities such as New York City, while the
original Tennessee system has been implemented in others including North Carolina.
The inclusion of ‘fairness variables’ as statistical controls in the modeling of teacher value-added
is a clear response to the problem of non-random distribution. But the distribution of student
problems is not fully accounted for by this response if we imagine student learning following a
model other than a simple linear process. Specifically, value-added models assume that student
achievement – as reflected by test scores – grows along a relatively straight line and at a
consistent rate from one year to the next. The changes in time (x) are independent of the changes
in growth (y). But it is just as possible that learning happens in such a way that over time the rate
of learning growth changes. Our hypothetical model follows the notion compound interest – in
which you collect interest that becomes part of the principle and subsequently accrues interest of
its own. Simply, as students learn more, the “more” that they have learned further enables them
to learn more in the next time interval. This may pose no problem if these students are randomly
distributed in classes, but when they are not as is typically the case, we could think of a class of
higher ability students as initially able to accrue more knowledge and thus able to build on this in
subsequent years. If student learning were to follow this model, measures of teacher
27

effectiveness based on student learning gains would have to account not only for the way certain
variables affect the rate of growth, but also the way they affect the growth of the rate.
Having outlined some concerns related to students, we now move to the source of the
measurements – the exams taken by students. We hold aside the debate about whether testing in
general is an accurate measure of what students know or learn and consider whether or not the
tests being used are designed the task of evaluating the effectiveness of teachers.
As noted above, measuring value-added depends on successive testing of students both before
and after the intervention of a teacher to measure the teacher’s effect and relative effectiveness.
As such, these tests should – following the norms of sound scientific practice – occur
immediately before and immediately after the intervention takes place. But, as with the
distribution of students into classrooms, actual school practice varies significantly from this
evaluative ideal. Students do not typically take a test on or before the first day of school to
determine what they know at “t=0.” Further, they do not typically take the tests being used in
value added assessments at the very end of the year. Since these tests are often used to evaluate
student progress and are used in student promotion decisions, they need to be graded before the
end of the year. Moreover, if there is only one test per year, then the prior year’s post-test
becomes the pre-test for the following year’s teacher. Two obvious problems emerge. First, two
teachers’ work is being measured with each test – the end of “last year” and the greater part of
“this year” in question – but only one “this year’s” teacher being evaluated by it. Secondly, the
test does not account for the intervening summer. So, our fourth grade teacher will be evaluated
partly on the performance of her students’ third grade teacher(s) and will be rewarded or
penalized for whatever her students did or did not retain from the previous year after the
summer. While examining the effect of different test instruments, Papay (2011) finds that test
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timing does have an effect on teacher value added estimates, more so than the difference he finds
from the use of different standardized test formats. Summer learning loss has been studied and
found to be unequal across different groups of students and in the expected directions (Downey,
von Hippel, & Broh, 2004; Alexander, Entwisle, & Olson, 2001). McCaffrey and his colleagues’
(2004) very carefully argued work suggests that the assumption of VAA that teacher effects
persist undiminished is a significant flaw in the model specification.16 Finally, as we shall see in
the following section, the work of the prior year’s teacher can have unexpected consequences.
Many authors have argued that, though there is enough data within an entire school to generate
reliable estimates of the school’s value added, using the same information for individual teachers
presents an issue of statistical power. Most teachers don’t teach enough students, and therefore
don’t have enough students’ test scores, to generate reliable estimates of their value-added. This
is especially true of teachers in their first few years and for teachers who teach smaller classes
(McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, Louis, & Hamilton, 2004; Braun, 2005). Acknowledging this
problem, the Tennessee system does not evaluate special education classrooms, where the classes
are too small to produce reliable estimates (Topping & Sanders, 2000). Since these measures are
intended in many systems to determine retention and promotion of new teachers, the problem of
statistical power cannot be put aside, as it is precisely the individuals who are most affected
whom these systems do the poorest job assessing. If a teacher is considered for tenure after two
years of teaching, and promotion decisions must include this type of assessment, annual test
score changes of a few dozen students will partially determine that teacher’s career for years to
come.
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See also Briggs and Weeks (2011).
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The problem of missing data is particularly acute for teachers in urban schools, and especially
among low-SES students, where moving from one school to another is a regular occurrence. If a
student moves between schools, then that student’s change in test scores – good or bad – cannot
be meaningfully attributed to any one of the teachers she has interacted with. Further, at the level
of the school, fluctuating populations could make a school’s measured effectiveness somewhat
meaningless, as they don’t serve a stable population (Baker, et al., 2010; Corcoran, 2010).
Uses, Misuses, and Unintended Consequences of Value Added

So far, we have discussed both what value-added intends to do in theory, and how that ideal
squares with the realities in the schools where such assessments are used. The general point is
that while value added purports to measure what students learn in school, it’s not very well
suited to what actually happens in school. This is shown both at the level of students in
classrooms and at the level of the measurement instruments – the tests themselves. We now turn
to what happens after a value-added score is generated to see the potential hazards of using this
type of quantitative measure of teacher effectiveness as a tool in the educational workplace.
When New York City released its value added scores in 2012, the confidence intervals reported
by the media – an average of 35 points for math and 54 points for English – showed exactly how
unstable the rankings were be for a single year’s estimates. The largest margins of error (75
points for Math and 87 points for Reading) were found for teachers who were at or near the
middle of the distribution. So while the estimate of a teacher’s relative effectiveness can be
categorized as at, above, or below the average; the confidence interval could span all three
categories (Santos, 2012). The inaccuracy of estimates is due to the small number of students
each teacher works with even over the course of many years; even after five years of teaching in
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a single grade, many teachers will have data for less than a hundred students. Further, as
teachers often move in and out of grades and/or subjects, the amount of useful evaluative data
will further decline.
Once scores are generated, they are typically used to rank teachers against their colleagues. This
use of value added is problematic for the majority of teachers who are ranked because of
problems with accuracy. While the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ teachers often rank consistently, most
teachers, whose scores would place them in the middle of the distribution – for argument’s sake,
within one standard deviation of the mean – are subject to often radical swings in their rankings
(Corcoran, 2010; 2009; Amrein-Beardsley, 2008). In some cases, a fraction of a point’s
difference in average value-added could push a teacher in the top third of the rankings (67 th
percentile) to the bottom third (33rd percentile) because both lie within one standard deviation.
Depending on the district’s or state’s policy, that objectively minor shift could have major
consequences for a teacher’s career (Winerip, 2012).
Beyond the composition, accuracy and propriety of value-added measures are concerns about the
effects of the testing regime which it necessitates. Daniel Koretz (2000) goes into detail to
explain how teachers can and do ‘game’ tests and what impacts this may have on education as a
whole. The most blatant form of gaming is cheating, whereby teachers give students answers or
change answers after the test is over. Widespread cheating in Atlanta, Georgia led one of that
state’s leading newspapers to investigate cheating on a national level; indeed they found
suspicious test score patterns – where improbable increases in one year were followed by drops
in the following year – in school districts across the country (Vogell, Perry, Judd, & Pell, 2012).
The authors of the investigative piece were very direct in noting that data driven accountability
and ever-rising benchmarks mandated by No Child Left Behind figure prominently in the
31

increase of overt cheating on tests. Other specific cases of widespread cheating have been
reported in New York, New Jersey, Philadelphia and Washington DC (Boyette, 2011; Otterman,
2011; Winerip, 2011b; 2011c).
Two more subtle forms of gaming are ‘coaching’ and ‘achievement transfer.’ Coaching in this
context means teaching students tested concepts in the style that they appear on the exams; if
division is tested horizontally – where the terms to be divided are listed left to right – it is
specifically taught that way. 17 Achievement transfer means spending more time on the subjects
or topics that will be tested at the expense of non-tested subjects or, alternatively, focusing
instruction on students who are likely to show larger score gains than on their peers who will not.
While we could see these all happening with any standardized testing program, it would only be
exacerbated if teachers felt that their job security was directly affected by the results of these
exams.
A further problem concerns two types of institutional misattribution. The first is an obvious
problem – many teachers teach subjects (or grades) where there is either no annual assessment or
any at all. But in an accountability system where everyone must be evaluated on the basis of
student test scores, this means that teachers may be evaluated based on score changes that have
nothing to do with the subjects they teach. This was indeed the case in Tennessee, which was
documented in the New York Times (Winerip, 2011). If these evaluations are consequential, as
they are in Tennessee, teachers are liable to be promoted or rewarded, punished or fired, for
score changes that have nothing to do with their own abilities.
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Koretz found that when students who were taught to solve math problems vertically were
subsequently given a test that presented them horizontally, scores dropped.
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The second type misattribution can happen when cheating or other gaming happens. Because the
scores in the prior year serve as the baseline for achievement growth in the following year, a
teacher who games his students’ tests sets an artificially high benchmark for the next year’s
teachers which is unlikely to be met. If the inflation of scores goes unnoticed, the teacher who is
assigned to the previously gamed students will end up looking as if she added little or in fact
detracted from student learning growth (Tuque 2012). It should be noted that this does not
simply mean the prior year’s teacher needs to cheat; focused instruction on tested topics or
matching instruction to test format could create the same artificially high pre-test scores. This
type of misattribution should be cause for alarm given the recent string of cheating on highstakes testing throughout the country.
It was noted above that value-added results in a relative assessment of teacher quality; this seems
at face value to be an improvement over assessments based on ‘objective’ threshold, as these
tend to privilege teachers with students who are closer to this benchmark at the outset. But while
making the index relative to the student’s starting point is an improvement, the ultimate
comparison is between teachers. In practice that means that some teachers will always be below
average, even if what happens in the average classroom is ‘objectively’ good. Take the
hypothetical example of ‘experienced’ teachers: when compared to newer teachers, they tend to
perform better; however, when compared to one another, some if not many experienced teachers
who are generally good may fall below average on this type of assessment. If Value-Added is
used to determine pay increases, bonuses, and discipline, the unintended consequence could be to
chase good teachers from the grades and subjects where their efforts are most valuable.
Hypothetically, you could have quality experienced math teachers opting for Kindergarten
classrooms for fear of assessment.
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Sociological trouble with Value-Added: An Authority Paradox

A final potential pitfall that has not been often mentioned is a paradox of classroom authority.
This returns us to our starting point – work measurement. Stake (1971) mentions this potential in
an article written about performance contracting in education. He makes the plausible argument
that in a situation where teachers’ evaluations are dependent on student test outcomes, students
have an unusual amount of power. If students can achieve a wide variety of scores on
assessments when giving their best efforts, it is certainly possible for them to achieve an even
wider variety of results without such. Simply put and to quote Stake, “bad performances are in
their repertoire.” While this is an unlikely situation, it is a consequence that needs to be
considered, especially as the consequences of these tests on teachers become widely known. To
move to a factory analogy, Burawoy (1979) points out those personnel not subject to piece-rates
were often very consequential for the pace of piece-rate work. Such calculations of efficiency,
piece-rates and value-added, do not take into account this problem of inter-subjectivity; the
output is treated as if it were the sole responsibility of the individual worker. In the case of the
teacher, the very object of their action is itself a self-directed actor, which raises this problem
from an occasional incident to a systemic flaw.
But I want to take the concept of an authority paradox back to the classroom using a largelyforgotten sociological work on teaching from Willard Waller.18 I will conclude by considering
Waller’s notion of classroom authority, its relation to Durkheim’s conception of authority and
education, and the impact of high-stakes testing on this relationship.

I first discovered Waller’s studies of teaching while reading David Labaree’s (2010) work on
school reform movements.
18

34

To this point, we’ve shown that the assumptions of value-added assessment betray many
important classroom realities. Indeed, this mismatch between model assumptions and actual
school and classroom life are at the heart of the American Statistical Association’s and American
Education Research Association’s official objections to this sort of testing-driven assessment
(American Statistical Association, 2014; American Educational Research Association, 2015).
But the effects of VAA on classroom authority and the interaction between students and teachers
are not as well-attended. Willard Waller came to sociology as a former high school teacher, and
closely examined the social and psychological situation of teachers and students in the
classroom.
For Waller, schooling is a distinctive social situation because of its mode of authority. School is
organized around ‘despotic authority,’ in which teachers and school administrators unilaterally
dominate students. But he characterizes that authority as in a state of ‘perilous equilibrium.’
While power in the school is theoretically vested in administration, and practically vested in
teachers, “The control of school affairs…rest[s] upon the consent, mostly silent, of the
governed.” (Waller, 1932/2014, p. 12) Thus, Waller places the ultimate power in schools with
students, “the most tractable but most unstable members of the [school] community.” (p. 10)
Furthermore, parents and the wider community place constraints on teachers’ and administrators’
authority in the classroom, compounding the fragile classroom situation. Thus, one main task
question in his Sociology of Teaching is “How can the teacher control school life at all?” (p. 3)
Waller discusses various factors which shape classroom authority. School imposes an artificial
social situation with pre-determined goals. Students are compelled to attend school and have no
say in its content or conduct. As such, schooling is organized around ‘institutionalized
leadership.’ The teacher holds authority because of her institutional position. This is distinct
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from personal or charismatic leadership, in which leaders emerge from among groups by their
actions. Because of the institutionalized nature of her position, the teacher is obliged to maintain
social distance from her students through a system of formal relations. 19 This formality keeps
the individual personalities of teachers and students from coming into contact. Waller sees the
teachers’ use of personal authority as a disciplinary risk, as it would reduce social distance and
thereby degrade institutional authority – which he regards as far less compelling than personal
authority. Social distance also keeps students from investing too much emotional energy into the
classroom situation.
But why keep students from investing energy in their schooling? To keep the inherent
antagonism of the classroom under control. Beneath the formal classroom relationship lays a
fundamental hostility between the ordered world of adults and the spontaneous desires of
children. Waller explains this hostility through Simmel’s conception of the feud, in which
antagonisms are based on group status rather than personal motives. 20 Teachers are charged with
pushing students into the world of adults, which affronts the world constructed by groups of
children. The despotic arrangement of schools amplifies this enmity by preventing teachers and
students from engaging interpersonally – denying students the sort of personal connection they
desire. Even as they adhere to the formal rules, students express hostility. Although school rules
favor the teacher, students resist by mechanically obeying rules or engaging in disobedience not
covered by the rules. Students thereby hollow out the meaning and intention of the rules. Waller
suggests that this subversion of classroom rules can only be minimized if teachers command

19

Waller is not in favor of this structure of schooling. Institutional leadership tends toward
formalism, where the institution serves its own narrow ends without regard to its intended social
function.
20
Simmel develops this concept in Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations (1922/1955).
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some amount of personal influence over students beyond the institutional power they are
assigned.
This general condition of institutional leadership is troubled by another feature of schooling. A
classroom full of students constitutes a crowd.21 This group setting makes order more unstable,
and obliges the teacher to hold the audience, keeping her relationship with its members
“significant to the exclusion of others.” (p. 160) The classroom crowd can transform into a mob
if sufficiently incited. When this happens, inhibitions are lowered and the fundamental hostility
between students and teacher is more likely to reach the surface as students react to one another
rather than to the teacher. This transformation must be actively suppressed. The teacher seeks to
maintain students’ crowd orientation by avoiding emotional reactions to students, maintaining
seamless classroom routines, and isolating individuals who might incite a mob feeling. Losing
control of a class is one of the most traumatic events in the teacher’s career, and it either
reinforces her commitment to classroom authority or destroys her career altogether.
Thus personal engagement is both necessary and dangerous in the classroom – teachers cannot
afford to breach formality for the sake of discipline, but discipline without personal influence
breeds discontent. Thus successful teachers must “filter personal influence through the sieve of
the institutional relationship.” (p. 190) The successful teacher carefully utilizes formal rules and
sanctions, and only infrequently (in crisis situations) transcends the formal setting to engage in
personality contact with students. These rare instances may take the form of emotional responses
like anger or of frank appeals to individual students.

21

The theory of crowd psychology [e.g., LeBon (1895/1969); Tarde (1898/1969)] had an
important impact on the early development of Sociology.
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Waller’s emphasis on the student-teacher relationship can be traced further back to Emile
Durkheim’s sociology of education. In Moral Education, Durkheim’s most comprehensive
statement on schooling, he defines education as a project of secular morality. He argues that the
family and the church cannot, as they once had, be responsible for transmitting morals befitting
modern society. Durkheim believes that “we must discover the rational substitutes for those
religious notions that for a long time have served as a vehicle for the most essential moral ideas.”
(Durkheim, 1961, p. 9) But as he posits the necessity of rational notions to replace religious ones,
Durkheim is careful not to push this emphasis so far as to eliminate the sacred character of the
educational process.
“If then, in rationalizing education, we do not retain this [sacred] character and make it
clear to the child in a rational manner, we will only transmit to him a morality fallen from
its natural dignity. At the same time, we will risk drying up the source from which the
schoolmaster himself drew a part of his authority and also a part of the warmth necessary
to stir the heart and stimulate the mind.” (p. 13)
For Durkheim, authority is strictly relational, bound up in the interactions among individuals in
such a way that some feel others to be superior. Authority figures are so because they embody
(or are seen to embody) the values of society. As for the authority of the teacher, Durkheim feels
this depends on the teacher ‘s respect for her own role as an educator which radiates out to the
students. This veneration of the role is distinct from a sense of personal superiority, which
Durkheim (like Waller) sees as detrimental to the educational process. 22

22

Durkheim and Waller differ on why personal authority is dangerous. Durkheim sees school
discipline as an educational device in itself. This is based on his contention that education is a
process of moral formation, in which children learn to conduct themselves for the benefit of
society. For this process to be successful, the authority of the teacher has to appear to students as
impersonal, a stand-in for the social orientation that students must internalize. Waller agrees
nominally with the importance of morality for the school teacher, but sees personal authority as
dangerous primarily to the orderly functioning of the classroom.
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“…the dominant part played by the teacher in generating this feeling [of respect for the
rules] – the personal role that he plays – entails a danger we must guard against…lest the
child develop the habit of associating the rule itself too narrowly with the person of the
teacher…” (p. 156)
Thus Waller’s focus on the educator’s need for personal authority is located firmly in the
sociological tradition. Returning to the broader question, the classroom situation is as perilous as
Waller describes; his references to feuds, deep-seeded hostility, crowds and mobs are all
understandable to the experienced teacher. Now consider an invasive teacher evaluation system
which depends upon student performance from the vantage point of the student-teacher
interaction. It would not take long for students to understand their role in these assessments: their
performance on examinations determines whether their teacher is considered effective or not. 23
Teachers could disclose this actively by suggesting that students ‘not try hard’ on pre-tests to
improve growth scores. Even without overt declarations, increased emphasis on test preparation
could further indicate a teacher’s personal stake in narrow student outcomes. For the vindictive
student, this could appear as an opportunity to get back at a teacher for real or perceived slights.
Even among compliant students, the sense of who controls the classroom could be altered. In
short, teacher evaluations so closely tied to students’ outcomes requires much more student
cooperation in the classroom. This impacts more than just the potential for disruptions, as serious
as that can be for teachers and students alike; it undermines the notion of authority that
characterizes the classroom. Under such an evaluation regime, students may not perceive the
teacher as vested with the authority of the institution, as she is as much a subject of external
domination as they are. This leveling of teachers and students – now equal before the eyes of the

23

Rothstein (Rothstein J. , 2011) mentions such hazards of measurement in his review of an
early stage report of the Gates Foundation Measures of Effective Teaching study. “But the MET
study’s inability to examine how teachers, students and administrators respond to the use of
MET measures for high stakes decisions limits what the MET project can tell us about the utility
of the measures for real world use.” (p. 7)
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exam – could further jeopardize the already perilous classroom situation. Whether or not one
agrees with the goals and methods of traditional schooling, it is clear that such invasive
evaluation systems problematizes that system.
But beyond the authority question, there is a further problem which is endemic to such
evaluation which Waller would recognize. Value-Added assessment requires a lot of testing. As
noted above, proponents argue that there should be pre- and post-testing each year in every
subject to accurately capture teacher effects. While he far predates the large expansion of testing
documented in Chapter 3, Waller addressed testing and grading as they relate to classroom
authority and the broader project of education:
“By introducing an element of the artificial and the forced, by placing the emphasis on
upon the false, objective symbol of the subjective reality of learning, it vitiates the
relationship of teacher and taught.” (p. 372)
The relationship between teacher and taught Waller describes is challenging, but it is also vital to
the enterprise of education. Testing harms that relationship by mistaking a representation for the
thing itself. Curiously, this anticipates Donald Campbell’s (1975) law of social indicators by half
a century, but in a much more important way. Over time, excessive evaluation saps students’
desire for education. Waller says that while the primary school student desires the teacher’s
personal influence (which the primary school teacher avoids), by the time students arrive in
college – where teachers seek to exert personal influence on young adults – the students have
become institutionalized and desire the narrow formalism of the grading system (p. 368). This
troubling paradox is only exacerbated as the scope and importance of testing grow. Whereas
teachers in the past may have been able to use testing at their discretion and thus tread delicately
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over this paradox, teachers under a high-stakes testing regime cannot afford to deviate from the
script of preparation and evaluation.24
So far, we’ve considered the theoretical model of value-added against the practical realities of
the schools and classrooms in which it would be applied. By way of early theories in the
sociology of education, we have suggested some short- and long-term negative consequences
such an evaluation regime would have. We now turn to consider empirical Value-Added data in
order to demonstrate some of the problems outlined here. If VA has troubling theoretical
characteristics, and some are already empirical demonstrable, we will then move to consider how
and why it has become a preferred mode of educational evaluation.

24

In chapter 3, we will see that even some of the most ardent standardized testers were careful to
frame their products as something that should be tailored to fit by professional educators.
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Figure 1: Value-Added and the teacher-student-test score chain
Tests are, by definition, indirect and incomplete indicators of students’ knowledge of subject
matter. They do not represent the quality or quantity of education received in the schooling
process, and certainly do not measure anything about that process or the individual responsible
for it. Value-Added makes inferences based on a third-order abstraction, bypassing the
complexities that bring us from classroom to test score.
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Chapter 3: Value-Added by the Numbers: A Quantitative Presentation Using NYC
Teacher Evaluation Data
Having discussed the problems with VAA in theory, I move to demonstrating some of the major
empirical problems with Value Added assessment of individual teachers using existing data, as
well as adding some potential problems not considered by others.
There are three issues demonstrated below. First, the concept of temporal instability noted by
Darling-Hammond et al. (2012) and Sean Corcoran (Corcoran, 2010), among others – that
teacher Value-Added rankings vary over time well beyond what one would expect of a reliable
rating system.25 Secondly, making use of teachers who had two records or more in a given year, I
show that value-added is not only unstable temporally, but also that it is highly variable for an
individual who teaches more than one class in a given year. Finally, I demonstrate the problem
of “persistent school effects;” despite the fact that New York City value-added measures control
statistically for school level variables in the estimation of teacher value-added, I find that school
characteristics are still highly predictive of a teacher’s value-added ranking.26 The cumulative
evidence here suggests that teacher ranking according to value-added scores is both imprecise in
assuming that abilities are relatively stable and improper given that characteristics of schools are
beyond teachers’ capacity to change. This is problematic given that proponents of VA suggest
that among existing evaluation methods, VA is unique in holding teachers accountable only for
things they can control (Harris D. N., Value-Added Measures in Education: What Every
Educator Needs to Know, 2011).

25
26

Also see Goldstein (1997) and McCaffrey et al. (2008).
The problem of school-level sorting is also noted by Rothstein (2009; 2008).
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Data Source: NYC Value-Added FOIL Data

Under Mayor Michael Bloomberg and schools Chancellor Joel Klein, New York City launched a
pilot program in the use of value-added assessment for teacher evaluation. The program was
conducted by the Value-Added Research Center at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and
cost an estimated $3.6 million (Otterman, 2010). New York State has since contracted the
American Institutes of Research Value-Added division to construct its teacher evaluation system.
The data come from a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request made by The New York
Times and a dozen other New York City media outlets to the NYC Department of Education in
September of 2010 (Santos, 2012). The United Federation of Teachers (UFT) sued to keep the
named teacher rankings private, and the subsequent litigation delayed the release until February
of 2012. In September of 2011, New York City announced that it would no longer personally
oversee the creation of teacher data reports which included these value-added rankings; that
function has now passed to the state level (Phillips A. , 2012).
The data were made available for download by television station New York 1, which was party
to the FOIL request to the Department of Education.27 There were three data files (and three
supplemental files) corresponding to three years 2009-10, 2008-09, and 2007-08. Each of those
files contains Value Added measures and rankings based on three or four years of data (called
multi-year) a measure and ranking based on individual year data (called single-year). The first
file also contains single-year estimates for 2005-06 and 2006-07. Thus, I have five single-year
and three multi-year data points. Math and English Language Arts value-added scores are

27

The data are available for download at http://www.ny1.com/content/news/156599/nowavailable--2007-2010-nyc-teacher-performance-data
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calculated for NYC teachers of grades 4 through 8; each grade/subject combination generates its
own score, so most teachers in fact receive more than one score per year. Any data point based
on fewer than 10 students’ scores is omitted from publicly-available data because of the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974.
The table below presents the number of cases available for each data point across the two tested
subjects. Each of the analyses presented below will make use of different combinations of data
points. The first three single-year estimates come from a single file provided in the FOIL request,
and are thus used for the analyses of temporal stability and of persisting school effects.28 The
analysis of intra-teacher stability makes use of the three multi-year data points in both subjects.
Table 1: Number of Records for Data Points in the FOIL data file
Data Point
2005-06 single year
2006-07 single year
2007-08 single year
2008-09 single year
2009-10 single year
2005-07 multi-year
2006-08 multi-year
2007-09 multi-year

N of Cases
6,488
9,022
16,707
16,044
15,630
16,707
10,779
11,289

The FOIL data were merged with school-level characteristics drawn from parallel years of the
New York City School Progress Reports; both data files used the same unique identifier for
schools. These reports contained variables including school enrollment size and attendance rate,
the percentage of Title I students (a proxy measure of economic disadvantage), the percentage of
students who were black or Hispanic, and an environment score which incorporates student,

28

New York 1 did not provide unique teacher identification variables, which made it difficult to
merge the three separate FOIL data files.
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staff, and parent perceptions of school safety and atmosphere.29 Below, I show the number and
proportion of cases in each subject/year of the FOIL data that were successfully merged with
Progress Report data.
Table 2: Merge Results for FOIL and NYC School Progress Report data
VA Data Year/Subject
2006 ELA
2006 MATH
2007 ELA
2007 MATH
2008 ELA
2008 MATH

N of Cases
8,779
8,660
8,547
9,404
8,580
9,409

% matched (N matched)
98% (8,650)
98% (8,526)
99% (8,474)
99% (9,333)
99% (8,498)
99% (9,332)

To demonstrate the temporal instability of value-added rankings, I use two techniques. First, I
calculate changes in rankings between single-year estimates and produce histograms of absolute
changes. This is used to discern the extent to which teachers’ rankings bounce over time. Second,
I use regression models to investigate what variables are related to the bouncing of teacher
rankings.
To show the persistence of school effects in determining teacher value-added, I first utilize
Analysis of Variance to show that there is a significant amount variance in value-added rankings
between schools. Then, using a statistical tool known as a sheaf coefficient, I demonstrate that
school characteristics when taken together are a powerful predictor of changes in teacher valueadded. This is a significant finding given that the rankings themselves are supposed to control for
school characteristics.

29

Documentation on the NYC school progress reports can be accessed at:
http://schools.nyc.gov/Accountability/tools/report/default.htm#Methods
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Finally, I look at within-teacher, within-subject variability at a single point in time. To do so, I
first plot a teacher’s two rankings and report correlation coefficients. Then, I use kappa, a
measure of inter-coder agreement to assess whether value-added rankings are any more reliable
at evaluating teachers than random chance.
Findings
VA “Bouncing:” Temporal Stability of Value-Added Rankings

The performance categories used here are the same defined by the methodology report produced
by the Value Added Research Center (VARC) which was contracted by the New York City
Department of Education to collect and analyze these data. ‘Low’ corresponds to rankings below
the 5th percentile; ‘Below Average’ to rankings between the 5 th and 24th percentile; ‘Average’ to
rankings between the 25th and 74th percentile; ‘Above Average’ to rankings between the 75 th and
94th percentile; and high refers to rankings at the 95th percentile and above.30
Tables 3 through 8 below show teachers’ movement among performance categories between
three single-year data points. I refer to this phenomenon as “bouncing.” For simplicity, only
teachers with all three years of data were included in these tabulations.

30

In many policy-oriented papers on VA, the top and bottom five percentiles are singled out as
“highly effective” or “grossly ineffective.” The latter category is the focus of many arguments
for teacher dismissal policies, while the former is often discussed in terms of merit pay bonuses
(Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 2011a; Hanushek E. , 2009).
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Table 3: Ranking movement between year 1 and year 2 – All Math Instructors (N=2,985)
Low
05-06 category
Low
Below Average
Average
Above Average
High

0
0.7
0.4
0.3
0

Below
Average
42.9
28.8
11.2
5.2
2.0

06-07 category (%)
Average
Above
Average
57.1
0
67.9
1.9
76.0
11.3
56.4
31.5
46.0
38.0

High
0
0.7
1.0
6.7
14.0

Totals
(N)
7
271
2,251
406
50

The first observation from table 3 is that the majority of teachers do not move out of the
‘average’ performance category between any two years. Indeed, this is the case across all six of
these tables. The width of the ‘Average’ category (50 percentile points) makes this unsurprising.
What we observe is that even if a teacher was classified in the ‘High’ or ‘Low’ categories in the
first year, she is very likely to be classified as Average in the following year.
Table 4: Ranking Movement between year 2 and year 3 – All Math Instructors (N=2,985)
Low
06-07category
Low
Below Average
Average
Above Average
High

0
2.0
0.4
0.5
0.0

Below
Average
30.8
30.6
12.0
3.4
5.1

07-08 Category(%)
Average
Above
Average
69.2
0
62.6
3.9
74.9
12.1
58.2
31.5
37.3
33.9

High
0
0.8
0.7
6.4
23.7

Totals
(N)
13
356
2,150
407
59

The same pattern is found in table 4. No math teacher who was ranked ‘Low’ in the 2006-07
school year was found in the same category in the following year. The majority of ‘Below
Average’ and ‘Above Average’ teachers in 2006 drifted into the middle category in 2007.
Teachers ranked in the ‘High’ category were unlikely to fall below average ranking, but over a
third fell into the ‘average’ category.
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Table 5: Ranking Movement between year 1 and year 3 – All Math Instructors (N=2,985)
Low
05-06 category
Low
Below Average
Average
Above Average
High

0
1.9
0.5
0
0

Below
Average
42.9
26.6
12.9
5.4
0

07-08 Category (%)
Average
Above
Average
42.9
14.3
66.4
5.2
73.7
11.9
57.9
30.5
50.0
30.0

High
0
0
1.1
6.2
20.0

Totals
(N)
7
271
2,251
406
50

Examining movement among math teachers over a two-year period from 2005-06 to 2007-08
(Table 5), we again see the same general trends. Most math teachers are ranked ‘Average’ at one
or the other time point, and even those ranked ‘High’ or ‘Low’ more often than not return to the
broad middle.
Table 6: Ranking movement between year 1 and year 2 – All ELA (N=2,795)
Low
05-06 Category
Low
Below Average
Average
Above Average
High

0
0.4
0.1
0.3
0

Below
Average
7.7
11.6
6.6
6.0
0

06-07 Category
Average
Above
Average
61.5
30.8
80
7.5
87.1
5.8
82.9
10.7
72.0
20.0

High

Totals

0
0.4
0.5
0
8.0

13
225
2,324
298
25

With English Language Arts (ELA), the drift to the middle is again the dominant trend, though
we see a bit more extreme movement for those ranked in the top categories. In table six, we see
that eight percent of ‘Below Average’ teachers in 2005 moved into the top two categories in the
following year; likewise, about six percent of those ranked ‘above average’ moved to the bottom
two categories in 2006.
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Table 7: Ranking Movement between year 2 and year 3 – All ELA (N=2,795)
Low
06-07 Category
Low
Below Average
Average
Above Average
High

0
0
0.7
1.6
0

Below
Average
0
17.7
9.5
8.0
7.1

07-08 Category
Average
Above
Average
100
0
74.0
8.3
77.3
11.6
64.2
23.0
35.7
28.6

High

Totals

0
0
0.9
3.2
28.6

3
192
2,399
187
14

The same pattern is observed between 2006-07 and 2007-08, shown in table 7. The great
majority of teachers were ranked in the ‘Average’ category in at least one of the two years. A
small but not inconsiderable proportion of teachers ranked ‘Above Average’ or ‘Below Average’
moved to the opposite side of the distribution. When we examine movement among ELA
teachers over the two-year period between 2005 and 2007 (Table 8), we see the same patterns as
before.
Table 8: Ranking Movement between year 1 and year 3 – All ELA (N=2,795)
Low
05-06 Category
Low
Below Average
Average
Above Average
High

7.7
0.4
0.7
0.7
0.0

Below
Average
0
13.3
10.5
4.4
4.0

07-08 Category
Average
Above
Average
69.2
15.4
77.3
8.0
77.4
10.8
67.8
23.8
40.0
40.0

High

Totals

7.7
0.9
0.6
3.4
16.0

13
225
2,324
298
25

To provide a more nuanced picture of year-to year movement, I plot the absolute change in
teacher rankings between years. This allows us to see changes not just between categories, but
the magnitude of the swings in ranking from year to year. The first set of graphs refers to
changes between 2005-2006 and 2006-2007.
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Figure 2: Absolute ranking change between Year 1 and Year 2
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Across all four frequency charts in Figure 2, we see that a large proportion of teachers had
modest ranking changes of 10 percentage points or less. But a fair proportion had high absolute
changes that were 30 points or more. Many of these changes would not often have had
consequences for teachers had the rankings been used for evaluation purposes. But from the
perspective of a measurement system, these often dramatic ranking changes suggest that there is
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not a stable characteristic underlying these assessments.31 If there were, we would expect a much
steeper decline from left to right in the chart, with very few teachers experiencing high absolute
changes in ranking.
Figure 3: Absolute ranking change between Year 2 and Year 3
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Figure 3 presents the same array of four histograms, but for changes between 2006 and 2007.
Particularly in Middle School ELA and Mathematics, if we set 20 percentage points as a
threshold, nearly equal proportions of the data are on either side. The very shallow slope of the
31

From a working conditions perspective, the stability of a ranking system can also impact
teacher morale. If teachers perceive assessments as having little direct relationship to the work
they do, it can lead to feelings of hopelessness. Rothstein (2012) notes this in his simulation
study of teacher quality policy.
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bottom two panels suggests that the reports of wide confidence intervals in a single teacher’s data
report bear out in subsequent years.
Figure 4: Absolute ranking change between Year 1 and Year 3
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Figure 4 again presents the same frequency histograms, but for changes over a 2-year period
between 2005 and 2007. Here again we see very shallow slopes in most of the histograms which
suggest the prevalence of very drastic absolute changes in individual teachers’ rankings in this
two-year period.
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Value-Added “Swaying:” Within-Teacher Variation in VA Rankings
The previous demonstrations focused on year-to-year changes in teacher rankings – bouncing –
and showed them in some cases to be quite dramatic, even if very few would have had
consequences for teachers in terms of either merit pay or dismissal in a ‘live’ assessment system.
Now we turn to a different sort of variation in rankings – within teacher variation – which I call
“swaying.” This analysis takes teachers who received more than one ranking in a single year, in a
single subject at the same school. Most of these therefore come from middle school teachers who
taught multiple grades in the same year. For simplification purposes, I took only teachers who
received exactly two value-added rankings and excluded those who received three or more. The
purpose of the following two sets of analysis is to demonstrate that even within one year, a
teacher’s value-added ranking is highly unstable. Here, instead of using one-year data points, we
use the three-year data points which are recommended for use in teacher evaluation by VARC. 32

32

Q: Which teachers received Teacher Data Reports?
A: Reports were generated for approximately 18,000 English language arts and math teachers
who taught 4th-8th grade students in 2007-08, 2008-09, and 2009-10. Teachers did not receive
these reports if they did not teach a subject that culminated in a state math or English exam,
taught for less than the full year, or did not teach a minimum number of students required to
receive a report. Teacher Data Reports were calculated for each grade and subject individually.
One teacher may therefore have multiple reports (e.g., a teacher who teaches 4th grade math and
English).
Accessed from:
http://schools.nyc.gov/Teachers/TeacherDevelopment/TeacherDataToolkit/FAQ/default.htm
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Figure 5: Scatterplot of ELA teachers’ rankings in one year in two separate classrooms 33
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Figure 5 presents a scatterplot showing a teacher’s pair of rankings in a single year. Given the
same time and same subject, we would expect to see at least some correlation in their ranking –
but the correlation coefficient, Pearson’s r, is a non-significant .08. This means that there is very
weak non-significant relationship between how a teacher is ranked based on her ‘performance’ in
one classroom and her performance in another classroom in the exact same time period. We see
data points in both the bottom right and top left corners, representing teachers who were among
the ‘best’ based on their performance in one grade level and among the ‘worst’ based on their
performance in another. This is hard to believe given that it is the same teacher at the same point
in time.

33

Pearson’s r statistic = .0796, p=.1595
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Figure 6: Scatterplot of Math teachers’ rankings in one year in two separate classrooms
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The data for dual-grade math instructors paints a similar picture. Notably, there is a statistically
significant Pearson’s r of .350 (p<.001); but this figure represents a weak correlation between the
two variables. The diagram again shows a wide distribution, including values in the top-left and
bottom-right corners where correlated data should not appear. This suggests that the relationship
between a teacher’s performance rankings in one grade and her performance rank in another
grade in the same year at the same school are at best weakly correlated.

As another way of examining teachers with multiple value-added rankings in a single year, we
can use a statistic of inter-observer agreement. In medical research, these sorts of measures are
used to determine the extent to which two observers agree on the interpretation of various patient
records; but they can theoretically be used “in any situation in which two or more independent
observers are evaluating the same thing” (Viera & Garrett, 2005). The statistic that measures the
rate of agreement is called kappa.
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Table 9: ELA teachers’ within-subject, within-year rankings with kappa statistic
Classroom 1
/Classroom 2
Low
Below Average
Average
Above Average
High

Low
0
0
0
0
1

Below
Average
0
9
37
4
0

Average
3
38
146
29
6

Above
Average
0
8
27
3
0

High

Total

0
1
5
3
1

3
49
215
39
8

Table 9 shows that 159/314 cases (51 percent) agree across classrooms. We would expect 160
cases to agree by chance alone. This generates a kappa value of -.0065 (p=.56). Thus if we take
two rankings of the same teacher in the same year in English, the value-added rankings correlate
no better than if they had been assigned by chance.

Table 10: Math teachers’ within-subject, within-year rankings with kappa statistic
Classroom 1
/Classroom 2
Low
Below Average
Average
Above Average
High

Low
1
2
5
2
1

Below
Average
4
19
49
4
0

Average
4
35
101
29
7

Above
Average
0
5
32
16
8

High

Total

0
3
13
6
0

9
64
200
57
16

Table 10 shows that 137/346 cases (40%) agree across classrooms. We would expect 127 cases
to agree by chance alone. This generates a kappa value of .0450 (p=.09). Thus if we take two
rankings of the same teacher in the same year in mathematics, the value-added scores correlate
no better than if they had been assigned by chance.

Schools Matter – The Persistence of School-level variables in VA rankings

The third set of findings concerns the charge that school characteristics continue to affect valueadded scores even though the scores themselves are meant to account for school-level variables
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in the models. We begin with ANOVA tests to get baseline estimates of whether or not there is
significant variation in value added ranking changes between schools.

Table 11: ANOVA tests on change in value added ranking between 2005 and 2006 with school
as the grouping variable
Elementary Math
Elementary ELA
Middle School Math
Middle School ELA

R2
.419
.474
.359
.391

SST
1070027.8
997759.1
483900.2
625158.7

SSB
448096.2
463056.8
173552.9
244639.6

SSW
621931.6
514702.2
310347.3
380519.1

F
1.63
1.90
1.52
1.79

Sig.
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001

N
1,999
1,883
986
912

Tables 11 through 13 report the results of a series of ANOVA tests. The groups are individual
schools and so the hypothesis tested is: do changes in value added ranking vary by school? For
table 11, in each subject and school level, we have a statistically significant F-value of between
1.5 and 1.9. We can interpret this as suggesting that changes in value added ranking between the
2005 and 2006 school years did indeed vary by school. In all cases the Sum of Squares Within
(SSW) was greater than the Sum of Squares Between (SSB), which suggests that there was more
variation in value-added ranking changes within an individual school than between schools.

Table 12: ANOVA tests on change in value added ranking between 2006 and 2007 with school
as the grouping variable
Elementary Math
Elementary ELA
Middle School Math
Middle School ELA

R2
.409
.427
.359
.368

SST
1033390.7
1018344.2
572425.5
602509.5

SSB
422667.4
434627.3
205717.1
221398.7

SSW
610723.3
583717.2
366708.5
381110.8

F
1.57
1.58
1.52
1.62

Sig.
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001

N
1,999
1,883
986
912

Table 12 again shows all statistically significant F statistics, which suggest that changes in value
added ranking between the 2006 and 2007 school years did indeed vary significantly between
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schools. Again SSW values were greater than SSB values, which suggest that there was more
variation in value-added ranking changes within individual schools.

Table 13: ANOVA tests on absolute change in value added ranking between 2005 and 2007 with
school as the grouping variable
Elementary Math
Elementary ELA
Middle School Math
Middle School ELA

R2
.415
.4299
.389
.3701

SST
1096626.8
1045034.1
583267.03
704391.42

SSB
455066.9
595762.3
227036.5
260718.3

SSW
641559.9
449271.8
356230.5
443673.2

F
1.61
1.60
1.73
1.63

Sig.
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001

N
1,999
1,883
986
912

The results in table 12 are consistent with the prior two tables. All of the F statistics are
statistically significant. In one case – middle school mathematics – there was more variation in
value added ranking changes between schools than within them (SSB>SSW). The larger point of
the three preceding tables is that there is significant variation in the changes in teachers’ valueadded rankings between the schools in which they work. This suggests that there may be sorting
of teachers into schools, not that schools themselves have an impact on how teachers are rated. 34
Alternatively, it implies that schools (as the larger unit within which classrooms are contained)
independently affect student performance, and therefore VA scores. We now move to see
whether or not there are school characteristics which significantly impact teacher rankings above
and beyond their own “abilities.”
Table 14 below presents the results of OLS regression models predicting teachers’ 2007 school
year value-added rankings at different grade levels and in different subjects. Only two covariates
are included in the models. The first is the teacher’s value added ranking from the 2005 school

34

Indeed Hanushek, Rivkin and Kain (2005) note that non-random assignment of teachers to
schools is one of the key problems with estimating value-added.
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year. The second is a “sheaf coefficient35” composed of a group of school characteristics – the
percentages of Black and Hispanic students in the school, the percentage of students eligible for
Title I funding, the percentage of students classified as Special Education students, and a
composite school environment score.
Table 14: Predicting 2007 teacher VA rank using 2005 teacher VA rank and a school-level
variables Sheaf coefficient, OLS Regression
Elementary Math
VA_2005
School Sheaf
Model R2
N

.362 (.37)
.999 (.09)
.148
1,988

Middle School
Math
.477 (.39)
1.00 (.12)
.172
965

Elementary ELA
.240 (.22)
1.00 (.14)
.070
1,872

Middle School
ELA
.151 (.14)
.999 (.18)
.054
898

Note: Beta weights in parentheses. All coefficients are statistically significant at p<.05 or higher.

The results presented in the table are consistent across grade levels and subjects. A teacher’s
ranking in 2005 is a statistically significant predictor of her ranking in 2007, which would be
expected. But the sheaf coefficient of school characteristics is also significant in all four
regression models; this suggests that these school characteristics do have significant impacts on
teachers’ rankings. This is an important observation, especially given that, at least in New York
City, the VA model is supposed to remove school level influences, including all those listed
above (New York City Department of Education, 2011). Further, if we examine the beta weights
connected to each coefficient we see that the relative importance of the sheaf coefficient is not
inconsiderable in any case, and in one case – middle school English Language Arts – the school
characteristics have more relative weight than does the teacher’s prior ranking.

Heise’s sheaf coefficient is a standardized multiple partial regression coefficient which treats
two or more variables as if they were one, allowing researchers to summarize the effects of
multiple indicators (Whitt, 1986).
35
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This chapter attempted to demonstrate some of the empirical limitations of value-added models
in identifying effective and ineffective teachers. We find that there is a significant instability in
VA rankings using actual data from the NYC public school systems pilot of VA assessment.
Specifically, VA rankings tend to “bounce” over time, suggesting that these measures are
impacted both by variation in student and teacher performance from year to year. Given that
standardized tests are imprecise measures of student learning, this should be expected.36 We
further find that even within a single year, VA rankings can vary for a single teacher who teaches
in two classrooms. This horizontal swaying suggests that VA is not capturing a stable trait of
teaching, but rather heavily influenced by the mix of students in the classroom. Finally, we find
that teacher VA rankings are persistently affected by school characteristics like race and
socioeconomic composition and indicators of school environmental conditions. This finding calls
into question the idea that VA holds teachers accountable only for factors they can control, a
fundamental tenet of VA proponents.

Taken together with the previous chapter, which analyzed the theoretical assumptions of valueadded alongside well-known practical realities of schooling, it is perhaps surprising to see that
value-added and related types of assessment are being pushed as a cornerstone of education
reform. This enthusiasm pervades through federal, state and local governments as well as private
grant-giving foundations and many education advocacy groups. But logical consideration of
evidence is not the only, or even the primary, engine of change. So we now turn to the history of
education policy and assessment technology to understand the politics of reform over more than

Papay’s (2011) study of different VA using different test instruments, and the Gates’
Foundations Measures of Effective Teaching Project (Kane & Cantrell, 2010) both show that
even in a single year, different assessments can generate different results.
36

61

a century of public schooling. We then proceed to trace the development of value-added
assessment from its genesis in the 1970s through its ascendance in policy circles by the
beginning of the 21st century.
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Chapter 4: Value Added in Context: A Technological History of Educational
Politics, or a Political History of Educational Technology
It’s perhaps unsurprising to conceive of the history of educational evaluation as bound up with
“moral panics” over the state of schooling.37 From its outset, mass schooling in the United States
has been described by some as grounded in the anxieties of the upper classes over the integration
of working class and immigrant populations (Schultz, 1974). In the beginning of the 19th century
in Massachusetts, high schools were proposed among a menu of options for the containment of
restive youth which also included day-prisons (Katz M. B., 2001). These concerns were
underlain by the prerogative of many industrialists that the working population of the future
needed to be adequately disciplined for the new factory system of production (Nasaw, 1979).
But from the start, panics over schooling seem to be complemented by contemporary
technologies of assessment and their inherent logics. The sources of anxiety about schooling are
generally constant – problems of equity and quality are the regular themes. But in another way,
the cart drags the horse as techniques create the content anew in successive eras. What the
precise object of an educational moral panic will be depends on what and who new techniques
are used to assess.
I propose here that educational reform movements, beginning with attempts at test-based
accountability in the mid-19th century, through the “cult of efficiency” in the early 20 th century
and other movements of so-called administrative progressives, draw on technological

Stanley Cohen (2002, p. 1) defines a moral panic as when “A condition, episode, person, or
group of persons comes to be defined as a threat to societal values or interests…presented in a
stylized or stereotypical fashion by the mass media…”
37
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innovations of the day for their legitimacy and capitalize on panics over perceived national
decline. Furthermore, with the development of assessment techniques, the object of focus for
reform efforts shifts. What Stanley Cohen (2003) calls the ‘folk devil’ – is influenced both by
ideological narratives of the time and by the available scientific/technological state of the art.
1830-1850: Horace Mann, Samuel Gridley Howe, and the ‘Testing Wars’ of the mid-19th century

Perhaps the first instance of a technologically-informed panic over schooling involves the first
comprehensive public school system in the United States. In 1845, the Boston Schools
Committee, led by Samuel G. Howe and influenced heavily by Massachusetts school
superintendent and fellow Whig reformer Horace Mann, administered the first system-wide
assessment tests to students of the city’s public schools. These exams, and the report generated
from them, had a profound effect on both the structure of schooling and the trajectory of testing
in American education (Reese, 2013).
Before the creation of the public primary school system in 1789 38, and for much of that system’s
early history, Boston’s schools were locally funded and evaluated, usually through a system of
‘exhibitions,’ in which selected students would perform recitations of school material in public.
A sort of talent show, students who gave the best performances won awards and honors. The
purpose of these exhibitions was to garner financial support for the schools, particularly those

The city of Boston had five “free schools,” one for each of the city’s five main sections, since
the early 18th century. Those schools were regarded as among the best in the country, and their
consistent funding by the communities reflected a widely shared belief in the need for schooling
among the population. The Revolutionary war interrupted the continuity of the Boston free
school system, as it did schools across the American territories. Massachusetts was the first state
to pass a comprehensive schooling bill in 1789, and the city of Boston followed suit in the same
year (Schultz, 1974, pp. 11-15).
38
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which served poorer students and therefore relied on charity39. Critics of the exhibition system
suggested that it encouraged rote memorization and “spouting” instead of substantive learning,
and that its competitive nature was morally suspect (Reese, 2013, pp. 21-23).
More importantly, some critics wondered whether the system promoted a false impression of
school quality; after the formation of the public system, most Boston residents felt their schools
were superior to those of other states and that their schools were generally improving each year.
Boston’s grammar schools – at the time led by educator-administrators known as schoolmasters
– operated autonomously under the traditional one-room schoolhouse model. Both Howe and
Mann, borrowing from the school reform trends they saw first-hand in Europe, which Mann
published to great fanfare and heavy criticism in his Seventh Report, sought substantive reforms
to the traditional operation of schools. Among these were the curtailment of corporal
punishment; the introduction of an age-graded system with a standardized curriculum that did
not favor any religious denomination or political party. Most importantly, reformers called for
the centralization and professionalization of school leadership and evaluation. Each of these was
at odds with the interests of the schoolmasters, who until then had relatively unchallenged reign
over their institutions. But the masters had managed to avoid any major changes to the schooling
system despite annual evaluations by state-appointed visiting committees (Schultz, 1974).
But the push for reform was abetted by two emerging trends in Europe espoused by both Horace
Mann and Samuel Howe: phrenology and the nascent science of statistics. Phrenology, now
discredited as a pseudoscience with racist overtones, was at the peak of its popularity in the mid-

39

Nasaw (1979) points out that the public school system in Boston, unlike those in Philadelphia
and New York, served children from relatively diverse social backgrounds. Public schools
required most families to pay tuition or ‘rates’ as they were then called, but poor families could
apply for rate exemptions.
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19th century40 and was seen by some as having socially progressive potential, specifically for
education and corrections.41 Perhaps the most appealing feature of the Phrenology movement
was its emphasis on empirical investigation and objective verification of mental traits, which
until then had been left to the relatively subjective techniques of philosophy (Parssinen, 1974).
This served as an important mark of rigor for the scientific community, but took on a quasireligious fervor when Phrenology was presented to the larger society (pp. 8-9).
Howe’s Reading Committee tests and the resulting report were more directly influenced by early
statistical analysis, which was also imported from Europe. The Manchester and London
Statistical Societies were founded in 1833 and 1834 respectively, and some have directly
suggested that they were founded to distance the collection of statistics from politics and
establish it as a disinterested science (Cullen, 1975). Both Howe and Horace Mann were
founding members of the Boston Statistical Society, the first in the United States, in 1839. Their
fascination with statistics and belief that they provided objective facts about not only school
performance, but social and political life more generally, served as the catalyst for using paper-

40

By 1823, England had twenty-four phrenological societies (Parssinen, 1974). By the time the
chief spokesperson of Phrenology’s social applications, George Combe, came to lecture in the
US in 1938, there were phrenological societies throughout the United States (Schwartz, 1952). It
is also of considerable importance that Howe was one of Combe’s closest acquaintances and his
greatest promoter in the US.
41
Popular education and expanded penal institutions were intertwined questions in 19 th century
Massachusetts. Both were seen as potential solutions to the problem of a rapidly growing
working class population. Before becoming fully immersed in school reform, Horace Mann
devoted a great deal of time to the cause of prison reform (Nasaw, 1979). Michael B. Katz
(2001) points out that “Educational reform was one aspect of a widespread effort of government,
both local and state, and private philanthropy to create a network of institutions capable of
restraining the effects of the onset of large-scale manufacturing and increasing urbanism (p.
164).” Among these institutions were reform schools which more closely resembled prisons or
forced labor camps, including the Boston Asylum for Indigent Boys which was modeled after the
Mettray Penal colony in France. In Discipline and Punish (1977), Michel Foucault places the
birth of the modern prison system with the opening of Mettray.
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based examinations which would be assigned numerical grades which could be aggregated,
averaged and illustrated in charts and tables (Reese, 2013, pp. 56-57).
The 1845 Boston Schools Committee, which first convened in January after a bitterly contested
election, was divided between committee members aligned with the schoolmasters and those
aligned with Mann, Howe and other early administrative progressives. 42 When the committee
first met, the members were mainly divided over the overuse of corporal punishment and the
quality of schools serving African American children – the latter issue was important to many
progressives, who were also abolitionists. Of course, these particular concerns came in the
context larger discord over the competence of the school masters and the efficiency of the system
in general, especially given the acrimony surrounding Mann’s Seventh Report (Schultz, 1974).
Testing and school comparison statistics were not on the agenda for the first half of the year, but
would become a central point of contention thereafter.
The exams were administered in the last week of June, 1845. They were designed in private,
away from the publicized debates over corporal punishment and school segregation; as such, the
exam format and questions took the school masters by surprise. An indication of the examiners

42

I borrow this term from David Labaree (2010) and David Tyack (1974), who use it to refer to
one of two strands of the educational reform movement in the early 20 th century. Educational
progressivism, part of the larger progressive era, had two competing factions which espoused
different solutions to the problem of inadequate public schools. One was the child-centered
progressives, followers of John Dewey’s education philosophy who generally believed that
education needed to be improved at the level of pedagogy by shifting away from rote instruction
and toward what is now referred to as a constructivist approach. Administrative progressives,
best represented by Edward L. Thorndike, believed the solution was to standardize the
educational system and to differentiate instruction according to students’ proficiency. The history
of schooling in the US suggests that the latter strand of progressivism was more successful and
continues to carry the day. I use the term deliberately in reference to Mann and his adherents
because I believe their influence created the strategic mold which Thorndike and others
successfully deployed nearly a century later.
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derogatory purposes, vocabulary questions asked students to define obscure words such as
‘thanatopsis’; others asked trivial and ambiguous questions on geography. The exam’s primary
authors were Howe on the Reading committee, and William Brigham, a fellow member of the
Statistical Society, on the writing committee. Both men were committed to using the tests as
evidence to push forward their favored organizational reforms in the schools. Since the tests
were administered to all students in the first class of each school, and given the new format –
written essays – and unannounced content, performance was predictably poor at many schools.
But the effect of the examinations was amplified when the committee published comparative
test-score data in tabular form in the committee report. Behind the scenes, Mann also “primed
the public” for an attack on the school masters by having articles published and letters written in
the newspapers which began to make a case for the necessity of favored school reforms (Reese,
2013, pp. 69-96).
The report of the reading committee was completed in early August of 1845, primarily by Howe,
but with assistance from Mann, who was more proficient with mathematics and statistics43. It
painted a picture of schools which were not nearly as good as residents believed and of
significant variation among the schools44. Students across schools were classified as lacking
knowledge in most subjects, a fact which the report linked both to prevailing instructional
practices and to individual school masters. Inevitably, since the schools were ranked based on
student grades, some schools were found to be at the bottom of the pack. The reading

In comparison to Howe’s 50-page report, Brigham wrote a much shorter 17-page report for the
writing committee.
44
The only comparison with another town successfully completed by the Committee was an
examination of an all-girls school in Roxbury, MA. The school scored higher on average than
any of the Boston schools, but also had the second highest average age, second to another allgirls school within Boston (Reese, 2013, p. 138). Against the objections of some committee
members, this comparison was heavily leveraged in the final report.
43

68

committee’s findings, including numerous statistical tables, were first presented as a working
draft to the full committee on August 7th; the draft, which contained many mathematical errors,
was only distributed to the entire committee three weeks later. Beyond the novelty of these data,
however, the reports criticisms and recommendations were congruent with the basic demands of
the reformers. Some of the results immediately reached the press along with the proceedings of
the meetings, but the schoolmasters’ faction on the committee staunchly opposed printing and
distribution of the full report beyond internal copies for committee members. The faction aligned
with Howe recommended wide dissemination of the report, enough copies for every Boston
family.
On September 11th, the committee voted to print and distribute 10,000 copies of the report, the
first publication of its kind on issues of education. Because of its wide circulation, and because
statistics and quantitative reasoning were a hot topic in the mid-19th century, the report received
a great deal of attention in the press (Reese, 2013; Schultz, 1974). Based on the general
presumption that the test score data provided factual evidence on the state of the city’s schools,
reformers used the opening created to attack all aspects of the schools, not least of all the school
masters. Their opponents criticized both the tests themselves and the conditions of their
administration. But the reformers achieved substantial success in their crusade, in large part due
to the implications of the 1845 summer exams; by 1851 Boston’s schools were headed by a
superintendent, the dual-headed system was ended, and written exams became the standard of
evaluation displacing the exhibition system. Given the city’s pioneering nature and Mann’s high
regard nationally, many of the reforms pioneered in Boston were adapted across the country.
Dubious or not, this early use of an ascendant technology affected substantial change in early
public school governance and practice.
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1900-1920: Taylorism, Classroom Management, and the ‘Cult of Efficiency’

Decades later at the turn of the 20th century, evaluation technology would again play a major role
in a frenzied period of education reform. The reformers would again come from the ranks of the
social elite and from outside of educational quarters, but both the nature of the school system and
thus the favored reforms changed substantially. In the era of the Boston controversy, migration
and urban expansion were only beginning to create the need for mass schooling. But between
1870 and 1900, owing both to further population growth45 and to changes in laws regarding
school attendance46, the number of pupils in public schools more than doubled from fewer than 7
million to about 15.5 million; school expenditures had likewise increased from $63 to $215
million dollars. Particular progress had been made in terms of the enrollment of black children in
schools: whereas less than 10 percent were enrolled in 1870, over 40 percent were in 1900; in the
same period, the percentage of white children enrolled fluctuated between 50 and 60 percent (US
Bureau of the Census, 1975).
This growth in both school attendance and expenses corresponded with a period of suspicion
about large institutions which accompanied rapid industrialization, urbanization, and
consolidation of wealth. Thus in the period beginning in 1900, American society began to react

45

Even in this period, population growth was driven by immigration from Europe, with an
increasing proportion from poorer Eastern and Southern regions (US Bureau of the Census,
1975). Most of these migrants remained in East Coast US cities, assuring that the problems of
perceived school underperformance would be concentrated in large urban systems.
46
By 1870, only three US territories – Massachusetts, Vermont and the District of Columbia –
had enacted compulsory schooling legislation. But many such laws – with widely varying
specifications – were passed in the next 30 years. The limitation of the legislation in many states
was that they often lacked both the means to enforce attendance and sufficient school
accommodations for all children (Katz M. S., 1976, pp. 17-20). Indeed, one of the concerns of
reformers in this era was the need to improve compulsory attendance laws to prevent dropout
and bolster retention, particularly in secondary school.
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against various perceived excesses and abuses in industry and municipal government, including
schools. Suspicion, and in some cases full-scale panic, was instigated by a number of journalists
and publications collectively known today as muckrakers47. But while the best exemplars of this
tradition, including Ida Tarbell and Upton Sinclair, saw their painstaking journalistic efforts lead
to positive changes in labor and housing regulation, environmental conservation, and anti-trust
legislation; other figures of the muckraking tradition were neither so diligent in their
investigative practices nor so scrupulous in their choices of targets (Callahan, 1962). Jal Mehta
(2013) notes that perhaps the first critique of public schooling in the muckraking tradition came
in 1892 when physician Joseph Mayer Rice lambasted rote pedagogical methods in a series of
nine articles in the magazine The Forum.48
Ironically, while much muckraking journalism and progressive reform efforts were being
directed at the exploitation of labor and the environment by large industry, business values such
as organization and efficiency were in a period of ascendancy among the American public.
Corruption and vice among businessmen were viewed as episodic rather than systemic. The
influence of business values on schooling was buttressed by powerful industrialists themselves.
Andrew Carnegie frequently railed in speeches and in print against the impractical education – a
reference to the traditional liberal arts curriculum –received by American schoolchildren

The most sophisticated of the muckraking publications was McClure’s magazine. But in terms
of popular influence, the most widely circulated magazines which contained critical stories about
municipal school systems were Ladies Home Journal and The Saturday Evening Post, which
each circulated more than 1 million copies per year at their peak (Callahan, 1962, p. 3).
48
Rice collected data from around 30,000 students, and found no relationship between time spent
on spelling instruction and students’ later performance on spelling tests. His findings were not
well received by school leaders, but such painstaking empirical data collection would become the
trend in subsequent decades (US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1992). Rice would
later go on to publish a collection of his essays in a volume titled Scientific Management in
Education and, suggesting a pecuniary motivation apart from his muckraking work on the
subject, a spelling textbook for use in elementary schools titled The Rational Spelling Book .
47
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(Callahan, 1962, pp. 8-9). Henry Ford was no kinder to academic study, famously quipping in
1916 “I wouldn’t give a nickel for all the history in the world. It means nothing to me. History is
more or less bunk.” John D. Rockefeller founded the General Education Board in 1901, whose
first project was to create a program of ‘practical education’ for African Americans in the South
– a program which was questioned by prominent Black intellectuals like W.E.B. DuBois and
Carter G. Woodson (Marshall, 2011). More directly, many businesspeople would end up
influencing municipal education policy by joining local school boards.
School administration was the primary target of education reform efforts. Both the criticisms of
the liberal arts curriculum49 and the problem of increased costs were laid at the feet of
professional schoolmen. Much of the discussion centered on the high schools, which were
expanding at the most rapid pace, and which would be of most acute interest to business leaders
and their government counterparts. Indeed, the key document which lays out the “social
efficiency” vision of administrative reformers comes from the NEA Commission on the Reform
of Secondary Education (Labaree, Someone Has To Fail: The Zero-Sum Game of Public
Schooling, 2010, pp. 25-26).
The atmosphere of distrust and suspicion created in the early muckraking period reached a fever
pitch regarding schools with the aid of proclaimed scientific research which deemed schools

49

The high school liberal arts curriculum was articulated by the preceding generation of common
school reformers. Its last expression was to be found in the 1893 Report of the NEA Committee
of Ten on Secondary School Studies – which consisted of six university presidents (including
Harvard’s Charles Eliot), three high school principals, and the US Commissioner of Education.
The report was very detailed in its recommendations for what should constitute a secondary
school curriculum, addressing all major academic subjects (Dexter, 1906). Labaree (2010) notes
that the report is very bureaucratic in its tone, arguing for a common program of study for all
secondary students regardless of social class of college aspiration, but lacking the passionate
appeal to values (e.g., democracy, citizenship) found in either Horace Mann’s common school
reports or the Cardinal Principles report of 1918.
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inefficient and with the prominence of a technique seen as a potential remedy. The research came
in the form of a 1909 report by Leonard Ayres entitled Laggards in Our Schools50. Drawing on
municipal school records, the report addressed two issues, students attending school below agegrade level (‘retardation’) and school dropout before eighth grade. 51 Overall, the report deems
one-third of all public school children retarded and cites an average dropout rate of fifty percent
by the eighth grade (Ayres, 1909). Each could be considered obvious byproducts of the era: nonEnglish speaking immigrants – and emancipated slaves who were denied literacy for centuries –
would enter school below grade level as a matter of course, but were categorized as laggards for
the simple fact that they were not in the appropriate grade. Similarly, dropout was often a
symptom of the economic circumstances of families; most migrants were poor when they arrived
and remained so thereafter, making work a necessity for many teenagers. Likewise, many
African American families in the south were toiling under the highly exploitative sharecropping
system. But Ayres’ report placed blame for these problems at the feet of the school systems:
“There is no teacher but will recognize the picture of this boy, and indeed, with some
modifications, it fits many girls just as well. These are the boys and girls with whom this
book deals. They are not the mentally deficient, exceptionally dull children. They
constitute a large part of all of the school children in most, but not all, of our school
50

Leonard Ayres was a major figure in the history of Educational statistics, and an unapologetic
promoter of education as a scientific discipline. In 1920 he was founding co-editor of in the
Journal of Education Research, along with Lewis Terman and George Strayer. The journal was
at the forefront of the movement to use scientific methods in the promotion of efficiency in
education. He published numerous articles in the journal which dealt with topics including the
computation of correlation and regression coefficients. His editorial work in the journal generally
derided educators who opposed the use of science and testing as ‘the professionally moribund’
(Ayres, 1920a) who, ‘one wonders…notwithstanding the scholarly attainments which they
sometimes possess, have not after all a fundamental intellectual defect’ (Ayres, 1920b).
51
A testament to its wide impact, Laggards was reprinted three times after its initial publication,
including twice in the year 1910 and again in 1913. Ayres was a firm believer in the power of
educational statistics – a later chapter of the book bears the title “Reform in and Through School
Records.” He was also a believer in generating public attention for educational statistics; when
he directed a 1916 school survey in Cleveland Ohio, educational news displaced war coverage
on the front page of many Cleveland newspapers (Lagemann, 2002).
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systems. These are the children that too many of our schools are confirming with the
habit of failure (Ayres, 1909, p. 220).”
Ayres deemed these systems inefficient through a formula – the index of efficiency – which
directly likened schools to factories, in which students were considered the raw material
(Callahan, 1962, pp. 15-18).
The accountability technique that revealed both the problem and the solution was Frederick W.
Taylor’s system of scientific management. Though he had been developing his ideas since the
1880s, Taylor’s most well-known elaboration of the concept came in eponymously titled
Principles of Scientific Management which was published in 191152. Scientific management
emerged as a result of Taylor’s experience as a gang manager at Midvale Steel Works, where he
discovered the problem of ‘ordinary management’ and from his later work researching and
experimenting with his famous ‘time and motion’ studies (Braverman, Labor and Monopoly
Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, 1998). The four basic principles of
scientific management were: 1) that managers must gather, study, tabulate, and codify all the
traditional knowledge of the particular labor process into a set of the most efficient practices; 2)
that managers must then match workers to jobs based on capability and train them to work for
maximum output; 3) that work performance should be assiduously monitored to ensure
application of efficient practices; and 4) that management should handle all planning and
conception of work tasks in advance.
It is important to note the amount of research, and the resultant practices, required to practice
scientific management. Taylor’s studies aimed at finding not only the most efficient methods for

Taylor’s first book on the subject, Shop Management, was published in 1903, and could have
had a great deal of influence in the first decade of the 20th century among those beginning to
criticize schools on the grounds of efficiency.
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every function of the worker, but also the best tools and materials for the job. Requiring this
level of rigor, his work at Midvale Steel took over 25 years. It is thus no accident that such a
system coincided with the development of large production industries, since smaller firms would
have had no way of paying for such intense studies. Even in the public consciousness, the Taylor
system was associated most closely with the stopwatch (Callahan, 1962, p. 28). It is usually said
that the original system of scientific management failed because it was both hated by labor and
superseded by other schools of managerial thought. That is false both because scientific
management succeeded in changing the basic assumptions of productive occupations (cf.
(Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century,
1998; Howard, 1985; Littler, 1978), and because in addition to resistance from workers, firms
were unwilling to make the necessary research investments or to increase compensation for
increased productivity.
Taylorism generated great, even mythical interest in the first decades of the twentieth century.
The system became the subject of national attention in 1910 owing to congressional hearing of
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). A group of manufacturers moved to sue railroad
owners over what were felt to be unfair increases in shipping rates. The railroads contended that
increased wages for their employees made the rate increases necessary; lawyers for the plaintiffs
called expert witnesses who testified that scientific management would make it possible to both
raise wages and lower consumer prices without decreasing profits. The testimony was described
as follows:
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“Theirs was the firm faith of the apostles: it was a philosophy which worked, and they
had the figures to show it (Callahan, 1962, p. 20).”53
In the end, the commission sided with the Merchants, but not due to the evidence presented
regarding the Taylor system, which was regarded by the commission as still in an experimental
phase; the ruling was based on other more verifiable claims. Nonetheless, interest in scientific
management – a term originally coined by one of the lawyers from the hearing, Louis Brandeis –
grew throughout the 1910s. Hundreds of papers were published on the subject, applying the
concept to nearly every facet of life. Efficiency societies formed and proliferated among the
public, as did the ranks less rigorous yet ‘certified’ efficiency experts. An observer at the time
remarked that ‘scientific management shingles have gone up all over the country’ without
‘standards or requirements, private or public… by which…the goats can be separated from the
sheep.’
Given the existing suspicion of municipal institutions and corporations that emerged from the
Muckraking periodicals and the growing fervor for all things efficient, especially scientific
management, the school systems were an inevitable target for reforms. In the years immediately
following the ICC hearing that brought Scientific Management to the fore, the primary venues
for criticism were popular magazines. Sensational and polemical articles would stir anxiety
among readers – a middle class clientele already stricken with the reform mindset – who would
then express their frustrations at school board meetings and elections. The Saturday Evening Post
featured stories with titles such as “Our Medieval High Schools,” and “Medieval Methods for
Modern Children;” these stories criticized schools both for antiquated teaching methods and for

53

The use of expert witnesses and their often sensational testimony is a recurring story when we
arrive at value-added assessment in the early 21st century.
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administrative inefficiencies.54 Ladies Home Journal was more virulent in its criticism of the
schools, and more focused on efficiency. The editors cited the four-hundred million dollars spent
annually on public schooling nationwide alongside dropout figures and literacy rates without any
contextualization of either figure. Further stories described the public school system as:
“not only ineffective in its results but also actually harmful in that it throws every year
ninety-three out of every one hundred children into the world of action absolutely
unfitted for even the simplest tasks in life.”
“…it has grown antiquated and will not meet our present needs; it has indeed become a
positive detriment…all traceable to its one great and crying defect – inefficiency
(Callahan, 1962, pp. 51-52).”
Educational entities at various levels began responding to these early calls for efficiency first by
putting scientific management on the agenda for discussion. The 1912 meeting of the National
Education Association (NEA) featured panels dedicated to the idea of efficiency in schooling
(Callahan, 1962, pp. 55-61)55; the 1913 Superintendence Department meeting of the NEA was
entirely devoted to the topic. At the federal level, the US Office of Education’s Commission on
the Reorganization of Secondary Education report entitled The Cardinal Principles of Secondary
Education hinted at the need for the reorganization of secondary education based on the presence
of students of varying aptitudes (Horn & Wliburn, 2013, p. 18). But as with Boston in the mid19th century, it would be outsiders to educational practice who would make the moral crusade for
reform armed with an existing technology. Among the key figures were Ellwood Cubberly,

The effects of John Dewey’s child-centered pedagogy were clearly also being felt in articles
such as these. But as Labaree (2010) points out, Dewey’s attempt to transform pedagogy was not
as successful as the efforts of administrative progressives. This may be attributed to the
durability of what Tyack and Cuban (1995) refer to as “the grammar of schooling” – that is dayto-day classroom practice.
55
The speakers on school efficiency who appeared at the 1912 NEA meeting ran the gamut
between the prescient and the absurd. Some attempted to define the problems of applying
scientific management to the education of children, while others gave attempted to define the
“Material, Civic and Social dividends” to the public and “Janitor Efficiency.”
54
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George Strayer, and Franklin Bobbitt; all three were from prominent schools of education and all
focused their attention on the school systems in the largest American cities (Mehta, 2013, p. 45).
Some prominent educators and those directly involved with the schools made their suspicions of
efficiency-driven reforms known from the outset. Education professor and former elementary
school teacher William Bagley remarked in 1912 that “nostrums, panaceas and universal curealls in education are snares and delusions…we must give up the notion of solving all of our
problems in a day.” Edward Hartwell, a statistician for the Boston schools, made a much more
direct criticism, noting that “we should discriminate in our investigation and consideration of
educational matter between methods and criteria that are applicable to living mechanisms and
their activities and those which pertain to the realm of the inventor, the engineer, and the
manufacturer (Callahan, 1962, p. 124).”
The attempt to reform schools in the mode of the Taylor system was fraught from the outset.
Firstly, while the desired outputs of jobs such pig iron hauling, bricklaying and metal cutting
were easily ascertained and checked for quality, the same was not the case for schools. Lacking a
clearly defined output, school administrators who attempted to apply scientific management to
their ‘school plants’ instead picked easily measureable objects of suspect validity which were
either tangential to schooling, over-determined by out-of-school forces, or both. Among these
were enrollment rates, average number of days attended by each student, and the number of
students “inspired” to pursue higher levels of schooling56. Secondly, lacking a single decisive

These sorts of ‘efficiency’ mirror the problems and remedies laid out by Leonard Ayres. He
suggests that the primary causes of ‘retardation’ were late entry and irregular attendance. His
primary remedies for these problems and for dropout (‘elimination’ in his terminology) were
more rigorous implementation of compulsory attendance laws (Ayres, Laggards in our schools; a
study of retardation and elimination in city school systems, 1909, pp. 5-7). The other primary
cause of retardation cited by Ayres was ‘physical defects’ among students, but these defects – the
56
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output, few if any school systems attempted anything approaching a Time-and-Motion study to
determine best practices.57 Nonetheless, the ethos of measurement-based school management
remained strong. As a result, many reforms clothed existing concerns over school finances
through novel ‘data-driven’ methods. In one case, Newton Massachusetts superintendent Frank
Spaulding58 claimed to have made his schools more efficient by calculating the cost per hour of
various school subjects to determine which were the most efficient uses of resources (Mehta, pp.
42-43). Spaulding’s approach was tantamount to “clothing business philosophy with the mantle
of science.” (Callahan, p. 73)
As the push for school efficiency matured through the period of World War I and into the 1920s,
it had two distinct threads, which Callahan refers to as the school surveyors and the efficiency
testers (p. 99). The surveyors followed the lead provided by Leonard Ayres and defined
problems of efficiency in terms of student flow, building use, and financial accounting more
generally. The approach of Frank Spaulding described above exemplifies this version of school
efficiency. Efficiency Testers more directly addressed questions of the educational process –
teaching and learning – by relying on the developing field of standardized testing and
psychometrics. Franklin Bobbitt emphasized the need to create external standards to determine
whether, in a given school, teachers were capable and students were actually learning (Mehta,

most common of which were poor vision and hearing, skin diseases, and defects of the nose and
throat – would be today understood as consequences of poverty and child labor (Ayres, Laggards
in our schools; a study of retardation and elimination in city school systems, p. 118).
57
Much breath and ink were wasted on the possibility. Franklin Bobbitt was probably the most
articulate spokesman for applying Taylorism directly to the work of schooling, but even his
writings only suggest the most basic experimental approaches to discovering best practices
(Callahan, 1962, pp. 86-92). The emphasis throughout this period was devoted to rating teacher
efficiency ex post facto rather than making ‘capital investments’ to discover the most efficient
methods.
58
Spaulding would subsequently lead school systems in Minneapolis and Cleveland, where he
would institute data-driven administration practices (Lagemann, 2002, pp. 86-87).
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2013, pp. 44-45).59 As for the source of these external standards, Bobbitt suggested that ‘the
commercial world’ ought to determine what should be taught in schools, since students were
destined to become workers. Bobbitt further recommended that school systems create or adapt
measurement scales for every product of schooling, which one city superintendent suggested
would require school systems to maintain record-keeping systems many times more elaborate
than even the largest corporations at the time (Callahan, pp. 83-86).
The importing of standards from business and from science was criticized by important
educational figures, most notably John Dewey. In Education as Engineering he argues that
efforts to found a science of education are doomed to failure without first pioneering new
educational methods in the mode of science.60 Using an extensive analogy to bridge building,
Dewey’s point is that if education is to be reinvented in any significant way, the reinvention will
have to take place in practice before a new theory or science can be articulated. By contrast, if
engineering or managerial methods are superimposed upon the educational sphere:
“Let it not be supposed that there is really any advance in the science of education merely
because there is a technical improvement in the tools of managing an educational scheme
conspicuous for its formation prior to the rise of science. Such ‘science only rationalizes
old, customary education while improving it in minor details.” (Dewey, 2009, pp. 3-4)
The pressure for scientific management-based reforms of both sorts described above became
institutionalized in a number of ways. Some large urban school systems established ‘efficiency

59

Among the architects of these original standardized tests in Mathematics, reading and other
subjects was Edward L. Thorndike of Teacher’s College. Thorndike first developed his theories
of learning through experiments with animals (Burke, 2013). His human intelligence tests, Alpha
and Beta, were adapted by the US Military to classify soldiers during World War I, and were
further transformed into the original Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) by Carl Campbell Brigham
(Lemann, 1999).
60
Elsewhere, Dewey bemoaned the fact that although production industries use this prototype
model of innovation regularly, schools lack the financial resources to do anything similar
(Callahan, 1962, p. 94).
80

bureaus,’ internal offices which designed (or adapted) tests and scales to rate their teachers,
students, and principals. Other municipalities hired efficiency experts, temporary consultants to
conduct surveys and/or construct and administer rating instruments. For the most part, these
surveying efforts were done in reaction to external organizations claiming inefficiency. 61 But
given budgetary constraints in many school systems, and the widely varying abilities of the
‘experts’ they hired, these surveys focused primarily on financial accounting version of
efficiency, and only the most superficial aspects of the classroom situation. This was a marked
change in the nature of the school survey, first initiated in Boston over a half century earlier.
School administrators in this era much more closely resembled accountants than educators.
It is important to note that accountability in this period did not hold teachers solely responsible
for student outcomes. Leonard Ayres’ Laggards in Our Schools emphasized the presence of
mentally defective children in classrooms as a decisive factor in producing school inefficiency.
In the language of moral panics, the victims would be gifted children whose learning was being
held back by a tide of laggard youth now flooding the school system. Some attempted to develop
measures of teacher efficiency based on student test scores (Conor, 1920; Elliot, 1915; Sears,
1921; Buckingham, 1920), while others stressed their primary function as measures of student
abilities which could inform teaching and placement (Monroe, 1920; Willing, 1920). But the
overwhelming emphasis of this early push for efficiency was on the classification of children as
gifted, normal, or subnormal, which comes out of the emphasis on intelligence testing. 62 In the
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For example, the 1915 Cleveland school survey was a reaction to a claim by the Cleveland
Engineering Society that schools were operating below 50 percent efficiency. In California and
New York, surveys were initiated due to pressure from commercial interests and taxpayer groups
(Callahan, 1962, pp. 115-116). Chauncey and Dobbin (1963) note that: ‘Early in the twenties,
more than one-hundred bureaus of educational research were established.’
62
An illustrative quote from a 1921 Journal of Educational Research Editorial: “Conservation of
power and reduction of waste is an important social ideal. A lot of the brain power in our schools
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years 1920 and 1921, for example, one journal – The Journal of Educational Research – featured
no fewer than thirty articles concerning the use of intelligence tests in schools compared to
between five and ten on the subject of teacher efficiency. Another, The School Review, which
was decidedly less interested in issues of measurement, had at least ten articles concerning
intelligence tests in comparison with only two connected with teacher evaluation. Intelligence
testing will thus be the focus of the next section of the chapter.
By the late 1920s, public attention had shifted away from school efficiency in the mode of the
Taylor system. Indeed, Taylorism as a managerial theory was eventually overshadowed by Elton
Mayo’s Human Relations approach. But the impact of the scientific management era in schools
would last for decades. Ellwood Cubberly’s Public School Administration, first published in
1916, remained a primary text in schools of education even after his death in 1941, ensuring that
school efficiency would remain a highly influential paradigm. 63 Indeed, the prominence of
school surveys in later decades’ efforts at school reform is a direct result of Cubberly’s influence.
Thus the salient legacy is not that schools were forever changed into factory plants – schools that
attempted such models did not last long – but rather that schooling came under the influence of
the logic of business and industry without careful consideration of its utility for educational
purposes (Callahan, 1962). Thus in the early 20th century, both the panic over schooling and the

is daily going to waste because it is idling far below its normal working capacity. Genius which
spends itself on inferior work is wasted. Our educational practice needs a severe earthquake that
will shake us loose to the recognition of this waste.” The ideal is a recapitulation of Taylorism,
but here the student is considered the worker, rather than the teacher. The general editor of the
journal makes similar comments about the selection function of schools in a later editorial
(Buckingham, The School as a Selective Agency, 1921)
63
Cubberly was a pioneer not only in school administration per se. He was also one of the most
successful school surveyors of the era, conducting investigations in Baltimore, New York City,
Oakland, Portland, and Salt Lake City (Eagle Shutt, nd). His history of schooling, elaborated in
Public Education in the United States (Cubberly, 1919) offered a teleological and functionalist
reading of American schooling which also remained dominant for decades.
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promised solution were bound up with the assessment technology of the day; despite strong
rhetorical resistance on the part of educators, public and interest group pressure fundamentally
changed school administration.
1920-1950: Educational Testing Service, the SAT, and the rise of Mass Educational Testing

It was mentioned above that part of the push for educational efficiency was connected to the
early development of psychometrics. Indeed, the entire concept of external educational standards
requires that someone outside of the school design and apply measures of school performance.
At the beginning, much of the impetus for developing tests of mental aptitude was clothed in a
discourse of institutional efficiency. The focus then shifted to intelligence itself - invoking
panicked tones about the state of the nation which would culminate in the passage of restrictive
immigration legislation in 1924. As the fervor for mental testing and the labeling that came with
it dissipated, mental testing underwent a change and became scholastic aptitude. It is this
sequence of events to which we now turn.
While Horace Mann and Samuel Howe were among the first to administer externally created
exams, standardization of assessment took a giant leap at the turn of the 20 th century with the
work of Alfred Binet in France and a group of US researchers who adapted his work 64. Binet,
along with his colleague Theodore Simon, developed a series of tests and a resulting scale for the
French school system to measure the intellectual capacities of French schoolchildren so that they
could be placed in appropriate grade levels65. The Binet-Simon scale was first released in 1905,
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Attempts at developing ways of differentiating mental ability began as early as the late 19th
century with the work of Sir Francis Galton and J. McKeen Cattell. The latter is credited with
coining the term mental test in 1890 (US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1992).
65
It is important to note that Alfred Binet did not share the beliefs of those who adapted his scale
in the United States. He was a disciple of John Stuart Mill, perhaps the most ardent early critic of
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and was revised again in 1908 and 1911 after further field testing by the authors. Though they
were not employed by the French government until after his death, Binet’s tests were put to more
immediate use by two Americans. Henry Goddard, who is regarded by some as the father of
intelligence testing in the United States, translated the Binet-Simon scale into English in 1908
and worked diligently to distribute copies to public schools. Lewis M. Terman revised the scale
for American use in 1916; his version became known as the Stanford-Binet intelligence test and
was the first to use the now-famous IQ scale (Plucker & Esping, 2013b; Plucker & Esping,
2013a). From the outset, both Goddard and Terman viewed intellect as an innate human
capacity, and linked the quantification of intellect with notions of efficiency. Terman remarked
in his 1916 book, The Uses of Intelligence Tests that:
It is safe to predict that in the near future intelligence tests will bring tens of thousands of
these high-grade defectives under the surveillance and protection of society. This will
ultimately result in curtailing the reproduction of feeble-mindedness and in the
elimination of an enormous amount of crime, pauperism, and industrial inefficiency
(Terman, 1916, pp. 6-7).66
Goddard expressed similar sentiments in more strident terms in his Human Efficiency and Levels
of Intelligence:

native intelligence. As such, Binet held that intelligence was, within limits, conditioned by
environmental factors (US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1992, p. 113). Given his
environmentalist position, he envisioned his tests to be used as full diagnostics which would not
only classify children, but also be used to inform approaches for developing their capacities, thus
increasing access to education rather than making it more exclusive. This is in contrast to
American adaptors, especially H.H. Goddard and Lewis Terman, who used the Binet scale to
advance eugenicist arguments (Minton, 1998). Lemann (1999, pp. 24-25) suggests that E.F.
Lindquist’s Iowa Every-Pupil Testing Program was much closer to Binet’s intentions, as they
were grounded in tests of achievement rather than aptitude.
66
Illustrative of the connection between educational efficiency and intelligence testing, it is of
note that Terman’s book was one in a series of education textbooks edited by Ellwood Cubberly.
Terman was also a founding co-editor of the Journal of Education Research along with Leonard
Ayres.
84

Testing of Intelligence is no longer an experiment or of doubted value. It is fast becoming
an exact science. The facts revealed by the army tests cannot be ignored. Greater
efficiency, we are always working for. Can these new facts be used to increase our
efficiency? No question! We only await the Human Engineer who will undertake the
work (Goddard, 1920, p. vii).
The ‘army tests’ referred to by Goddard were the ‘Alpha’ and ‘Beta’ tests used to screen draftees
during World War I.67 Alpha was designed for recruits literate in English, while Beta was for
illiterate or immigrant recruits. Goddard and Terman served on the design committee for the test,
which was chaired by Harvard psychologist Major Robert Yerkes. The Alpha test, which was
completed in the summer of 1917 and was largely based on the Stanford-Binet scale, was
administered to over 1.5 million men by the end of the war. This constituted the largest instance
of mass standardized testing at the time and provided invaluable data for intelligence test
promoters to argue for their more general utility (McGuire, 1994; Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery, nd). It was also the first major application of the multiple-choice testing
format, the development of which was credited to Arthur Otis, a student of Terman’s who
created the first group intelligence tests (Chauncey & Dobbin, 1963, p. 6). The design committee
emphasized the ease and efficiency (i.e., low labor costs) with which exams could be scored (US
Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1992, p. 124). Internally however, the value of the
test was questionable: it correlated poorly with officers’ assessments of recruits’ capacities and
was perceived by high-ranking military officials as making little contribution to the success of
the war (Fancher, 1985, pp. 126-127).

Educational philosopher Jacques Barzun notes that “The vogue for this type of test began after
the first world war” in his foreword to Banesh Hoffman’s The Tyranny of Testing (1963/2003, p.
7). E.L. Thorndike, a psychologist at Columbia’s Teachers College, was a primary constructor of
early versions of the alpha, but his more complex view of intelligence conflicted with Robert
Yerkes who believed intelligence was one quality that should be measured on one scale (Carson
J. , 2007).
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The results of the alpha tests were kept secret until the end of the war. The National Academy of
Arts and Sciences published the findings in 1921 under the title Psychology Examining in the
United States Army (Army Alpha and Beta Tests, 2014). Like the school surveys conducted by
Leonard Ayres, the test results provoked panic about the state of the nation’s intellect, though at
first only indirectly about its schools. The official summary of findings stated that the average
mental age of white draftees was approximately 13 years old and added that by this fact half of
the white draftees would be classified as “morons” (Yerkes, 1921). Based on the results of the
test, many authors bemoaned the menace of ‘racial impoverishment68’ which they believed
threatened to destroy American civilization (McDougall, 1921; Stoddard, 1922; Wiggam, 1922).
A review of Henry Goddard’s 1920 book stated that the results of the army tests placed the
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The significance of eugenics in the history of psychometrics is hard to overstate. Eugenics was
introduced as a theory of social management by Sir Francis Galton, who also pioneered the
concept of mental measurement in its service – though he failed to create an effective exam
(Fancher, 1985). Most of the psychologists who helped to design the Army alpha exams –
including Yerkes, Goddard, Termin and Bingham – subscribed to the idea native intelligence.
Brigham’s A Study of American Intelligence loudly proclaimed that the nation was imperiled by
a decline in intelligence owing to the presence of non-Nordic racial groups, a conclusion
endorsed by Yerkes in his foreword (Brigham, 1922). Even though E.L. Thorndike differed with
Yerkes on the nuances of mental measurement, he wrote unambiguously in support of native
intelligence (Thorndike, 1913; 1940). The College Board’s decision to create a universal entry
exam based on the alpha tests represented the interests of their elite clientele, which was
concerned with increased applications from non-white – that is non-Nordic – students (Saretzky,
1982; Karabel, 2005). In 1948, reacting to an article which criticized the use of the SAT for
college admissions, Educational Testing Service President Henry Chauncey reacted in a
eugenicist tone: “If ability has any relation to success in life parents in upper-socioeconomic
groups should have more ability than those in lower socio-economic groups. And if there is
anything in heredity one would expect children of high socioeconomic group parents to have
more ability than children of low socioeconomic group parents” (Lemann, 1999, p. 67). Even as
late as 1963, Chauncey makes no distinction between intelligence testing and scholastic aptitude
testing, though he distances himself from the native intelligence hypothesis, saying that although
such a capacity is believed to exist, current instruments do not measure it (Chauncey & Dobbin,
1963, pp. 21-22).
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science of mental testing beyond reproach before going on to advocate a national campaign of
intelligence testing in the pursuit of greater national efficiency (Popenoe, 1921).
The Army alpha and the accompanying rising status of intelligence testing were not without
strong criticism. Anthropologist Franz Boas challenged the racial impoverishment claim by
stressing the importance of the social environment. He argued that in any supposed racial type
are found a wide variety of individual traits conditioned by at least as much by social location as
by anything inherited (Boas, 1922). As such, the findings of eugenics must be considered part of
their political agenda rather than anything objective. Specifically addressing intelligence tests, he
suggests they can provide no definitive answers in themselves:
…cultural environment is a most important factor in determining the results of the socalled intelligence tests. In fact, a careful examination shows of the tests shows clearly
that in none of them has our cultural experience been eliminated…I suspect strongly that
such influences can always be discovered and that it will be impossible to construct any
test in which this element is so completely eliminated that we could consider the results
as an expression of purely biologically determined factors. (Boas, 1931, pp. 12-13)
Walter Lippman’s series of essays in The New Republic not only criticized the fever-pitched
interpretations of the alpha exam results, but also the arbitrary methods by which the tests were
constructed (American Social History Productions, 2012).69 Lippman notes that Alfred Binet had
shied away from attempting to define intelligence as such, opting to focus on the practical
problem of identifying children who would need special attention in school, which he did by
constructing arbitrary scales based on his own common sense attempts at defining aspects of
mental ability (Lippman, Mental Age of Americans, 1922). By contrast, the Americans who
adopted Binet’s approach – and worse still those who interpreted their research – treated exams

Lippman’s essays appeared between July and December of 1922 and were titled ‘Mental age
of Americans,’ ‘Mystery of the A Men,’ ‘Reliability of Intelligence Tests,’ ‘Abuse of the tests,’
‘Tests of hereditary intelligence,’ and ‘Future for the Tests.’
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constructed by the same methods as if they measured an uncontested, heritable quality in humans
(Lippman, The Abuse of the Tests, 1922). The numerical format in which the results appear – the
quotient – further abstracts the results from their arbitrary basis and gives them an “illusion of
constancy” which test promoters all-too-eagerly endorse. In the end, he attributes the eagerness
of intelligence testers and their interpreters to overstate both the extent and the implications of
the findings from the Army tests to a desire on their part for greater social power rather than any
scientific commitment:
But of course no student of human motives will believe that this revival of predestination
is due to a purely statistical illusion. He will say with Nietzsche that “every impulse is
imperious, and, as such, attempts to philosophize.” And so behind the will to believe he
will expect to find some manifestation of the will to power (Lippman, A Future for the
Tests, 1922).70
Despite the fact that later criticism showed the army tests to be roundly biased in favor of nativeborn whites71 – or perhaps because of it, given their eugenicist views – many psychologists who
were involved with the testing program both touted and began adapting them for use in civilian
life. Most notably, Robert Yerkes published the National Intelligence Test, which was widely
administered. Walter Bingham, another design committee member, focused on using intelligence
tests in industry and emphasized their role in increasing firms’ efficiency (Bingham, 1937).
Lewis Terman, an educational psychologist with particular interest in gifted children who had
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Even given his sharp criticisms, Lippman believed both: a) that the tests in use at the time
would be superior to standard methods of classification used in schools (Lippman, The
Reliability of Intelligence Tests, 1922) and b) that they could be usefully developed for a variety
of applications, but for the pretensions that they measure intelligence (Lippman, A Future for the
Tests, 1922).
71
In an article which defends the psychological research community of the 1920s against claims
of racism, Snyderman and Herrnstein (1983) summarize criticisms of the Army tests from within
and outside of academia. Specifically, they argue that the Army test results did not play a
decisive role in the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924, as is argued by Stephen J. Gould
(1981).
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been working on the Stanford-Binet scale since 1916, used the results of the Army tests to
promote widespread use of intelligence testing in schools. 72
But in the long term, it was Princeton University professor Carl Campbell Brigham who had
perhaps the greatest impact on standardized testing in education. Brigham was an assistant
administering the Army Mental Tests during World War I. At first a strident eugenicist, Brigham
contended that the tests proved the superiority of “Nordic” Europeans (Brigham, 1922). Upon
returning to civilian life, he tried to make intelligence testing mandatory for admission to
Princeton.73 By 1926, he had converted the alpha test into the first version of the Scholastic
Aptitude Test (SAT). In the same year, after being appointed chairman of the testing committee
at the College Board, Brigham administered his test to a group of college-bound high school
graduates, just over 8,000 students. For the next decade, he was an influential member of the
College Board and remained in charge of the exam. The early administrations of the SAT were
not of consequence; the exam given to fewer than 20,000 students each year throughout the
1930s, and the College Board still made admissions decisions primarily based on its essay exams
which had been in use since its founding 1901 (US Congress Office of Technology Assessment,
1992). But like earlier IQ tests, these initial pilots of the SAT provided later legitimation for the
exam (Saretzky, 1982; Blackwell, 1999; Lemann, 1999).

Terman’s Stanford Achievement Test (which would now be considered a misnomer for what
was essentially an intelligence test) popularized the use of the intelligence quotient (IQ) –
defined then as mental age divided by chronological (Terman, 1916, p. 17). Terman borrowed
the concept from German psychologist William Stern, who coined it in 1912 (Plucker & Esping,
2013).
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At the same time, E.L. Thorndike was making similar attempts to introduce mental testing into
the admissions criteria at Columbia and Cooper Union. Thorndike’s student, and Brigham’s
fellow Alpha test assistant, Ben Wood would go on to develop the New York State Regents
exams and the Graduate Record Examination (GRE).
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The intervening years saw technological and political changes which would allow for the mass
administration of college admissions testing. The technology was machine scoring. The SAT was
a multiple choice test, but it still needed to be graded by hand. Ben Wood, another testing
enthusiast and a student of E.L. Thorndike, had been working with the IBM Corporation to
develop a machine to grade exams quickly and with fewer errors (Lemann, 1999, p. 35). They
were unsuccessful, but did manage to purchase the rights to a scoring machine developed
independently in 1933 by a Michigan high school teacher named Reynold Johnson. IBM
released the first commercial scoring machine in 1937, and the SAT began using the machines in
1939 (Hadhazy, nd).
Concurrently in 1933, newly-appointed Harvard President James Conant, in collaboration with
his new assistant Dean Henry Chauncey, was looking for a scholarship test to use to admit
students from outside the university’s usual clientele of elite northeastern families. This goal led
him to prefer the idea of an IQ or aptitude test over an achievement test, which he felt would
only reinforce the existing prep school pipeline. Owing to Brigham’s claim that the tests
predicted academic achievement and Chauncey’s promotion of the test, he chose the SAT and
employed it to select ten scholarship students into the class of 1934 and again the following year.
In 1937, with the cooperation of other testing advocates, Princeton and Yale each created similar
programs which utilized Brigham’s SAT and a battery of multiple-choice subject tests designed
by Ben Wood (Lemann, 1999, pp. 38-40).
From the outset, Conant’s aspirations were much larger than admitting a few Midwestern
students to Harvard. On the heels of the 1937 administration of the scholarship exam, he
proposed the idea of a national testing agency which would administer these exams as a national
census of abilities for the purpose of discovering the country’s most talented minds. Taking his
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inspiration from Frederick Jackson Turner, who had bemoaned the loss of America’s unique
social levelling with the settlement of the western frontier; and from Thomas Jefferson’s notion
of a natural aristocracy selected based on merit, Conant believed that a massive campaign of
testing and sorting would turn back the tide of class stratification and national decline through
the mechanisms of equal opportunity and enlightened leadership. Public education would
provide the site for mass testing and consequently the place in which equal opportunity would be
realized. And channeling those with the highest test scores into positions of social stewardship
would ensure the best possible future for the nation74.
But Conant’s immediate plans for the SAT as a college entrance exam met opposition from what
would seem an unlikely source. Carl Brigham had begun recanting his views on intelligence
testing in the late 1920s during his tenure at the College Board. This was in no small part due to
the zeal with which many intelligence testers had pursued their expansion, which Brigham felt
came at the expense of rigorous evaluation of the tests themselves (Saretzky, 1982). Brigham’s
criticisms of the tests were public and harsh, and his position at the College Board placed a major
roadblock in front of Conant’s campaign75. But Brigham’s failing health and early death in 1943

Conant’s ideas of discovering a Jeffersonian ‘natural aristocracy’ and fostering equal
opportunity by means of the SAT was similar to remarks by Thorndike with reference to IQ
tests: “It seems entirely safe to predict that the world will get better treatment by trusting its
fortunes to its 95- or 99-percentile intelligences than it would get by itself. The argument for
democracy is not that it gives power to all men without distinction, but that it gives greater
freedom for ability and character to attain power” (Thorndike, 1920, p. 235)
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Contrasting with his earlier book title “A Study of American Intelligence,” Brigham’s 1932
book on the SAT was titled “A Study of Error.” By 1934 he wrote that “The (intelligence) test
scores very definitely are a composite including schooling, family background, familiarity with
English, and everything else, relevant and irrelevant. The native intelligence hypothesis is dead.”
(Saretzky, 1982, p. 16) His public comments on the potential effects of widespread intelligence
testing were equally harsh, and suggested that such exams would have a deleterious effect on
teaching and learning in schools (Lemann, 1999, pp. 40-41). Lee Cronbach differs about
Brigham’s legacy, suggesting that his retractions were made on technical grounds rather than
personal epiphany (Cronbach, 1975).
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allowed it to move forward. The first step came with the onset of the Second World War; the
College Board decided in 1941 that the essay exams would be too administratively complex to
administer during war time, and opted to use the SAT instead – though this was still only of
consequence at prestigious institutions. At the same time, Henry Chauncey was selected to adapt
the SAT and administer it as a placement test for incoming recruits to the Army and Navy. The
tests were given to over 300,000 high school students on April 2, 1943.76 This large scale, oneday administration of the Army Navy College Qualifying Tests proved that such tests could be
efficiently and securely administered in a single day to vast numbers of students (Lemann, 1999;
Horn & Wliburn, 2013). Over the course of the war, these exams were administered to roughly
10 million army recruits (US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1992). This brought
the SAT to the larger population of students for the first time in its history.
The final decisive step in the ascendance of the SAT as a national exam came in 1947 when the
College Board and the American Council on Education – another large national agency
concerned with educational testing – were merged into one unit. The merger, opposed by both
organizations for different reasons, was a direct result of Conant’s political power at the time. At
the same time, the College Board handed over the task of administering its new primary exam,
the SAT (the essay tests were never resumed after 1941) to a newly founded organization in
Princeton, New Jersey – the Educational Testing Service (ETS). Henry Chauncey left Harvard to
become the first ETS president in 1948.
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The test was in fact a college admissions test; selected recruits were sent for advanced training
at college campuses across the country. Similar tests were also given to enrolled college students
for placement in the same programs.
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James Conant saw college admissions testing as a means to a political end; Henry Chauncey saw
testing as the end itself. Like the scientific managers before him, he was convinced that the
rational information provided by test scores could replace the fraught decisions made based on
tradition and sentiment. His immediate goal after the establishment of ETS was to administer a
massive census of intellectual capacity to the entire country – an eerie similarity with avowed
eugenicists twenty-five years earlier. Though this effort never materialized, ETS was provided a
substantial government contract (nearly $1 million) to administer the Selective Service College
Qualification Test (SSCQT) following the outbreak of the Korean War 77. Moreover, during his
twenty-two-year tenure as its president, ETS created innumerable tests and expanded the
administration of its best known device, the SAT, from around twenty thousand to over one
million each year. In 1983, ETS was contracted to administer the National Assessment of
Educational Progress (NAEP), a role which it continues to play today (National Center for
Education Statistics, 2013).
More generally, the success of massive test administrations such as the Alpha and ANQT
provided the model for states to begin large-scale testing of pupils as New York did with the
Regents Exams. Perhaps the most notable statewide testing program was E.F. Lidquist’s Iowa
Every Pupil Test of Basic Skills, which was first administered to elementary grade students in

The SSCQT exam – which like the ANCQT was based on the SAT - was one of two criteria
which decided whether male college students would be allowed to continue attending college or
be sent to the battlefield – the other was class rank in college. ETS administered the exam to over
500,000 students over the course of the war. Though about 60 percent of test-takers qualified for
exemptions based on either or both criteria, the percentage scoring above the threshold score of
70 on the SSCQT varied greatly by region; reflecting the racial bias of the exams, those in the
Northeast passed at a far higher rate (73%) than those in the Deep South (42%) (Freeman, 2009;
Frusciano, 1983). Nonetheless, the debate over conscription at the time did not focus on the use
intelligence tests in determining deferment, but on the idea of exempting college students in
general.
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1935 and high school students in 1942 (Peterson, 2007).78 From the outset, results of the Iowa
tests were being used to evaluate the performance of students and schools. The exams became
very commercially successful, and Lindquist eventually began marketing them to school systems
outside of Iowa (US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1992, pp. 122-123). Another
milestone achieved by Lindquist was a more advanced automated scoring machine, though this
would not be realized until the 1950s.The use of mass-produced achievement tests like the ITBS
in school systems paralleled and eventually overtook that of aptitude testing. 79 In an interesting
parallel with the application of scientific management techniques, test-makers pointed out that
school systems and end-users (meaning principals and teachers) would ideally engage in
intensive study of the tests they wished to use in their schools to make sure the tests align with
the content being taught in their classrooms:
No one outside the school can do the job of stating what the school wants to
measure…the job is wholly one for the teachers and administrators…Without it,
achievement testing is scarcely more than random activity and contributes little to the
work of the school…for the most part, the greatest benefit for the most students will
result through the use of tests that have been chosen by committees of the students’ own
teachers (Chauncey & Dobbin, 1963, pp. 57-64).
But the centralizing tendencies that came along with the introduction of these measurement tools
made it unlikely that schools would get to choose the tests that best fit their instructional goals.
Katz (1975) suggests that this process began in the late 19th century, and Wise (1979) argues that
this centralization has a generally detrimental effect on educational quality. Further, as was the
case with the proliferation of efficiency experts, many test publishers sprang up with the vogue
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Because they did not come along with the sort of social labeling associated with aptitude tests,
Lindquist’s achievement tests were not subject to the same level of criticism as were aptitude
tests such as the SAT.
79
Between 1900 and 1932, there were more than three times as many published achievement
tests available on the market as there were aptitude or mental capacity tests (US Congress Office
of Technology Assessment, 1992).
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for achievement testing and created what Chauncey calls “the quick-and-dirties that infest the
darker part of the educational forest,” meaning hastily constructed exams which make sweeping
and unsupported claims about their usefulness.
In the period encompassing the two World Wars, intelligence testing both unearthed the
supposed problem of innate mental deficiency and became its apparent solution as a sorting
mechanism at all levels of schooling. From the outset, mental testing as an educational policy
tool had its critics. In addition to Walter Lippman’s criticisms noted above, William Bagley
(1925) worried over the potential for mental testing to lead to a sort of social determinism –
which presaged critiques of educational tracking decades later (Gamoran, 1992; Gamoran, 1987;
Oakes, 1985). Banesh Hoffman made one of the most famous critiques of testing using the SAT
as the representative in his 1962 book The Tyranny of Testing, arguing that professional testers
relied on the perceived objectivity and numerical precision of their products to displace other
forms of evaluation. Criticisms of the uses to which tests were put came from within the testing
camp as well: ETS vice-president Henry Dyer said in 1971 that IQ tests and grade- equivalency
scores used by schools often lead educators to “succumb to what Alfred North Whitehead called
‘the fallacy of misplaced concreteness,’” meaning that the numerical score is taken as an
empirical fact rather than an imprecise indicator (Stevens, 1971).80
As with the Taylor-infused school efficiency movement, the focus of mass testing remained on
groups of students and on large units such as school systems rather than individual schools or
teachers. It would take further innovation to refine the targets of educational reformers.
Furthermore, between their initial appearance and the end of World War II, testing proponents

Dyer went further and said that attempts to use such tests for ‘professional accountability’
were “absurd, wrong and misleading.”
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shifted their emphasis from “classification for assignment” to “classification for allocating
resources” in response to public criticism. Many – including Brigham, Terman, and Chauncey –
also retreated (at least in public) from their explicitly eugenicist views. This is part of the reason
why Lindquist’s achievement tests, and others like it, were able to ultimately gain more traction
than many of the aptitude tests created in the same period. Though one cannot be sure, it is
plausible that these were pragmatic shifts of position made to preserve the relevance of their tests
and not genuine changes of heart or mind. Contemporary arguments for native intelligence,
including those of Arthur Jensen and Herrnstein and Murray indicate the continuing appeal of the
hypothesis.
But this is not the place to discuss the nature/nurture debate. What is salient is that large-scale
standardized testing became a permanent feature of the American school system. The
administration of the Army Alpha and later the SAT can be seen as blueprints for the program of
national testing which begins in the 1970s. More directly, SAT scores themselves have been
routinely editorialized as indicators of national educational progress from President Reagan’s
wall charts through the present day. This sea change was in no small part due to the early and
energetic efforts of test promoters who made outsized claims both about extant problems with
schooling and the capacity of the tests to address them. These claims were buttressed by the
scientific pedigrees of the testers, which allowed them to displace critics as luddites or
traditionalists, and to gain influence among policymakers.
1966-1975: The Coleman Report, Systems Analysis, and the discovery of “bad schools”

Around the same time as his critical essays on the Army Alpha exams were being published in
The New Republic, Walter Lippman’s Public Opinion was released. Prophetic in many ways
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throughout the book, he gives some attention to the role of social science in public policy.
Aligning with the book’s general thesis that individuals only indirectly experience most the
world (and therefore political life), he suggests that social science was poised to fulfill a great
need “among the directing men of the Great Society.” He observes that at the time social science
was still limited by the ad hoc ways in which their primary data were collected and by the
inability to approximate experimental methods. But the increasing importance of a class of
accountants, statisticians and other experts to people in power, he believed represented a
fundamental shift analogous to that which happened to engineers and chemists – and therefore
physical science generally – during industrialization. Increased contact between practical social
scientists with decision-makers throughout society would result in more purposive data
collection and steady advancement of theory (Lippman, 1997, pp. 235-237). This development
would be further reinforced because:
…all large forms of association must, because of sheer practical difficulty, contain men
who will come to see the need for an expert reporting of their environment…In the
exchange of technic and result among expert staffs one can see, I think, the beginning of
experimental method in social science. When each school district and budget, and health
department, and factory, and tariff schedule, is the material of knowledge for every other,
the number of comparable experiences begins to approach the dimensions of genuine
experiment (Lippman, 1997, p. 237).
The American public school system expanded in both size and reach between 1950 and 1970. In
1950, there were 25 million public school students, with 83 percent of 14 to 17 year-olds
attending (US Bureau of the Census, 1961). By 1970, those figures had climbed to 46.5 million
and 94 percent respectively (US Bureau of the Census, 1970). A larger proportion of the
population was completing primary and secondary education; the median number of years of
school completed rose from 9.3 to 12 (US Department of Education, 1993). The growth in
school attendance and completion was distributed across segments of the population, though the

97

gaps between races and regions of the country remained noticeable (Fischer & Hout, 2006, pp.
11-13). Mostly owing to the educational component of the GI Bill, postsecondary enrollment
experienced perhaps the most remarkable growth, expanding more than three fold in the same
period from 2.6 million to 8 million (US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1992). As
in the time frames already discussed, immigration was the major force impacting K-12 school
expansion during this period. But incorporation of previously excluded populations, specifically
African Americans and rural populations, also contributed to this growth. As would be expected,
the incorporation of new groups into the school system would again raise questions about school
quality. Furthermore, given the achievement of near universal access to educational services,
debates about social equality began in this period to shift from the issue of equity of access to the
issue of differences in quality (Rivlin, 1971, p. 66).
Sociologist Arthur Wise also notes an important trend in the nature of educational policy in this
period. Demands relating to education, both in terms of equality and overall quality, were
directed at governments (state and federal) instead of at individual schools or school boards.
Under increased pressure, legislative bodies attempted to address these grievances through
legislation. Intentionally or not, these solutions changed both the operations and the public
conception of the school system. Wise argues that while legislative solutions were the proper
mechanism for addressing school equity issues, the same sorts of solutions are incapable of (and
perhaps degrading to) addressing school effectiveness (Wise A. , 1979).
There were two major catalysts for school-related panic between 1950 and 1970. The one that
more immediately conjures up images of a panic was the Cold War – and more particularly the
launch of the Sputnik satellite by the Soviet Union on October 4th, 1957. Though the United
States successfully launched its own satellite less than four months later, the fact that its main
98

political and ideological competitor was the first to achieve such a milestone in space exploration
created a sense of physical and ontological insecurity throughout the country. Critics – who
were convinced of the failure of the schools long before Sputnik – capitalized on the opportunity
it provided to advance their positions.
Historian and Constitutional scholar Arthur Bestor, who published a manifesto on the question of
school quality in 1953 titled Educational Wastelands, was interviewed in January of 1958 by US
News and World Report on the question “What went wrong with US schools?” His argument
was in that progressive school reforms – implemented by a group of “professional educationists”
– had failed to produce the needed mathematics and science talent for the United States to be
competitive with the Soviet Union (Tyack & Cuban, 1995, pp. 52-53).81 Life magazine further
stoked panic over the state of the nation’s schools with a five-part series titled “Crisis in
Education.” Accompanying essays articulating national educational decline were photo spreads
comparing two high school students – Alexei Kutzkov (Russian) and Stephan Lapekas
(American) – in a way that depicted Soviet education as academically serious and American
education as diluted by socialization and too concerned with trivial matters (Bracey, 2007)82.
Another influential trumpeter of educational decline following the launch of Sputnik was
Admiral Hyman Rickover, who is also credited with the development of the first nuclear
submarine. The admiral published a series of books beginning with Education and Freedom in

Interestingly, University of Illinois Education professor Harold Hand calls Bestor’s take on
American schooling a “Devil Theory” (Hand, 1958) in an argument which predates the theory of
“folk devils and moral panics” outlined by sociologist Stanley Cohen in the 1970s (Cohen S. ,
2002). Hand notes that Bestor’s argument about the effects of progressive education on the
American space program would have been minimal at best – since recent high school students
would not have been working on the space program – and that his indictment of an ill-defined
group of educational decision-makers did not withstand investigation.
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The first installment of the ‘Crisis’ series appeared in the March 24 th, 1958 issue, and featured
an essay by novelist Sloan Wilson titled It’s Time to Close Our Carnival.
81
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1959, and continued with two comparative studies of US schools with those in England and
Switzerland (Ducros, nd). Each volume leveled similar criticisms about the content of American
schooling, charging that it has been leveled toward the less capable students by emphasizing “life
adjustment education” rather than fundamental content, particularly math and science. 83
The major response to Sputnik came in the form of the National Defense Education Act
(NDEA), which was signed into law in September of 1958. The majority of the law’s impacts
were at the postsecondary level, but it did turn a new page in the story of education reform at the
K-12 level, as federal funding was used to leverage changes in state education policies. A
multitude of new subject-area initiatives were started following the NDEA, resulting in new
textbooks and curriculum protocols (Buxton, 2009; Rudolph, 2002). Notably, in 1959 the US
Office of Education fully funded an already existing study by the University of Pittsburgh and
the American Institutes of Research, known as Project TALENT, which was charged with
assessing the quality of education in US high schools.
While the Cold War and the panic over Sputnik initiated a struggle over US high school
curriculum, the nascent Civil Rights movement simultaneously drove another set of reforms in
the school system aimed at desegregation and school equity. Mandatory desegregation of public
schools began with the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954. As schools attempted to
integrate in the years that followed, focus shifted to the tasks of educating diverse populations
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Based on an interpretation of the work of John Dewey and other child-centered progressives,
‘life adjustment education’ aimed to increase schools’ emphasis on the practical applications of
learning (McFarland, 1954). The move toward this practical-skills curriculum began to take hold
in 1945 in response primarily to a high dropout rate and a generally low college-going rate
among US high school students. By the time Sputnik was launched, critics of life adjustment had
already gained traction in undermining it (Breault, 2009). Lawrence Cremin (1961) regards the
Life Adjustment movement as a key misstep of educational progressives.
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and the problems of school equity (Weiner, 1993; Mehta, 2013). On the one hand, some
education scholars used terms like ‘culturally deprived’ and ‘disadvantaged’ to refer to students
from working class and poor backgrounds, whose values and capacities did not accord with those
purported in school (Reissman, 1962; Passow, Goldberg, & Tannenbaum, 1967). These terms
and the approaches to schooling associated with them became controversial as a result of the
“culture of poverty” thesis advanced by Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1965) in The Negro Family: A
Case for National Action. Other writers focused on the drastic inequalities between the schools
serving black and white students (Kozol, 1967; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). Stanley Aronowitz
(2000, pp. 114-115) suggests that increased investment in education coincided not only with
fears of Soviet competition, but also with trepidation about rising rates of crime following the
economic boom of the postwar years. Elsewhere, Moynihan (1970) suggests that concerns over
juvenile delinquency – especially among urban Blacks and Puerto Ricans – were reigniting a fear
of proletarian violence that was common in the 19th century.84 Linking the threads of the Cold
War and fears related to minority communities, some have suggested that the War on Poverty
programs of the 1960s were an attempt to buttress the poorest American communities so that
they wouldn’t provide fuel for Soviet propaganda abroad (Balogh, 2004).
Bolstered by the broader civil rights movement and Cold War fears, and thus incorporated as part
of Lyndon Johnson’s ‘War on Poverty’ agenda, the question of racial inequality in education
became more pressing than that of educational standards. The introduction to the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 makes clear that the intention of the legislation is to “…
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Moynihan notes that the rates of crime and poverty in New York in the late 1950s and early
1960s were lower than those in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but that
expectations had changed such that relative to what people expected, there was a perception of a
real and growing problem of juvenile delinquency (Moynihan, 1970, pp. 43-46).
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contribute particularly to meeting the special educational needs of educationally deprived
children.” The fact that Project TALENT had far less public impact than the government report
on ‘Equality of Educational Opportunity’ (the Coleman Report) gives evidence to which issues
dominated the period.
But as the story below suggests, Cold War rhetoric and the techniques developed to prepare for
both armed and ideological warfare would find their way into the sphere of domestic issues,
including education. Part of the strength of this school equity agenda in the period came from a
technical innovation which had been developing in the military since World War II: Systems
Analysis.
Systems Analysis (SA) encompasses a wide variety of mathematical and statistical techniques,
including multivariate modeling and simulations, but is generally oriented toward generating
‘optimal’ solutions to administrative problems by defining and quantifying the inputs and outputs
of a given situation.85 The story of Systems Analysis begins with Operations Research (OR). As
a formal discipline, OR originated in Great Britain as the country prepared to deploy radar
systems to combat aerial bombing campaigns by the German Luftwaffe. This original application
concerned the best uses of machines, although it was quickly adapted to the analysis of human
systems in the military context (INFORMS, nd).

A report from the RAND corporation describes Systems Analysis succinctly: “By a ‘system
we mean a set of interrelated factors that are used together to produce an output…All of these
systems produce some sort of output…[which] are typically difficult to quantify…[and] also
have costs associated with them…[and] have various ways of combining the elements or inputs
in order to produce outputs…In a successful systems analysis, the analyst can vary the inputs,
note the effect on both cost and output, and then decide that one system is better than another…if
you tell him what output you want, he can tell you how to get it at minimum cost (Kershaw &
McKean, 1959).”
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Branches of the US military, primarily the Navy and Air Force, began separately using OR
techniques to inform bombing campaigns and anti-submarine warfare in 1942.86 Among those
contracted to teach these techniques in the military was former accounting professor and future
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara (Mehta, 2013, p. 69). In 1945, following the conclusion of
the war, the US government established Project Research and Development (RAND) under a
contract to the Douglas Aircraft company, with the intention of applying OR-style techniques to
identify and solve long-term military problems (Gass & Assad, 2005). The project’s reputation
and staff grew rapidly over the next three years. In 1948, Project RAND’s government contract
was transferred from Douglas Aircraft to the newly established nonprofit RAND Corporation
(RAND Corporation, nd). Among RAND’s first objectives as an independent entity was to refine
OR to deal with military problems which involved more uncertainty than radar or bombing. The
stated goal was to create a comprehensive ‘science of war’ which considered a variety of
outcomes, and Systems Analysis was the methodological basis. But the techniques proved
incapable of this optimization given the various contingencies of war. Though RAND continued
to be influential in military planning during the 1950s and 1960s, Systems Analysis and its
applications to social welfare research are considered its most far-reaching contribution to
American policy-making (Jardini, 2000). But the key to understanding RAND’s transition to
domestic and civil affairs lies in the discipline of economics.
Economics was a small branch at the RAND Corporation in its early years. But by the mid1950s, it came to occupy a central place in the organization because economists’ notion of cost-
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At the same time as OR methods came into use in the US military, sociological methods were
also being utilized for the first time in the Army. Samuel Stouffer’s study of army life, which
made use of developing survey research methods, was commissioned around the same time
(Bulmer, 1996). One could characterize the 1960s as a period when sociology and economics
competed for influence on policymakers, with economists emerging as the victors.
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effectiveness became the outcome of choice for systems analysis techniques. Cost-effectiveness
was not only an appealing goal for the military; it also suggested a way to apply SA other
problems (Jardini, 1996, pp. 107-113). RAND Corporation’s first statement on the applicability
of Systems Analysis to education came in a 1959 memorandum to the Ford Foundation – which
provided them a small grant of $35,000 – outlining potential difficulties of studying schooling in
terms of the relationship between inputs and outputs. The lack of an adequate definition of
school output should, the validity and reliability of tests as measures, and the problem of finding
school systems which are ‘similar in all respects except one’ are among the problems discussed
by the authors (Kershaw & McKean, 1959). The paper presages much of what James S. Coleman
found in his report – also discussed below – including the relatively small role played by schools
in educational outcomes and the important role of “peer effects” (pp. 20-27). Ultimately,
however, the authors conclude that even if the prospect of comparing school systems is a ‘long
shot,’ it is the “only hope of providing a systematically better basis for intelligent choices in
education.” As Jardini (1996, pp. 359-360) points out, this study was RAND’s first foray into
the field of domestic policy research, though they would not put the full force of their
organization into this line of inquiry until the late 1960s.87
Prior to Systems Analysis, government interest in using economists’ tools for policy planning
had already made an impact. H. Thomas James (1968, pp. 4-6) notes in the The New Cult of

RAND Corporation’s most high-profile attempt to move in this direction was an attempt to
create a domestic policy think tank with the same relationship to the federal government’s
department Housing and Urban Development that it had with the Air Force. This attempt failed,
as the Ford Foundation backed other interests in the founding of the Urban Institute, but RAND
was still able to gain footholds in social research through a program on Middle East studies
(1967-1973) and by establishing an independent institute in New York City (1968-1975). Even
during this early period, the use of independent consultants as evaluators of city programs led to
significant criticism of the mayor’s office (Jardini, 1996).
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Efficiency and Education that the work of the 1947 Hoover Commission exemplified a growing
importance of economic analysis and a renewed interest in efficiency in the federal government.
Following the commission’s 1949 Report, President Truman submitted over thirty reorganization
plans for various executive offices. President Eisenhower also promoted efficiency-driven
reforms, including the National Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. But this reorganization was
only put into practice in 1960 under the new Secretary of Defense.
When Robert McNamara became Defense Secretary, the influence of Systems Analysis on US
national policy increased dramatically. Between 1961 and 1963 – what was known as the
“McNamara revolution” in Office of the Secretary of Defense – military concerns of all sorts
were redefined as economic problems reducible to the efficient allocation of resources.
McNamara, who had been an accountant for the Ford Motor Company immediately after the
war, sought to implement in the Department of Defense the top-down management techniques he
had implemented at Ford, collectively known as “statistical control.88” He found willing
colleagues at the RAND corporation, who shared his mindset with regard to efficiency and
management and who were growing frustrated in their partnership with the US Air Force
(Jardini, 1996). McNamara brought many former RAND employees into his office; his hope was
to change DoD operations without changing the organizational structure of the military.
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Statistical (Quality) Control methods originated with the work of Walter Shewhart in the
1920s. They utilized sampling to ensure consistent quality of manufactured goods and to find
variations in quality which could be remedied by improving aspects of the production process
(Deming W. E., 1982). The techniques were adapted for use during World War II largely based
the efforts of W. Edwards Deming, who proceeded to have a long career as a business consultant
especially in post-war Japan. Perhaps ironically, Deming opposed setting numerical goals for
employees.
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The outcome of the reforms of the Department of Defense under Secretary McNamara was
Planning, Programming and Budgeting, or PPBS (West, 2011). The principles were based
largely on the work of two RAND economists, Charles Hitch and Roland McKean’s, in The
Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age. As with Taylorist efficiency experts in the early 20 th
century, Systems Analysts made the analogy between their intended object, the conduct of
warfare, and the efficient manufacture of raw materials:
“…the problem of combining limited quantities of missiles, crews, bases, and
maintenance facilities to ‘produce’ a strategic air force that will maximize deterrence of
enemy attack is just as much a problem in economics (although in some respects a harder
one) as the problem of combining limited quantities of coke, ore, scrap, blast furnaces,
and mill facilities to produce steel in such a way as to maximize profits” (Hitch &
McKean, 1960).
PPBS became the standard for military planning at the highest levels shortly after McNamara’s
appointment as Secretary. Charles Hitch was among the lead architects of the transformation of
the DoD to the system. Its implementation had disastrous consequences for the conduct of the
Vietnam War, during which goals were defined in quantitative terms. Donald Campbell (1975)
retells the notorious ‘body counts’ as an example of his famous law about the corrosive effects
that follow from the ‘worship of a quantitative indicator.’ McNamara later expressed regret over
the excessive faith he had placed in rational management on camera in The Fog of War (Mehta,
2013, pp. 70-71). Perhaps the film would have been more aptly titled “The Fog of Statistics.” But
at the time, enthusiasm for PPBS and Systems Analysis generally was running high in
Washington.
The migration of PPBS to domestic policy took place amid political controversy over the Great
Society programs. When the initial attempt to implement the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act
through direct funding to locally-administered Community Action Programs proved divisive, the
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Johnson administration reorganized the program along the PPBS model (Jardini, 1996, pp. 326340). In retrospect, the central problem with the Great Society programs was that, given a
stretched federal budget due to the mounting costs of the war in Vietnam, the Office of
Economic Opportunity was never able to implement its programs at an appropriate level to meet
the problems of urban poverty (Walinsky, 1969). Furthermore, the collapse of these programs
coincided with a backlash against such policies by working class whites who felt their benefits
went overwhelmingly to African Americans, and who were being actively courted by Johnson’s
challenger, George Wallace89 (Bush M. , 2004; Kaufmann, 2004). Nevertheless, its failure was
attributed to the community action framework (Moynihan, 1970), which was largely phased out
when the law came up for renewal in 1967.
McNamara and systems analysis were influential among federal officials in charge of Great
Society programs. The director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, Sargent Shriver, was in
close communication with McNamara during the planning of the Economic Opportunity Act.
Other McNamara supporters included economists in the Bureau of the Budget who had worked
with Charles Hitch in the implementation of PPBS at the Department of Defense. When Shriver
was relieved of his position at the OEO in 1968, he was replaced by a former Budget Bureau
analyst (Moynihan, 1970, pp. 4-5). In August of 1965, President Johnson signed a directive
ordering the implementation of the PPBS across all federal cabinet departments. Though
outcomes in the domestic sphere were much more difficult to define, RAND employees and
alumni were hired to work in various federal offices to manage the transition to the Systems

89

Additionally, many whites in both the north and the south began to respond negatively to a
change in the character of the Civil Rights movement, which up until 1964 focused primarily on
issues of integration, but shifted focus toward Black Power and Black Nationalism in the late
1960s (Bush R. , 1999).
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Analysis approach (Jardini, 1996, pp. 341-343). Moynihan later remarked that PPBS “colonized
the federal establishment” (Mehta, 2013, p. 71). In the same year, the original Elementary and
Secondary Education Act was passed, which allocated $3 billion for federal education funding.
The vast expansion of systems analysis techniques at the federal level filtered down to state
governments as well. Alice Rivlin’s Systematic Thinking for Social Action crystallizes the PPBS
approach outside of the military, and shows the degree to which the logic and practice of systems
analysis were accepted in the halls of government.90 In her own words, “Missionaries no longer
need to be sent to convert the heathen to the virtues of systems analysis” (Rivlin, 1971, p. 6).
Other authors spoke about the potential of Systems Analysis in tones reminiscent of efficiency
experts and intelligence testers:
“(Systems Analysis) enables one to raise probing questions in a universal language.
Systematic thinking is logical thinking…The range of potential applications…is nearly
unlimited…Its major virtue is the enhancement of human judgment.” (Hartley, 1968, p.
28)
“The argument for systematic experimentation is straightforward: Information necessary
to improve the effectiveness of social services is impossible to obtain in any other way.”
(Rivlin, 1971, p. 108)
With the application of PPBS and cost-benefit evaluations across the domestic policy spectrum,
many compensatory programs were found to be ineffective or too expensive (Rossi & Freeman,
1993). With regards to compensatory education programs, results were particularly dismal;
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In 1968, Rivlin was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare in charge of planning and evaluation. The Secretary at the time was William Gorham,
who began his career at the RAND Corporation, and would go on to found the Urban Institute
based on a federal contract to evaluate President Johnson’s social welfare programs. In this way,
the same procedure that gave rise to RAND in the military brought economics-driven
policymaking to civilian life. Systematic Thinking was published based on a series of lectures
given by Rivlin to the Brookings Institution in 1970. The two previous speakers in the same
series were Charles Hitch and Charles Schultze; the latter was the director of the Bureau of the
Budget in the Johnson Administration.
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Levin (1972) notes that of 1,200 such programs evaluated by the Office of Education, only 10
were shown to be successful.
Systems Analysis in education saw its most notable exponent in 1966 with the publication of a
report commissioned by the US Office of Education. The report – titled “Equality of Educational
Opportunity” – was mandated by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and quickly became associated
with its primary author, sociologist James S. Coleman, earning the nickname ‘The Coleman
Report.’91 Based on a massive study involving nearly 650,000 students and teachers in over
3,000 schools92, it examined the impact of school segregation in terms of “inputs” and “outputs.”
The report found that most students attended racially segregated schools; white students attended
the most segregated schools, while Black students were the most segregated among minority
groups. Schools with mostly black students had fewer resources and were staffed by less
credentialed and less educated teachers. Racial gaps in achievement – measured by ETS-created
standardized tests of mathematics and verbal ability – were significant and increased with age.
But the most notable finding regarded the relationship of school characteristics (inputs) to

91

The Coleman Report was not the first large-scale attempt to measure educational inputs and
outputs and relate the two. Researchers at the American Institutes for Research (AIR) and the
University of Pittsburgh, led by John C. Flanagan, conducted a national survey of high school
students called Project TALENT. But as Rivlin notes, the study focused only on high school
students, did not collect race data, and did not lend itself to socioeconomic comparisons (1971, p.
13). Flanagan was associated with Air Force aptitude testing during World War II and founded
AIR shortly after. The study was fully funded by the US Office of Education only after the
Soviet launch of Sputnik.
92
An important link to the previous section is that although the principal investigators, Coleman
and Ernest Campbell, were both university academics, the survey coding and much of the
analysis were conducted at the offices of Educational Testing Service. This is consistent with the
increasing role of private research firms in conducting early social policy research in the 1960s
(Bulmer, 1996). Perhaps more relevant, the director of the National Center for Education
Statistics, Alexander Mood, had been a researcher with RAND Corporation from 1950 to 1955
before founding his own OR firm. Mood supervised the Coleman Report and played an
important role in computerizing the statistical arm of NCES (INFORMS, nd; Mosteller, 2009).
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measured achievement (outputs): the report found that students’ family backgrounds and the
characteristics of their peers in school played far greater roles in determining achievement than
did any measure of school quality. The implication of this finding was that efforts to improve
student achievement by increasing school resources – one of the intentions of the Johnson
Administration – would do little in terms of educational output.93 For our purposes what is most
important here is that the school was conceptualized in the language of the systems analyst.
The general finding in Coleman that students’ outcomes varied significantly by school, ignoring
the report’s important caveat regarding the broader social context, raised the issues of school
performance and a new specter: accountability94. By 1971, states from New York to Kansas to
California were calling for schools to be held responsible for student performance. Fred
Hechinger called accountability the ‘great current controversy across the nation’ (Hechinger,
1971).95 President Nixon’s Message on Education Reform included a section on “New
Measurements of Achievement” which began with the question “What makes a good school?”;

Beyond the reports’ political impact, its repercussions for the community of researchers
concerned with education were enormous. The shift in focus from educational inputs – facilities
and resources material and human – to outputs like test scores marked a decisive change in the
nature of discussions about what matters in schooling. In another chapter, I examine the
evolution of Value-Added Assessment techniques, a story which begins with responses to and
critiques of the Coleman Report.
94
There is a complexity which should be mentioned at this point. On the one hand, the concerns
over school equity indeed had factual grounding; Coleman brought a large amount of data to
bear on a problem which was likely obvious to casual observers and social scientists alike. The
point about moral panics and moral crusades is not that they create problems out of thin air, but
rather that they mark a focal point for public outcry. As Tyack and Cuban (1995) and Labaree
(2010) point out, the educational system has frequently been visited with reformers using moral
outrage as a tool. What I attempt to add to this discussion is the observation that the chosen
target depends heavily on the state of social science and its techniques.
95
Ironically, in the same article, Hechinger quotes former RAND economist and Systems
Analysis pioneer Charles Hitch – then serving as University of California President – in
opposition to Governor Ronald Reagan’s call to impose accountability metrics on the UC
system. Such measures, Hitch said, ‘would reduce our flexibility to make best use of our
resources.’ It’s rough when the axe swings in the other direction.
93
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therein, he advocated a shift in focus from educational ‘inputs’ to ‘outputs’, emphasized the need
to develop ‘more sensitive measurements’ of school quality, and called for accountability,
though in vague terms (Nixon, 1970).
As with Systems Analysis in general, its application to school accountability was trumpeted by
supporters as the antidote for all the ills of public education. “Educational Engineering,” as
Assistant Education Secretary Leon Lessinger called it, would facilitate educational
accountability for results. Without specifics, he suggested that accountability in itself had the
capacity to affect change in every aspect of education from curriculum to student boredom to
school segregation (Lessinger, 1970; 1971).96
Some of the first experiments with school accountability went under the heading of performance
contracting, in which outside firms were brought in to teach underperforming students and were
paid on the basis of students’ growth on standardized achievement tests. Beginning with a
program in Texarkana, Texas in 1969, by 1972 there were around 150 performance contracts in
effect throughout the country. Teachers’ and Administrators’ unions reacted harshly to the
introduction of performance contracts; “Hucksters in Our Schools!” was the title of a 1970 article
in American Teacher addressing the issue; teachers in Gary, Indiana threatened to strike in the
same year over a performance contract in that city. Some test-makers also reacted unfavorably
toward this use of standardized tests in performance contracting, as it became clear that the tests
were directing instruction (Mecklenberger, 1972; Ascher, 1996). The push for performance
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Lessinger was perhaps the most vocal spokesperson for educational accountability of the era.
His 1970 book, titled Every Kid a Winner: Accountability in Education was described as the
“bible of accountability,” and many authors followed suit with more specific accountability titles
in the next five years.
111

contracting ultimately ended in controversies over contractors’ ‘teaching to the test’ and the
lackluster results of program evaluations (Rosenthal J. , 1972).97
The first major municipal effort at school accountability was initiated in New York City. Mayor
John Lindsay was enamored with the McNamara approach to government administration, and
had the cooperation of Albert Shanker, the head of the United Federation of Teachers. The 1969
contract between the union and the city explicitly notes a joint agreement on professional
accountability (Lessinger, 1971, p. 63). The $100,000 contract to design the system was awarded
to ETS; reflecting the concerns of the teacher’s union, ETS intended to construct a system which
controlled for students’ background characteristics, a point which was criticized by educational
psychologist and civil rights activist Kenneth B. Clark. Echoing claims of the ‘soft bigotry of
low expectations” 30 years later, Clark contended that this sort of system would “formalize and
give sanction to negative expectations for poor and minority children” (Buder, 1971). Both the
New York City Board of Education and the schools Chancellor emphasized that the program
would not be used in a punitive fashion against individual teachers or administrators, and that
evaluation would be of school performance in the aggregate (Hechinger, 1971). Other
accountability designs provoked much resistance among educators. In 1973, the issue of
evaluation provoked a six week-long teacher’s strike in Detroit (Stevens, 1973). Shortly after the
New York City plan was instituted in 1974, the Schools Chancellor was urged by the president
of the Board of Education to address a potential cheating scandal (Buder, 1974). Ultimately, the

The contractor in Texarkana, TX – Dorsett Educational Systems Inc. – was found to be
instructing students on the same items contained in the evaluation exam (Stake, 1971). In 1970,
the Office of Economic Opportunity conducted an 18-site experiment with Performance
Contracting. Batelle Laboratories was the first evaluator to release its results, which showed no
differences between students taught by contractors and those taught at public schools. The
RAND Corporation, which further evaluated the experiment, found no evidence of better
achievement at any of the sites (Ascher, 1996).
97
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accountability program was overshadowed by greater concerns surrounding the decentralization
of school control and later by the city’s fiscal crisis.
By 1975, accountability was ceasing to be a buzz-word in discussions of educational policy.
Schools in large American cities were more actively coping with budget crises as their tax bases
migrated to the suburbs. Concerns about educational equity persisted, but were generally
expressed in questions of school funding. Three major cases in the California Supreme Court, all
titled Serrano vs. Priest, were focused on this question; similar cases were argued in many states
under headings of ‘funding equity’ and ‘funding adequacy’ (Bollinger, 2003).98 But perceptions
of the concept of school quality were dramatically altered by the application of systems analysis,
a change which would set the stage for education reform battles in the 21 st century. Because SA,
aided by standardized testing and school surveys (each products and producers of previous moral
upsurges, as documented above) made possible the direct comparison of schools, the notion of
good and bad schools and the distinction between the two became important.
But as school accountability faded into the relative background of educational policy efforts, new
technological innovation and political framing was already underway. One educator in 1975
presciently wrote:
“Teachers know all about panaceas. Accountability was the most recent remedy for the
ills of American schools. After some obligatory grumbling and retooling, teachers made
their peace with it… This interesting notion has useful possibilities. But teachers may not
be able to develop them, for a newer panacea is upon them. Productivity has surfaced.”
(Miller F. , 1975)
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State and federal courts have heard many school funding equity cases in since the 1970s, but
there has been one generally constant feature: the expert testimony of Value-Added pioneer Eric
Hanushek. He has testified on behalf of the state in twenty such cases, and his research even
informed the Supreme Court decision in the 2009 Horne v. Flores decision, where the majority
opinion suggested, in Hanushek’s language, that school performance measures should focus on
output rather than input. This will be revisited in the final chapter.
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The next chapter traces the developments of both the technology of evaluation and the attendant
political context in terms of teacher productivity. It also leads us to the state of the art with
Value-Added Assessment.
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Chapter 5: Value-Added in Private: Developing techniques to measure teacher
productivity
The last chapter discussed the relationship between educational politics and assessment
technology since the earliest days of public schooling. This chapter will resume immediately
where the last left off and take us directly through the development of value-added assessment.
The focus will be the development of value-added as theoretical model, practical technology and
policy tool, as well the discursive and political shifts which accompanied this development.
One of the pioneers of value-added research crystallized the shift in the approach to studying
educational systems in a presentation to the American Education Research Association in 2000.
Though his reference is the Dallas school district, it could easily be applied to the country as a
whole:
For many years the District and Department followed what was the classical evaluation
approach of the late 1960s and early 1970s…Good program evaluation was the key…In
the 1980s we tried a comprehensive program to identify and reward effective
schools…from 1997 conducting research using teacher effectiveness data (Mendro &
Bembry, 2000, pp. 2-3).
Beyond data and technology, how can we understand the last 20 years of education reform from
a political/ideological perspective? Anthony Picciano and Joel Spring’s (2013) work on the
“Education-Industrial Complex” posits a network of actors which has taken shape in the last 20
years of education policymaking in the US. In seeking to understand how technological changes
have been (often uncritically) pushed into American schooling, the authors utilize two important
concepts: “flexians” and shadow government. The former term refers to individuals who move
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between for-profit, nonprofit, and government employment. Flexians develop networks which
take advantage of the executive power of governments, the influence of non-profits, and the
economic power of corporations to promote their personal agendas and often to enrich
themselves. In an era when governments, particularly at the state and local levels, are in financial
trouble and increasingly turning functions over to private firms – what Wedel calls ‘Swisscheese government’ (Picciano & Spring, p. 18) – opens many doors for flexians to become part
of government networks without being accountable to elected officials or the public. In this way
flexian networks – including unaccountable private companies and non-profit foundations –
come to constitute a shadow government which can promote its favored ideology.
Picciano and Spring argue that technology is the primary ideology for so-called flexians
operating in the education system. However, they are not the only scholars to observe this
unbridled enthusiasm for all things digital and algorithmic. Evgeny Morozov (2013) offers a
wide ranging critique of such ambitious number-crunchers – many of whom make money
working for Silicon Valley firms – who believe that better algorithms and accessible data can
solve problems that have challenged the political process for generations. He names this
phenomenon ‘technological solutionism’ and suggests that their quest to remake the world in the
image of computer software and “the internet” is misguided. Further he argues that if successful,
technologically managed politics would undermine the very human freedom that it seeks to
enhance. In this chapter, we will see how an exponential growth of computing power coincides
with political developments in education and thus enabled value-added to flourish in policy
circles.
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From Coleman to A Nation At Risk: Economic competitiveness and the narrative of school
failure

By the middle of the 1970s, research on schooling had begun to move away from the program
evaluation model and systems analysis, even as school systems at all levels continued to rely on
these methods. As we have seen, these techniques were deployed partly in reaction to the
massive Great Society programs begun under Lyndon Johnson (Moynihan, 1970; Jardini, 2000).
Perhaps the most important piece of education research in that era, the 1966 Coleman Report,
advanced a controversial position: for student outcomes, in-school factors matter substantially
less than out-of-school factors such as students’ home environment and peers. Despite this
major finding, the Coleman data’s unique feature of linking students to schools and teachers
provided the first opening for research on so-called educational productivity. Among the
reactions to that finding lay the seeds of the present debate over teacher quality, though it would
take 40 years to appear in its current shape.
Before discussing the details of how assessment technology developed, certain contexts need
consideration. First, the Cold War and real or perceived competition with the Soviet Union ebbed
as the Vietnam War ended. The end of this ideological conflict may have dampened American
policymakers’ appetites for progressive reforms, as they were no longer necessary to maintain
capitalism’s appeal among a restive public99. Thus, even though the envisioned ‘Great Society’
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It could be argued that the decline and eventual demise of the Soviet Union opened up space
for the resurgence of neo-Classical economic theories which argue against government
interference and in favor of so-called ‘free markets’ in all aspects of social life. Neo-classical
resurgence animated many educational reform efforts throughout the 1980s and 1990s, most
notably the educational voucher and school choice movements, which can be traced back to
Milton Friedman’s writings in the early 1960s. John Chubb and Terry Moe’s (1990) Politics,
Markets and America’s Schools popularized the argument for privatization by arguing that more
autonomous private schools outperform public schools which are weighed down by the
democratic political process.
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was never achieved, the pragmatic reasons for pursuing it were gone. At the same time,
continued demographic shifts in the nation’s urban centers – “white flight” – accelerated in the
wake of attempts to desegregate public schools. These shifts placed great financial strains on
many cities, making it unlikely that local leaders, even if they were interested in progressive
school policies, would be able to afford them. The fights over school funding in the Serrano v.
Priest cases in California were partly a result of the fiscal choices of cash-strapped cities.
So public schooling again found itself under duress, but shifts in the nature of the economy also
made a dramatic impact on education discourse. The 1970s marked the beginning of the postFordist period which was characterized by deindustrialization, decreased reliance on skilled labor
in manufacturing, an increase in service sector employment, and technological upgrades to
certain occupations. These changes served to increase emphasis on education as an economic
growth engine both at the societal and individual level100. Human Capital theory, though
traceable to the work of Adam Smith, is more commonly associated with economists of the
1960s, particularly Theodore Schultz, Gary Becker and Jacob Mincer. The theory posits
education as a form of capital investment; just as upgrades to machinery render production more
efficient, so do upgrades to the educational level of the workforce. Formal schooling is offered as
the key example of a human capital investment, and is said to offer returns to both individual
workers who upgrade their skills and to societal groups that expand access to schooling. Despite
substantial challenges to its central tenets (the relation between education and the labor force,
and the rational decision-making of individuals), human capital continues to occupy a central
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This link between educational expansion and economic growth was first theorized by
Economist Gary Becker in 1962 in his book Human Capital. The shift away from manufacturing
in the most developed countries makes it easier to argue for this connection, whether or not it
actually exists.
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place in educational policy-making in the US. Simply put, education is conceived of as an
economic imperative both for individuals and groups and for the nation as a whole. This
conception has helped fuel panic over schooling since the 1980s.
A related technical innovation was the introduction of a number of international education
assessments, which sought to compare the knowledge of students from industrialized countries.
The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, which has existed
in some form since 1958, began attempting to measure and compare educational progress among
countries in the early 1980s with its Second International Mathematics (SIMS) and Science
(SISS) studies. In 1991 the organization administered its first Reading Literacy Study. The Third
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), conducted in 1995, became the first
regular international assessment of educational performance, now repeated every four years,
along with the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (International Association for
the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, nd). The Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) followed suit in the late 1990s with its own comparative test of all
subjects, the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). It is important to note that
both the impetus for and technology of national assessment originated in the US – the TIMSS
program was largely adapted from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP)
which has been administered in the US in some form since the 1960s (Beaton, et al., 2011).101
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One motivating force behind the expansion NAEP was the annual release of ACT and SAT
test scores. In the 1970s, reaction to media panic over the declining scores on college entrance
exams – which tested only those students interested in attending college – crystallized the need
for a complete national indicator. The NAEP also underwent significant changes in the 1980s;
before 1983, the exam did not allow for comparisons of states or school districts. But technical
innovations including Item Response Theory scaling and new sampling techniques allowed for
such group comparisons and for tracking of trends in performance (Beaton, et al., 2011).
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Concern over educational quality from the mid-1980s forward was first crystallized in a 1983
report commissioned by President Ronald Reagan, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for
Educational Reform (ANR). The report framed deficiencies in the US school system in the
context of rising international economic competition and stagnating domestic social mobility,
and likened existing educational policy to “unilateral disarmament.” The claim that a “rising tide
of mediocrity” was threatening America’s economic dominance was based primarily on reported
declines in SAT scores and the results of international assessments of academic achievement,
which frequently placed the US low among industrialized countries. Given that the federal
government does not directly control education policy, ANR urged policymakers in the states to
focus on basic competencies and to devote particular attention to science and mathematics
education.102
Notably, the report does not name teachers as the source of the problem, but emphasizes a need
to change school policy from the outside – meaning by interest groups not immediately
connected to schooling. As during the Cold War, emphasis was on the rigor of coursework,
especially in high schools. Other cited issues were the amount of school time spent on studying
(as opposed to extracurricular activities) and lowered selectivity among colleges. Teachers are
placed among the victims of the school systems and are said to be necessary partners in efforts to
change the schools.103 The only problem attributed to teachers directly is a lack of qualifications
in needed subject areas such as mathematics, natural sciences, and computer technology. But the
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Although ANR read more like a manifesto than a policy research report, it was supported by a
detailed analysis of students’ high school transcripts, prepared by noted education policy
researcher Clifford Adelman.
103
A Nation at Risk is a political document and so one could regard the emphasis on school
systems rather than individual teachers as an attempt to prevent a backlash by teachers’ groups.
But later reform reports go much further in positioning teachers as an obstacle to the desired
changes to the school system.
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blame for this is placed at the feet of schools of education, which were charged with emphasizing
methodology over content.104
ANR resonated among policymakers and business leaders. Mehta (2013)notes the proliferation
of reports by various state education agencies echoing its sentiments. ANR juxtaposed stubborn
educational insiders pursuing their narrow interests with external reformers acting on behalf of
the public good. The more important shift in language was a contrast to the Coleman Report’s
suggestion that schools were unlikely to overcome larger social forces; here, schools were held
solely responsible for a perceived decline in American global economic standing and for
stagnating social mobility. Similarly, ANR’s emphasis on economic competiveness and higher
level skills required for the jobs of the future raised the stakes of education reform to no less than
the future of the country.
Three years later, the focus on the schools in general would be narrowed to educators by another
government report. In August of 1986, the National Governor’s Association published and
adopted Time for Results, which urged state governments to “make it clear to teacher
organizations, administrators, and school boards that they must consider new ways of doing
business” (Kean, 1986). Like A Nation at Risk, it emphasized a connection between education
reform, economic competitiveness and social mobility. In a summary of the report’s findings,
one author states that the governors’ “highest priorities are jobs and economic development”
(Nathan, 1986). But taking the claims of ANR as given, Time for Results moves to suggest
accountability strategies to measure student learning and reward or punish schools for their
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Teacher education was a major focus of many other reports that appeared in the 1980s.
Specifically, a number of reports called for a five-year teacher education program and increased
efforts to attract and retain mathematics and science teachers (Sadker & Zittleman, 2007).
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results. The task force on school management – headed by then governor Bill Clinton –urged
school systems to tie certification of principals to student outcomes (Clinton, 1986). Other NGA
task forces raised issues of educational technology, school choice, and efficient use of school
buildings. Like most educational reform efforts of the 20th century, the outline of the Governors’
action plan stressed educational efficiency – defined as the most progress on test scores and
graduation for the least additional cost.
The report’s section on teaching reform stops short of calling for teacher evaluation based on
student results, but raises a specter of unionized teachers as an obstacle to reform. The NGA
chairman’s overview claims that governors have had to battle with educators to secure real
reforms (Alexander L. , 1986). In co-chair Thomas Kean’s summary of the teaching task force
report, the “total school” is the chosen unit of analysis in order to “foster faculty and staff
cooperation.” At the same time, however, the task force repeatedly referred to “organized
education groups” and “educational interest groups” whose agendas conflict with “broad public
concern.” Specifically, Kean challenges educators to justify calls for increased funding and
professional discretion by delivering results, which are only defined in the report by standardized
tests. The task force recommends using these measures unless educators can come up with other
ways of assessing progress (Kean, 1986, pp. 206-207). Broadly speaking, Time for Results offers
teachers and schools autonomy only at the price of accountability.
Not every commissioned report on education advanced the same claims of educational decline,
economic peril, and needed accountability. In 1990, the U.S. Department of Energy‘s Sandia
National Laboratory reported on historical indicators of school performance and projected
technological needs of the nation’s workforce. In the first case, the report finds no evidence of a
decline in educational quality, though the authors are careful to suggest that improvement was
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possible and necessary. SAT score declines were found to be well-explained by a changing
population of test-takers, and National Assessment of Educational Progress test scores showed
no evidence of decline in mathematics or science (Carson, Huelskamp, & Woodall, 1992, pp.
270-271). On the latter question, the report runs counter to the human capital narrative advanced
in A Nation At Risk and Time for Results. Citing data from a number of surveys, the authors
argue that technical skills are not in demand among employers and that, if anything, the
production of science and engineering degree-holders is in excess of demand. Further, the
authors suggest that even if American students are performing relatively poorly on international
standardized tests, their later outcomes such as college attendance, degree attainment, and skilled
technical employment are comparatively high. In sum, the Sandia Report shows that critics of
the American school system at the time were wrong on points of fact. But, as Berliner and Biddle
(1995) note, these findings were suppressed by the administration of George H.W. Bush, as they
contradicted its education reform agenda.
Critiques of the Coleman Report and the ‘Education Production Function’

In 1966, immediately following the release of Coleman, a group of education researchers was
convened to discuss the survey and its findings. These meetings, called the Harvard Seminar on
the Equality of Educational Opportunity Report (SEEOR), sought to reanalyze the vast data
collected and further interrogate the main findings. In general, these seminars confirmed what
the original report had said about the relationship between school inputs and outputs, that
variation in academic performance was higher within schools than between schools and thus
more attributable to student characteristics than to anything that could be easily changes about
school resources, including staff.
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But one group of critics suggested that the report’s data on school quality and its analytic
methods were inadequate for discovering the relationship between school quality and student
academic achievement. They further argued that the data and methods systematically favored the
‘no school effects’ conclusion. Among the problems, these critics suggested that teacher
characteristics should have been included in the group of school input variables (Hanushek &
Kain, 1972). Eric Hanushek, at the time a graduate student at MIT, was one of the participants
arguing this position.105 His doctoral dissertation was his first attempt to revise the Coleman
analysis. Therein, he further developed the ‘teacher effect’ concept in regards to racial
differences in academic achievement. Shortly thereafter, building on an argument which couldn’t
be directly tested with Coleman Report data, Hanushek used longitudinal data to estimate teacher
effects (Hanushek E. , 1970). In a subsequent article, he used achievement gains between the
first and third grades as an outcome measure (Hanushek E. , 1971). This change in approach
marked the birth of value-added assessment in education.106
Other researchers saw problems with the measurement of educational productivity similar to
those of the systems analysis approach. In a 1970 paper, Samuel Bowles discussed the theoretical
and practical issues with attempting to quantify what and how well schools produce. At the
conceptual level, researchers lack a clear theory of student learning with which to specify the
production process. Similarly, even if learning outcomes are accepted as one goal of schooling,
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Hanushek also figures into the last part of the story in the previous chapter. He was a
consultant for the RAND corporation from 1969-1973, during which time he published a report
titled “The Value of Teachers in Teaching.” In his expert witness testimony in Vergara v.
California, examined in the next chapter, we learn how this research figured into his first expert
witness testimony in the 1973 Serrano v. Priest case (Mar 24 AM, 0h18m).
106
Even at this early point, the policy implications of Value-Added were quite clear. The author
suggests that swapping teachers at the bottom of the verbal ability scale for those at the top
would produce dramatic achievement gains (Hanushek E. , 1971, p. 286).
124

there are certainly others. Bowles called school output “multidimensional with a vengeance”
(Bowles, 1970, p. 23). Practically, researchers could not control variation in the school situation
or the schooling process. Further, schools do not behave in the ways efficiency-driven
researchers would like them to, frequently making decisions based on criteria other than the
maximization of output. Bowles argued that available data are not precise enough to support
even an approximate model of student learning. Beyond this, he follows Coleman and others in
stressing that given how much learning takes place outside of school, the potential productivity
of schools is likely to be overstated by those interested in interrogating the concept of
educational production (pp. 40-41).
But to move beyond simulations and secondary data analysis, Value-Added assessment would
require massive data collection projects. The city of Dallas and the state of Tennessee were the
first testing grounds for such efforts.
Early Value-Added Systems: DVAAS and TVAAS

Dallas, Texas was the first municipality to evaluate education using value-added techniques
(Stone, 2000). Beginning in the late 1960s, and accelerating after a lawsuit in 1971, the Dallas
Independent School District was charged with assessing the effectiveness of its desegregation
initiatives. As was shown in the previous chapter, accountability was a policy buzzword at the
time, and was enmeshed with desegregation efforts. William Webster was in charge of research
and development for the Dallas schools and was responsible for compliance with state-mandated
accountability (Cunningham, 1997). He is regarded as primarily responsible for the Dallas
Value-Added Accountability System (DVAAS).
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In 1984, the district began using a version of value-added based on regression techniques to
evaluate schools.107 That system was abandoned and replaced in 1990 by another which used
hierarchical linear modeling; another iteration of DVAAS, which could be used to evaluate
individual teachers, was field tested in 1996.108 Despite the ability to assess teachers, the
Commission which created the system emphasized identifying effective schools and merit pay
(Webster & Mendro, 1997).
By this time, many researchers had expressed concern about the use of student achievement data
in evaluation of teacher performance, owing to the fallout over merit pay policies in previous
decades (Webster & Mendro, 1995, p. 393). Technically proficient auditors expressed
reservations about the Dallas system, noting that its estimates of teacher effects would be
unreliable (Thum & Bryk, 1997). More holistic critics suggested potential unintended
consequences of an evaluation system based on high-stakes multiple choice tests – including
widespread cheating, narrowing of the curriculum, and negative impacts on school culture
(Sykes, 1997). The architects of the system responded that despite its limitations, the value-

Dallas’ move to evaluate schools based on test results was followed by Texas as whole in
1990, when the State Board of Education implemented the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills
(Cruse & Twing, 2000). Jennings (2005) notes that Texas schools in this period began to
emphasize data-driven decision-making.
108
An important feature of the Dallas accountability process was that it included various
stakeholders – including teachers and parents – in deciding how to weight various student tests
and which demographic controls (“fairness variables”) to include in the prediction equation. The
teacher evaluation pilot was politically contentious, particularly the creation of a Teacher
Effectiveness index which ranked teachers into Tier 1 (top 40% effectiveness across a school
district), Tier 2 (next 50%), and Tier 3 (bottom 10%). This index was dropped from the final
teacher evaluation reports (Webster W. , Mendro, Orsak, Weerasinghe, & Bembry, 1997).
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added assessment system would be a fairer means of assessing schools and teachers than other
systems currently in use. 109
Dallas’ foray into Value-Added assessment is important not only for its novelty. The model of
accountability created there would substantially influence the Texas model implemented by
George W. Bush, which would then be replicated in NCLB. Sandy Kress, a Democratic Party
operative in the 1970s and 1980s, was president of the board of trustees for the Dallas Public
Schools and a zealous believer in the power of accountability (Donald, 2000). Before becoming
its president, he led the board’s Commission for Educational Excellence which recommended
Mendro’s Value-Added system and gave it consequences for schools and teachers (Bembry,
Bearden, & Mendro, 1997). After four divisive years serving on the school board, Kress
resigned, and quickly became engaged in promoting educational accountability across Texas. He
earned the favor of George W. Bush, and despite partisan disagreements, was the chief promoter
of the “Texas miracle” – overall test score gains and a closing of the racial achievement gap

Representative of the status of ‘rigorous science’ in educational research discussed in the next
section, Webster and his colleagues devote careful attention to the technical criticisms of Thum
and Bryk, while regarding Sykes’ thoughtful and perhaps more relevant critique of the Dallas
Value-Added System as ‘Pie in the Sky.’
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attributed to the Texas accountability system110 – during Bush’s presidential campaign and
became the key architect of NCLB’s accountability provisions. 111
The first state to implement data collection for value-added assessment was Tennessee, which
has never been shy about novel education policy. In 1983, the state enacted a merit pay system
called the Career Ladder System. Two years later, it hosted perhaps the largest randomized
educational experiment in US history, Project STAR, to assess the effects of class size on student
achievement. Ceperly and Reel (1997) note that Tennessee was pushed into accountability
reform by a 1988 lawsuit over school funding equity112. As a result of the lawsuit, legislators
needed business support to raise taxes and equalize school funding. In return, they promised the
state’s business roundtable that schools and teachers would be held accountable for performance.
William L. Sanders of the University of Tennessee113 had begun pilot studies of a value-added
assessment system as early as 1982 with funding from the state’s department of education (Ball,

The “Texas miracle” is now widely regarded as a myth and a case study in how testing
regimes can pervert the educational process. Many point to Texas as the archetype of
“educational triage” – focusing instruction on students who are on the verge of being ranked
proficient by a test – while ignoring both those who will definitely pass and definitely fail
(Booher-Jennings, 2005). The parallel in studies of social service accountability is “creaming” –
prioritizing the easiest cases when one is rated on the number of successful outcomes (Miller,
Roby, & van Steenwijk, 1970; Cohen N. A., 2014). Others note that Texas saw a dramatic
increase in the number of special education placements as average scores were on the rise –
special education students’ scores did not count in accountability metrics (Haney, 2000).
Observers likened this practice to a form of creative accounting which bolstered Texas’
reputation without improving its educational quality (Bernstein J. , 2002).
111
Illustrative of the Picciano and Spring’s ‘flexians,’ Kress now works as a lobbyist for a
number of private education firms including Pearson, Teach for America, and Wireless
Generation (Vasquez-Heilig, 2013).
112
The lawsuit, Tennessee Small Schools v. McWherter, went through a number of appeals
which concluded in 2006.
113
Before his research moved to education, Sanders was an agricultural statistician in Tennessee
whose research focused on reproduction in livestock, specifically how to parse out the influence
of genetics from that of environment. In the late 1970s, then Governor Lamar Alexander wanted
to use student achievement data for the state’s merit pay program. Amid controversy over the
110
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2013; Sanders & McLean, 1984). The result of these efforts was the Tennessee Value-Added
Assessment System (TVAAS). The system was immediately popular with state lawmakers, and
Sanders became a popular lecturer both inside the state and elsewhere. The primary argument for
its superiority over other means of test-based evaluation was that it used gain-scores or student
achievement growth, rather than raw test score data, to compare school effectiveness. As in
Dallas, Tennessee regarded this as fairer because it seemingly levels the playing field between
schools by not punishing those that serve low-scoring students.
When Tennessee passed its Education Improvement Act in 1991, Sanders’ system was the
centerpiece of the legislation. The law specifically mandated the use of TVAAS. The system
made use of norm-referenced tests the state’s Comprehensive Assessment Plan (TCAP) for its
annual data.114 Between 1991 and 2003, the state paid over $5 million to Sanders’ research outfit
just to cover the data analysis contract (Smith, 2004). The first few years of data collection still
focused on school-level analysis, but in 1994 student and teacher information were linked in the
database, allowing for Value-Added measurement of individual teachers. Since 1993, valueadded reports on schools and school systems have been part of the public record in Tennessee;
teacher reports only commenced in 1996 and are only distributed to teachers and administrators

appropriateness of using such data, Sanders used agricultural value-added methods with data
from Knox County to make the case that the technique was viable. The initial study, concluded
in 1984, failed to gain the attention of legislators (Archer, 1999).
114
A departure from earlier education evaluation laws, the Tennessee EIA specified that TVAAS
would be used to evaluate individual teachers’ contributions to student achievement. TVAAS’
use of norm-referenced tests is also a significant detail. Norm-referenced tests are not designed
to reflect mastery of content areas; they instead seek to rank students by using small batches of
questions covering broad areas of knowledge. The SAT is an example of a norm-references test.
Tennessee’s norm-referenced tests compared Tennessee students with other students around the
country. Criterion-referenced tests are designed to assess mastery of specified curriculum goals.
Tennessee’s criterion-referenced exams were aligned with its state curriculum (Baker & Xu,
1995, p. 3). Thus, the tests used to assess teacher quality were not actually based on what
teachers were expected to teach.
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(Kupermintz, 2003). Furthermore, the state placed limitations on which student achievement
scores could be used to determine teachers’ value-added scores (Baker & Xu, 1995).
Sanders’ team collected annual data on all of the state’s public school students. Sanders
recognized that in addition to the evaluation function the data would serve within Tennessee, the
scope and nature of the data would have effects on educational research well beyond state
borders. Many of the conclusions drawn from early analysis of Tennessee data have become
recurring themes regarding the merits of Value-Added methods, most notably the claim of
residual effects of ‘highly effective’ teachers in subsequent years (Sanders & Horn, 1998). But at
this stage, Sanders was still careful to note that while VAA data could be valuable for
understanding how teachers impact student learning, it should not be used to make high-stakes
decisions:
“We hope the data are used for diagnostic purposes…This is about trying to improve our
schools, not about embarrassing teachers (Hill D. , 2000).”
“To my knowledge, no teacher has been fired where the reports were the justification for
it. This is not about firing people. This is about measurement, about producing what I call
the river of diagnostic information to show individual teachers where their relative
strengths and weaknesses are (Clowes, 1999).”
Echoing the wisdom of Coleman, Sanders also remarked that schools and teachers should not be
held to account for societal problems beyond their control (Archer, 1999).
Used for consequence or not, TVAAS was subject to criticism early on because it did not
account for student background variables in the determination of teacher effects, and for its
questionable handling of missing data (Darlington, 1997). The method used in the early Dallas
system did include background measures, similar to systems currently in place in New York and
Los Angeles. But Sanders devoted much time to arguing that background characteristics were
superfluous to a model which included individual students’ prior test scores (Sanders & Horn,
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1994; Sanders & Horn, 1998).115 Another important criticism focused on the complexity of the
statistical techniques, which rendered the assessment incomprehensible to nearly everyone
directly affected by it (Baker & Xu, 1995; Popham, 1997). The TVAAS system provided an
important model for this method of teacher and school evaluation, but subsequent political
developments would push Value-Added into the education reform spotlight.
Clinton, Bush, and NCLB: Education Science and the Focus on Teachers

While much criticism is leveled at No Child Left Behind (NCLB), the educational program
enacted by President George W. Bush, its emphasis on measurable outputs and accountability
has its root in the educational agenda of President Bill Clinton.116 The Improving America’s
Schools Act (IASA), Clinton’s reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act,
for the first time tied Title I funding to schools’ adoption of testing programs, and required
districts to take corrective action against schools not meeting improvement standards (Education
Week, 1994; Thomas & Brady, 2005). Clinton’s ‘Goals 2000’ legislation, signed just before the
IASA, included a grant program intended to leverage state-level cooperation with the president’s
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The general consensus among VA researchers is that the models should include controls for
background characteristics. I’ve already shown in chapter 2 how background characteristics at
the school level impact teacher VA rankings.
116
Some trace this lineage back even further to the convening of the Charlottesville Education
Summit by President George H. W. Bush in 1989. But the goals set by this summit were only
given any legal force after Clinton, himself a key architect of the summit, was elected in 1992.
Clinton had also been influenced by his experience in the National Governor’s association –
during which he was a contributor to the above-mentioned Time for Results. Bush’s legislative
attempt, America 2000, failed due to opposition from conservatives in his party, who argued it
was an incursion on states’ legislative territory. Nonetheless, the bill was notable for its emphasis
on uniform national academic standards (McDonnell, 2005).
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education agenda (Heise, 1994) – bearing much resemblance President Barack Obama’s Race to
the Top program 15 years later.117
But the overlap among the education policies of two Republicans and one Democrat itself needs
explanation. Goals 2000’s emphasis on standards-based reforms was mirrored in No Child Left
Behind, as was its emphasis on the expansion of educational technology. In their similarities we
can see the long shadow of A Nation at Risk, both Bushes and Clinton made use of the rhetoric of
an underprepared workforce in need of experience with new technology. Looking at the evolving
role of the federal government in education, McDonnell (2005) suggests that the common
experiences of Lamar Alexander (the elder Bush’s secretary of education), Bill Clinton, and
George W. Bush as governors in southern states helps explain their similar attraction to
standardized testing as a means of measuring academic progress. As we have already seen, two
of the three southern states (Texas and Tennessee) gave birth to Value-Added Assessment.
Rudalevige (2003) contends that in Congress, Republicans and many Democrats had grown
frustrated with the lack of results – however defined – from money spent on education. In her
analysis of the same period, Elizabeth DeBray (2006) notes that in the 1990s, conservative thinktanks began to take clear positions with respect to education policy – specifically promoting
school choice, vouchers, and other market-based reforms. Organizations like the American
Enterprise Institute, the Thomas B. Fordham Foundation, and the Hoover Institution began
drafting education policy platforms, which until then had been the province of more centrist and
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After the election of a Republican majority in the House of Representatives under Speaker
Newt Gingrich, congressional Republicans fought Goals 2000 – particularly its emphasis on
national education standards.
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liberal groups (pp. 24-26).118 This active conservative influence drove education policy further to
the ideological right and fostered a hostility toward both public schools and unionized teachers.
This hostile climate took one form in the push for scientifically based research in education. The
first attempt in this direction came with the 1999 Reading Excellence Act. Another competitive
grant program for the states, the REA defined ‘scientific reading research’ as “grounded in
rigorous, systematic and objective procedures…employ[ing] systematic, empirical methods that
draw on observation or experiment, involve rigorous data analyses that are designed to test the
stated hypotheses and justify the general conclusions drawn” (Baez & Boyles, 2009, p. 6).
Another piece of legislation, drafted in 2000, aimed to reform the Department of Education’s
Office of Educational Research and Improvement (now the Institute for Education Sciences),
included a similar definition of scientific research, but in the context of a bill which would affect
the practice of research (Eisenhart & Towne, 2003).119 But these were precursors to a much more
wide-reaching debate over what constitutes scientific research in education.
In November 2001, the National Research Council released a report titled Scientific Research in
Education. In its treatment of what constitutes rigorous research, the council was carefully
ecumenical on questions of methodology – making sure to note that non-experimental and
qualitative methods could be deemed rigorous. Yet certain inconsistencies are apparent. At the
outset of the report, they argue that science can be value-free and insulated from political and

Before the 1990s, conservatives espoused Ronald Reagan’s position on federal education
policy – the abolition of the Department of Education and the total handoff of schooling to the
states. Clinton’s re-election in 1996 further confirmed to many in the Republican party that such
an anti-education agenda was not palatable to the American electorate.
119
The “Castle Bill” also contained standards for qualitative research methods, but which
proscribe them to only those questions are not amenable to quantitative analysis (Eisenhart &
Towne, Contestation and Change in National Policy on 'Scientifically Based' Education
Research, 2003, p. 32).
118
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sociological forces, yet they use the history of standardized testing (discussed at length in the
previous chapter) as an example of the steady – and apolitical – accumulation of scientific
knowledge in education ( National Research Council, 2002). Perhaps more significantly, the
examples of rigorous research offered in the report are overwhelmingly quantitative and
experimental. Furthermore, the council report emphasizes that scientific research ultimately aims
at establishing cause-and-effect, implying (and devoting considerable attention to) the sort of
experimental and quantitative methods that have been ascendant in public policy since the 1970s
(p.101; p.110-126).
But it was two successive pieces of legislation, No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 and the
Education Sciences Reform Act of 2002, which unequivocally enshrined experimental and
quantitative methods as the standard for educational research. Scientifically based research is
defined in NCLB as “using empirical methods that draw on observation or experiment” and
“evaluated using experimental or quasi-experimental designs…with a preference for randomassignment experiments, or other designs to the extent that those designs contain withincondition or cross-condition controls (NCLB 2001, 2002).” The full text of the law refers to
scientifically based research over 100 times, mostly in the sections concerning disadvantaged
students and their schools, and those outlining “teacher quality” (Manna & Petrilli, 2008).120
What this meant in practice was that schools and districts would be obliged to choose services
and programs which were vetted using experimental and quasi-experimental design research if
they were to receive funding from the federal government under the Elementary and Secondary

120

Notably, the sections of the law which pertain to expansion of charter schools and educational
technology contain almost no references to scientifically-based research (Manna & Petrilli, 2008,
pp. 67-68). Apparently, the standard of experimental design was not meant to be equally applied
to the favored projects of the Bush administration. This provides additional evidence of the
influence of Picciano and Spring’s (2013) educational flexians.
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Education Act. Thus, indirectly, education researchers who wanted to influence educational
practice would have to meet this standard (Barhouse-Walters, Lareau, & Ranis, 2009a).
The Education Sciences Reform Act (ESRA) went further in establishing what kinds of research
the federal government would fund based on similar criteria to those of NCLB. The act abolished
the Office of Educational Research and Improvement and replaced it with the Institute of
Education Sciences (IES).121 The force of the law for education research was that the Department
of Education would only fund projects which adhered to its definition of scientifically valid
research. While the ESRA definition is slightly broader than NCLB, it shows a clear preference
for experimental and quasi-experimental designs and emphasis on questions of causality and
program evaluation (Barnhouse-Walters, Lareau, & Ranis, Appendix B: The Definitions of
"Scientifically-Based Research" in the Education Sciences Reform Act of 2002, 2009b). A
related development was the What Works Clearinghouse, an initiative of the IES which evaluates
research on educational interventions based on strict methodological criteria – meaning only
randomized controlled trials and quasi-experimental quantitative studies – with the intention of
helping “students and schools meet high standards…by providing educators with credible and
reliable evidence…to make informed decisions” (Institute of Education Sciences, nd). The
WWC was based on an earlier effort by Chester Finn – Ronald Reagan’s Assistant Secretary of
Education – to strengthen the practical utility of education research. Walters (2009) suggests that
these successive redefinitions of scientific research are a culmination in the effort to reign in
certain tendencies which had gained currency among education researchers since the 1960s –

Perhaps reflecting President Bush’s intentions for the IES, he chose Grover “Russ”
Whitehurst, an experimental child psychologist, as founding head of the institute. Whitehurst is a
fellow at the conservative Hoover Institute, and until recently was director of the Brookings
Institution’s Brown Center for Education Policy. During his tenure in 2012, he terminated Diane
Ravitch as an unpaid senior fellow.
121
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postmodernism, critical theory and interpretivism. In 2004, IES also provided $760,000 in
startup money to found the Society for Research on Educational Effectiveness (SREE), an
organization committed to “applying the procedural norms of science to the study of educational
problems” and focused on the “cause-and-effect relations important for education” (Society for
Research on Educational Effectiveness, nd).
What makes such an effort hostile toward educators is its emphasis on distinguishing legitimate
“scientific” knowledge from other sorts of discourse about education. When education is turned
into a problem to be solved by scientists, it implies that those presently responsible for the
practice of education are not equipped to the task – or are not producing the desired results.
Thus, while some randomized field trials may produce valuable insights about how to reform
educational practice:
“one cannot ignore the politics associated with constituting knowledge as scientific,
particularly the boundaries created around who and what can be said to constitute such
knowledge and the differentiating status such boundaries ensure. For monopolizing
knowledge, any knowledge, but particularly scientific knowledge, restricts opportunities
for others to think, in effect ensuring a large class of “unskilled” workers (which is all
that teachers and other mere practitioners will become)…” (Baez & Boyles, 2009, p. 30).

In this way, the attempt to define education policy as an “evidence-based field” can be seen as an
attempt to wrest control away from educators themselves and into the hands of a group of
analysts operating in a particular paradigm.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this portion of NCLB easily passed through a normally contentious
Congress. Legislators have long been enamored with social engineering strategies – turning
complex processes into simple indicators of causality and efficiency. James Scott observes the
phenomenon in his classic work Seeing Like a State (Scott, Seeing Like A State: How Certain
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Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, 1998). Looking specifically at American
schooling, Wise (1979) notes the tendency toward and limitations of administrative solutions to
educational problems. But beyond this push for ‘education science,’ NCLB directly targeted
educators through its emphasis on teacher quality. Indeed, ‘highly qualified teachers’ are the sole
focus of Title II of the law, and the phrase features prominently throughout the entire
document122.
Manna and Petrilli (2008) suggest that three think tanks were significant in crafting this focus:
Education Trust, the Fordham Foundation, and the National Commission on Teaching and
America’s Future (NCTAF). Each provided summaries of research on teacher quality during
legislative hearings prior to the passage of NCLB. EdTrust and Fordham focused their
summaries on research which favored Value-Added Assessment as a means of measuring teacher
quality. EdTrust relied heavily on Sanders’ work on the long-term impacts of effective teachers,
featuring a chart from his 1996 study on the cover of their research summary123. They also cite
research by Erik Hanushek, the early proponent of education production function research
discussed above. The conservative Fordham Foundation - then headed by Chester Finn – cited
many of the same sources as EdTrust, including Sanders and Hanushek, in order to emphasize
the connection between teacher quality and student achievement. What distinguishes the two is
that Fordham Foundation cited other research which advocated deregulation strategies to address

The ‘highly qualified teacher’ provision specified that by 2005-06, all teachers covered under
the ESEA would be required to possess a Bachelor’s degree and full certification in the state
where they were teaching, in addition to meeting requirements for subject matter expertise.
Notably, the provision did not apply to charter schools, and a 2002 modification to the law
exempted trainees in alternative certification programs – such as Teach for America –from the
requirement (NCLB 2001, 2002; Zeichner, 2013).
123
The Sanders paper cited in the EdTrust and Fordham research summaries (Sanders & Rivers,
1996) makes an argument very similar to that of another high profile study done in 2013 by
Harvard economist Raj Chetty, discussed below.
122
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the teacher quality problem. NCTAF, directed by Linda Darling-Hammond at the time, focused
primarily on upgrading teacher credentials and improving teacher preparation programs, an
approach which the Fordham Foundation directly attacked (Manna & Petrilli, 2008, pp. 77-80).
Ultimately however, VAA methods were not mandated in the accountability provisions of
NCLB, likely due to the influence of congressional Democrats (perennially reliant upon the
support of Teachers’ unions), who were crucial in its passage. 124 George W. Bush had to break
with the right wing of his party, which opposed the law’s mandated federal testing requirements.
Nonetheless, much like the Interstate Commerce Commission hearings had done for Scientific
Management, the attention of federal hearings gave Value-Added Assessment currency among
education reformers and policymakers. Perhaps more importantly, NCLB’s impossible mandate
for “100 percent proficiency” for all students and its requirement for annual testing in multiple
subjects gave the Obama administration leverage to push outcomes-based teacher assessment on
the states. Further, according to the expert testimony of Harvard economist Thomas Kane in the
2014 Vergara v. California case – discussed in detail in the next chapter – this testing
requirement also created the volumes of data value-added researchers needed to study year-toyear achievement gains. This leads to the early research promoting value-added as a policy tool.
The Widget Effect, NCTQ, and Political Research on Value-Added

As noted above, the annual testing mandates set out by No Child Left Behind facilitated a flood
of new student test score data like those produced in The Coleman Report. Researchers interested
in Value-Added assessment could begin to analyze state testing data, which could now generate
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DeBray (2006) notes, for example, the key role played by Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy
in the passage of NCLB. Connecting the history of accountability policy in Texas, Sandy Kress
played a key role in persuading Kennedy to support NCLB (Stanford, 2013).
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the gain-scores for the models. As one might expect, one of the first major post-NCLB valueadded studies was conducted by Eric Hanushek.
Hanushek and colleagues relied on a large set of data (over 400,000 students across two cohorts
in grades 3 through 7) from the Texas schools system (Hanushek, Rivkin, & Kain, 2005). From
the outset, the paper is conceived as a counter to education research since Coleman, and
specifically to the enthusiasm for class-size reduction policies since the 1983 Tennessee STAR
experiment. They make a bold claim for value-added, stating that because it utilizes individual
student test scores in multiple years, the models “are able to identify the impacts of schools and
teachers uncontaminated by the many unobserved family and other influences that have plagued
past research” (p. 419). The authors do note that the “central estimation problem” with VA
methods is that the processes of assigning teachers and students to schools and classrooms are
not random and thus subject to bias (p. 423). This caveat anticipates criticisms offered by Jesse
Rothstein (2009)and others which have already been discussed in chapter 1 above. A further
limitation of the study is that students were not linked to individual teachers, thus the analysis
relies on differences between grade-levels to infer teacher quality differences.125
Hanushek and his colleagues use teacher turnover events to demonstrate the existence of teacher
effects on student achievement.126 Based on their analysis incidents of teacher turnover, they
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Grade-level value-added is calculated by the difference between two cohorts test scores in the
same grade. Grades (and by extension, teachers) are then compared in terms of grade-average
value-added scores. Converting these grade-average value-added scores into a measure of the
variability requires a number of very strict assumptions, including that the variation in teacher
quality is the same for all grades and cohorts and that there are no strong complementarities
between specific students and teachers (Hanushek, Rivkin, & Kain, 2005, pp. 426-427).
126
Teacher turnover – incidents when a teacher moves from one school or grade to another – is
exploited by Hanushek (and subsequent VA researchers) because in theory it provides an
opportunity to show how changes in teacher quality correlate with changes in student
achievement. If we assume that nothing else changes about the school, the students in it, or the
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report that a one standard-deviation increase in teacher VA in a school grade results in a .11
standard deviation growth in student achievement in reading and a .095 SD achievement growth
in math. Subsequent analysis in the paper show that even these modest findings only apply to
elementary school grades, and more consistently in math. Nonetheless, they contend that these
are lower bound estimates of teacher effects and that “thus there can be little doubt that teacher
quality is an important determinant of mathematics and reading achievement” (2005, p. 440).
They further conclude by arguing that policy emphasis on teacher credentialing and class size
reduction are misguided given their estimates of teacher quality effects exceed observed impacts
of credentials or class size.
Another important post-NCLB value-added study picks up on the conclusions advanced by
Hanushek et al. In Identifying Effective Teachers Using Performance on the Job, Robert Gordon,
Thomas Kane and Doug Staiger (2006) begin their study of teacher effectiveness by positing:
“ultimately, the success of US public education depends upon the skills of the 3.1 million
teachers managing classrooms in elementary and secondary schools around the country.
Everything else – education standards, testing, class size, greater accountability – is
background…Without the right people standing in front of the classroom, school reform
is a futile exercise” (p. 5).
They propose that the evidence linking teacher credentials to student achievement is weak, and
that policymakers need to require that teachers demonstrate minimum competency on the job.
They define competency as student achievement growth and measure it using a value-added
model which controls for students prior test scores and demographics (similar to the DVAAS

teacher herself when she arrives in her new position; it is possible to regard the increase or
decrease in student performance as evidence of a change in teacher quality attributable to the
new teacher. This approach is refined and utilized by economist Raj Chetty and his colleagues in
a paper discussed in detail in the next chapter.
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model above).127 Their study relies on data from the Los Angeles Unified School District from
2000 to 2003. Although smaller than Hanushek et al.’s Texas data (only 150,000 students across
four cohorts) the LAUSD data are in student-teacher linked format which Hanushek cited as a
critical component. Yet, as opposed to Hanushek et al., who rely on numerous tables and model
specifications, Gordon et al. presents only two figures. The first plots the distribution of teacher
impacts on average student achievement by teacher credential level; the second plots teacher
impacts by VA effectiveness quartile.128 The first figure shows largely overlapping distributions,
suggesting that credentials are not related to teacher effects on test scores. The second shows
four relatively distinct distributions, suggesting that prior measures of teacher impacts on student
test score gains identify teachers who increase student achievement.129
The presentation of evidence concludes on page 9 of the 30-page report. The majority of the
paper focuses not on whether value-added identifies effective teachers, but on how VA could be
leveraged as a policy for improving US public education. The first prescription they offer is for
states to ‘reduce barriers to entering teaching’ by broadening the NCLB definition of highquality teachers and specifically through the use of alternative routes to certification. They
buttress this point by pointing to the Teach for America program 130 and by raising alarm of a
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In their recommendations for improving teacher evaluations, they strongly advise that VA
models control for background characteristics.
128
Another figure is presented much later in the document, which plots teacher impacts by years
of experience (p. 28). That is used to justify the two-year probationary period, but also suggests
the negative impact of constantly replacing two-year veterans with brand new teachers.
129
This is an early incidence of the all-too-common circular reasoning employed by VA
proponents. If teachers impact gains in student test scores in prior years, chances are they will do
so again in subsequent years. Even if one accepts that this is an unbiased measure, the question
remains whether boosting test scores wholly constitutes teacher effectiveness.
130
Teach for America is a two-year teaching program which has not been shown to generate a
significant number of career educators. A recent rigorous study commissioned by Teach for
America found that 87 percent of TFA recruits trained as teachers did not plan to remain in
teaching (Clark, Isenberg, Liu, Makowsky, & Zukiewicz, 2015).
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‘coming teacher shortage,’ suggesting that baby-boom generation teachers will retire in droves
and that interest in teaching is declining (Gordon, Kane, & Staiger, Identifying Effective
Teachers Using Performance on the Job, 2006, pp. 10-12).131
The second recommendation is that schools make it harder for the least effective teachers to be
granted tenure. Specifically, they recommend that tenure be denied to teachers in the bottom VA
effectiveness quartile after two years. Foreshadowing later research on the long-term impacts of
effective teachers, the authors speculate that such a policy would lead to cumulative test score
increases and lifetime earnings gains of up to $169,000 per high school graduate and up to $507
billion dollars per year in nationwide earnings gains! (p. 15) Their third recommendation focuses
on achievement gaps and what they refer to as maldistribution of effective teachers. They
suggest that high-VA teachers be offered substantial pay increases for teaching in lowperforming schools. Since there is no conclusive research on the motivating effect of pay
increases among teachers, the authors suggest that top quartile teachers be given at least $15,000
per year if they are willing to teach in high-poverty schools.
Their final two recommendations are more specific to teacher evaluation and more directly
address the use of VA. The first of these is that teacher effectiveness needs to be defined by
multiple measures. Here, the authors argue that, while imperfect, VA rankings based on
standardized tests constitute the most important and only “objective” measure of effectiveness
(p. 18). They propose that other measures – classroom observations and reviews of student work

As of this writing, there is little evidence that the “coming teacher shortage” ever arrived.
Brenneman (2015) suggests that while there are subject area shortages in Math, Science,
bilingual and Special Education fields, there is no national crisis in teacher supply. Shortages in
Math and Science have causes well beyond teacher certification, and so changes those processes
would be unlikely to resolve these specific problems.
131
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– could supplement assessment of teachers, but that these subjective measures are of secondary
importance. In their opinion, VA or some other measure based on student test scores should
constitute the preponderant factor in teacher evaluation (p. 19). To facilitate evaluation of all
teachers, they recommend that standards and related assessments be developed for all subjects in
all grades so that testing can happen every year. Finally, they recommend that schools be
provided funding to build the data infrastructure necessary to evaluate teachers based on student
test score growth (pp. 22-23). Though Identifying Effective Teachers does not rely on much
value-added data, it is politically far more important. This is perhaps the first incidence of
proposing VA as a policy solution to perceived educational shortfalls. 132 In its use of dramatic
statistics ($507 billion dollars in national income) and dire warnings (The Coming Teacher
Shortage), this report cast value-added as the cornerstone of a new strategy to transform
American education. It also gained one of its authors, Thomas Kane, the attention of the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation. This relationship led to the largest educational policy experiment in
American history – the Measures of Effective Teaching Project.
But another subsequent study, although not about Value-Added specifically133, dropped a further
bombshell on the question of teacher effectiveness. The Widget Effect was published in 2009 by
an education policy advocacy group called The New Teacher Project (TNTP)134. Like Identifying
Effective Teachers, Widget begins with an ominous quote (from 1936):
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Further evidence of its intended policy impact, the report estimates the costs of implementing
its recommendations ($3 billion per year), and provides answers to common criticisms from
teachers’ organizations. (pp. 24-29).
133
When The Widget Effect refers to the consequences of ineffective teaching, it utilizes VA
studies conducted by William Sanders and Eric Hanushek.
134
TNTP was founded in 1997 by former Washington DC schools Chancellor and notable
education reformer Michelle Rhee. The Widget Effect research was supported by funding from
the Gates and Walton Foundations, among others.
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“There are at least ‘several hundred’ incompetents now in the school system [says the
superintendent]. Other observers think there are several thousands, while still others insist
that ‘several’ would be nearer the mark. Whether these incompetents were unfit to teach
at any time, or have been rendered unfit by the passing years, is a matter of opinion. The
question is, why are they allowed to remain?” (Weisberg, Sexton, Mulhern, & Keeling,
2009)135
This opening places The Widget Effect in a long tradition of doom-saying educational reports
beginning with Laggards in Our Schools over a century earlier. Sounding much like A Nation at
Risk, it characterizes the failure to identify and act on teacher effectiveness as a “national
failure.” It defines the ‘widget effect’ as “institutional indifference to variations in teacher
performance” and characterizes this as both “deeply disrespectful to teachers” and as a “gamble
with the lives of students.” (pp. 4-6) The report relies on analysis of district teacher evaluation
systems and on survey data from about 16,000 teachers and administrators in 12 school districts
across four states (AR, CO, IL, OH). 136 Based on the survey results, the authors point to five
indications of the Widget Effect operating in schools: 1) nearly all teachers receive “satisfactory”
or better ratings, 2) not enough is done to identify and reward the best teachers, 3) not enough
feedback is given for teachers to improve, 4) new teachers are not given enough professional
support, and 5) ineffective teaching goes unaddressed. It seems from the introduction of the
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The story, from The New York Times, is far more banal than the quote suggests; it provides a
history and description of the New York City teacher tenure system (as of 1936) and contains
one (unfounded) suggestion from an assistant superintendent that there are “several hundred”
incompetent teachers out of 36,000 in the NYC school system. The source of incompetence
suggested in the story is that many teachers are on the job for too long; the article cites a
recommendation that the Teacher Retirement Board takes steps to retire more teachers to make
way for new recruits (Bernstein V. , 1936).
136
Only ten of the twelve surveyed districts provided teacher evaluation system data which
buttress the study’s major point – that most teachers are ranked satisfactory or better. DiCarlo
(2014) points out that the surveys on which Widget is based were voluntary and that in the
districts surveyed there were about 41,000 active teachers; about 15,000 teachers responded.
This represents a 35% non-random response rate. A review of the study has also questioned the
selection of school districts, arguing that they do not represent the full scope of approached to
teacher evaluation (Pecheone & Wei, 2009).
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report that this last point is the most important. The authors seem to set as their aim the removal
of so-called incompetent teachers – even if couching this aim in a historical reference. 137
The Widget Effect’s first point is simple. Analysis of existing teacher evaluation systems shows
that most teachers are rated satisfactory or better.138 In two of the districts studied, this holds true
even when the schools themselves are faring poorly (pp. 11-12). However, the other points are
not as solid. They are based on voluntary responses to an online survey. Further, many of the
statistics refer to subpopulations of the 15,000 teachers or 1,300 administrators, making the
voluntary survey results even seem even more dubious.139 Taken at face value, the surveys
suggest that a substantial group of teachers and administrators feel teacher evaluation systems do
not adequately capture the differences among teachers in terms of effectiveness. More
importantly, a substantial majority of surveyed teachers did not receive feedback on how they
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A similar tone is struck in another highly politicized piece of media. The documentary film
Waiting for Superman, which is at heart an advocacy piece for the charter school industry, takes
as one of its foci the inability of many US public school systems to fire ineffective teachers. The
filmmakers describe what they term the “dance of the lemons,” in which tenured teachers
deemed ineffective (though not incompetent) by administrators are moved from one school to
another in over the years, often coming to rest at the most disadvantaged schools. It also notes
the phenomenon of “rubber rooms” – formally called reassignment centers in New York City –
where teachers accused of classroom misconduct are charged with minor administrative duties
while they await dismissal proceedings. The film provides little context to evaluate the
prevalence of these issues, it does point correctly to a sense of outrage in education reform
circles over an inability to remove obviously ineffective teachers.
138
As discussed briefly in the introduction (footnote 3, pg. 3), it is ironic that after decades of
attempting to standardize teaching methods, reformers turn to grumble about the similarity of
teacher effectiveness ratings.
139
The report’s layout does not lend itself to systematic reading; charts and tables are presented
in strange formats; some statistics are repeated in multiple places. The endnotes often refer to
very substantial qualifications of statements. For example, expanded surveys were administered
to four of the school districts (two in Arkansas and one each in Illinois and Ohio); these
expanded surveys asked respondents about their specific experiences with evaluation and to
report if they knew of tenured teachers who delivered poor instruction (Weisberg, Sexton,
Mulhern, & Keeling, 2009, p. 32). These limited subsamples are used to support some of the
reports boldest claims.
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could improve their teaching. Finally, most surveyed teachers reported that there are poorperforming tenured teachers at their schools. (pp. 13-18)
The report then turns to consider the evaluation systems in the surveyed states. In this portion,
they note that most teachers are subject to very little classroom observation time and that there is
little relationship between observation time and the ratings teachers received in prior years (such
that poorly rated teachers were observed no more than highly-rated teachers). Other statements
made in this section are far too sweeping given the data behind them. Most glaringly, the
authors conclude this section by suggesting that evaluation policies create a dysfunctional school
culture among teachers where feedback is not valued (p. 23).
Widget finally turns to makes policy recommendations for reversing the widget effect. The first
is to “adopt a comprehensive evaluation system that fairly, accurately, and credibly differentiates
teachers based on their effectiveness in promoting student achievement.” The next three ask that
administrators be trained to and held accountable for using such an evaluation system and that
these policies be linked to teacher assignment, retention and efficient dismissal (pp. 27-30).
While the authors do note in a lengthy sidebar that Value-Added methods could be viable as state
testing systems evolve, they stop short of recommending VA outright. They instead stress
stronger observation and feedback systems for teachers, rewards for effectiveness and sanctions
for poor performance.140
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What is missing from Widget is a consideration of the drastic changes that would need to be
made to teachers’ and administrators’ working conditions to facilitate their recommendations.
That administrators spend so little time observing or conferring with their teachers, and that
teachers spend so little time collaborating on best practices, are themselves products of an
underpaid and overburdened school labor force.
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Widget’s basic finding is both valid and startling; it warranted and received much attention.
Although much of it relied on somewhat dubious surveys and reporting methods, it addressed a
fundamental question. While the report did not recommend value-added methods unequivocally,
the alarm it raised on the state of existing systems made a strong case for upending the whole
enterprise of teacher evaluation. It is in this context that we ought to understand the mandate in
Race to the Top to tie teacher evaluations to student achievement.
These post-NCLB studies bring us to the point where we started in the beginning of this project.
What is clear is that value-added research expanded greatly in scope as NCLB testing data
became available. At the same time, greatly enhanced computing power facilitated the
digitization and statistical processing of larger and more sophisticated educational data.
Furthermore, the focus of school reformers shifted sharply toward teacher effectiveness. But
value-added research in this period also set the stage for two even larger value-added studies –
Long Term Impacts of Teachers and Measures of Effective Teaching. But given their centrality to
a widely publicized court case focused on teacher tenure, these will be examined in the final
chapter.
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Chapter 6: Value-Added in Public: Evidence and Ideology in Vergara v. California
Value-Added Assessment was originally conceived as a tool for academic research. However,
since the turn of the 21st Century and particularly since the rollout of the 2009 Race to the Top
program, this method of assessing school and teacher quality has become part of the national
debate over education reform, and has been proposed as an evaluation policy. In the previous
chapters, we’ve considered how the assumptions of VAA conflict with the practical realities of
schooling, how innovations in evaluation have been applied to education historically, and the
development of VAA from a research tool to a policy option. To explore the role value-added
plays in educational politics beyond its role in research, I examine a recent court case – Vergara
v. California. The case featured testimony from expert witnesses whose research relies on valueadded assessment. The goal here is to gain perspective on how VAA is interpreted outside of
research circles.
I begin by outlining some of the details of the case as well as key figures inside and outside the
courtroom, focusing on the larger political forces they represent. Then I compare the academic
work of key expert witnesses alongside their testimonies in the case. Finally, I assess press
coverage following the decision.
Background on the Trial

In 2014, perhaps the most notable political platform for Value-Added Assessment was the
proceedings and the decision handed down in Vergara et al. vs. California. The case had nine
students as plaintiffs against the state department of education and three school districts in
California (Los Angeles Unified School District, Oakland Unified School District, and Alum
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Rock Union School District). The plaintiffs charged that the state’s teacher tenure policies particularly the two-year evaluation period before tenure is granted, due process protections
related to dismissal, and “Last-In, First-Out” policies - left the districts’ poorest students with the
worst teachers, thereby constituting a violation of the equal protection clause of the US
Constitution. The California Federation of Teachers (CFT) and California Teacher’s Union
(CTU) intervened as defendants, citing their interest in a case involving teacher tenure. Before
the trial began, the three school districts were dropped as defendants. 141 The suit was filed in
2012; the trial took place over two months from January 27th to March 27th, 2014. On June 10th,
Judge Rolf Treu ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, citing evidence that ineffective teachers harmed
the educational and economic well-being of their students. The judge's 16-page opinion included
references to the 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education decision, arguing that equal access to highquality teachers is among the fundamental educational civil rights issues of our time. The ruling
was immediately stayed, preventing it from having any impact on teacher tenure policy until
appeals by the defendants are complete.142 Those appeals were heard in April of 2016.143
Although the named plaintiffs in Vergara were nine California public school students, the case
was the product of an organization called Students Matter, which paid for the plaintiffs’ legal
fees and the public relations team that handled the case. The organization’s website describes it
as “a national non-profit organization dedicated to sponsoring impact litigation to promote access

It is important to note that, according to the procedural history in the judge’s decision, the
districts were dismissed “voluntarily with prejudice,” meaning that the plaintiffs (Students
Matter) dropped the charges against the districts. The superintendents of these districts became
plaintiffs’ witnesses.
142
http://cacs.org/research/vergara-v-california-case-context/
143
The unions’ appeals led to the overturning of the Vergara decision. The plaintiffs appealed
that decision, but the California Supreme Court refused to hear any further appeals.
141
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to quality public education.144” The group was founded and is funded by David Welch, an
entrepreneur from Silicon Valley.
Students Matter hired the corporate law firm Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher to argue the case; the
three co-lead attorneys were Theodore Olson, Theodore Boutrous, and Marcellus McRae.145 The
firm, which ranked fifth nationally in a survey of corporate legal directors, is representing
Chevron in an environmental harm case against the nation of Ecuador, and has represented the
automobile industry against the Environmental Protection agency in both California and
Massachusetts. It also represents New Jersey Governor Chris Christie in the scandal stemming
from lane closures on the George Washington Bridge. As a member of the firm, Olson
represented George W. Bush in 2001 dispute over the Florida election tallies and subsequently
served as US Solicitor General146; Olson represented Citizens United in the Citizens United vs.
Federal Election Commission case which declared that political spending constitutes free
speech.147 Boutrous was the lead counsel for Walmart in their 2007 gender discrimination
lawsuit, which was argued before both the Ninth Circuit Court and the US Supreme Court. 148
McRae is noted for defending corporations against workplace discrimination and environmental
pollution lawsuits.149
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http://studentsmatter.org/
Olson was named as the plaintiffs’ lead attorney, but did not participate actively in the trial.
McRae handled the bulk of the proceedings; Boutros offered opening and closing statements.
There were a number of other plaintiff attorneys who handled questioning of individual
witnesses. The legal team for the defense was much smaller, consisting of one attorney each for
the California public schools and the California Teachers’ Union.
146
http://studentsmatter.org/legal-team/theodore-b-olson/
147
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/20/AR2011012005149.html
148
It is notable that the Walmart case also involved expert witness testimony from a statistician
and a sociologist.
149
http://www.gibsondunn.com/lawyers/mmcrae
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Vergara is not the first lawsuit to dispute teach tenure protections in California. In 2010, Reed v.
California challenged the Last-In- First-Out policy. That case was filed by the Southern
California American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). However, in that case, the plaintiffs were
able to establish specific harm to specific students in three middle schools where teacher
turnover was particularly high. Reed ended in a settlement which was later nullified by the state
appeals court for not allowing sufficient input from the teachers’ union.150 Vergara is also not
the first case to make an issue out of test-based teacher evaluations in California. In the 2012
case Doe v. Deasy, Judge James Chalfant ruled that the LAUSD had to make students’ test
performance, and particularly Value-Added Models, part of teacher evaluations in compliance
with the state’s 1971 Stull Act.151 Similar to Vergara, Doe was filed on behalf of a group of
parents by EdVoice, a nonprofit founded by Netflix CEO Reed Hastings 152 which strongly
supports charter school expansion and received major support from the Broad Foundation.
The ruling in Vergara, whether or not it withstands the appeal by both the National Education
Association (NEA) and the California Teachers’ Union (CTU), may set off a series of similar
cases in other states. Students Matter President David Welch has promised to promote similar
cases in other states, and former CNN personality Campbell Brown has already begun filing a
similar case in New York. Brown’s organization, the Partnership for Educational Justice,
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http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/11/local/la-me-lausd-layoffs-20120811
http://www.scribd.com/doc/96728121/Doe-v-Deasy-Tentative-Ruling-Compact-PDF The
ruling left it up the school district to negotiate with the teachers’ union over how test scores were
to be factored in to teacher evaluations, but as of 2015 no deal was reached (Fensterwald, 2015).
152
Hastings is also a founding member of Green Dot Charter schools, one of the largest charter
school management companies in the state.
151

151

includes executives from Students First and Democrats for Education Reform on its advisory
board.153
This list of expert witnesses’ affiliations in Vergara further indicates the interlocking network of
private and non-profit interests that has gained power in US education policy. The key experts
for the plaintiffs – those whose testimonies featured in the judge’s ruling – were three
economists: Harvard’s Thomas Kane and Raj Chetty and the Stanford’s Eric Hanushek. Kane
was the principal investigator for the Gates’ foundation-funded “Measures of Effective
Teaching” (MET) study and is a strong advocate of using Value-Added Assessment to evaluate
individual teachers’ effectiveness in the classroom. Raj Chetty was called as a witness based on
his study of the long-term impacts of effective teachers. Eric Hanushek, also a senior fellow at
the conservative Hoover Institute, has been writing about performance-based teacher and school
evaluation since the 1970s, and has further argued that input-based schooling policies – those
which focus on resources and teacher credentials – have little impact on educational quality.
Hanushek was also a member of former California Governor Arnold Schwarzanegger’s
Committee on Education Excellence, which received support from the Gates Foundation and
whose other members include executives of Students Matter and the New School Venture fund –
another corporately-funded non-profit organization.
Other plaintiff experts included Dan Goldhaber, a labor economist at the University of
Washington – Bothel; Arun Ramanathan of EdTrust – West154, a non-profit organization which
lists “Accountability” and “Teacher Effectiveness” as two top items on their advocacy agenda
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http://www.edjustice.org/about/board-directors-advisory-board/
As of April 2014, Ramanathan is now the CEO of Pivot Learning Partners, a company that
works on the implementation of Common Core Standards.
154
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and which has received funding from both the Gates and Walton foundations; and Sandi Jacobs,
vice-president of the National Council on Teacher Quality (NCTQ) and a former program
specialist with the US Department of Education. NCTQ receives funding from the Broad, Gates
and Walton foundations; its advisory board includes former NYC schools chancellor and current
News Corporation VP Joel Klein, founder of KIPP charter schools Michael Feinberg, Pearson
executive Michael Barber, and fellow expert witness Eric Hanushek (National Council on
Teacher Quality, nd).
Among its experts, the defense called one economist, Jesse Rothstein of the University of
California-Berkeley. Rothstein has been a vocal critic of value-added assessment, arguing among
other things that its statistical assumptions are never met in practice in actual schools. He also
wrote a critical analysis of the MET study findings for the National Education Policy Center
(NEPC), where he is a fellow. The other expert witnesses for the defense were all education
researchers: Linda Darling-Hammond of the Stanford Graduate School of Education; Susan
Moore-Johnson a colleague of Kane’s at Harvard; Ken Futernick of California State University –
Sacramento; and David Berliner, Professor Emeritus at Arizona State University and a researcher
at NEPC.
Other key witnesses were Oakland Schools Superintendent Tony Smith and Los Angeles Schools
Superintendent John Deasy. Both Smith and Deasy testified for the plaintiffs, despite initially
being named as defendants in the case. Their testimony is not grounded in research, but becomes
important when we consider the press coverage of Vergara.
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Contextualizing Foundation Influences

Students Matter is a relatively small player among nonprofits interested in education reform. But
David Welch’s effort in Vergara was supported directly and indirectly by many of the largest
players in educational “venture philanthropy155.” The Broad Foundation was one of the earliest
contributors to Students Matter. The David and Heidi Welch Foundation has made significant
donations to NewSchools Venture Fund, which invests in both traditional and online charter
schools, and to StudentsFirst, the education reform group founded by former Washington, DC
schools’ chancellor and tenure opponent Michelle Rhee.
Foundation influences are also evident among the school districts which were dropped as
defendants. John Deasy, the Los Angeles School Superintendent and plaintiff witness, served as
a director for the Gates Foundation and was a Broad Foundation Fellow 156. Former Oakland
Superintendent Tony Smith, a Students Matter advisory board member157 who also testified for
the plaintiffs, was the director of the National Equity Project which, under its former name (Bay
Area Coalition of Equitable Schools), was a recipient of Gates Foundation support for its
emphasis on “small schools.158” Smith is now executive director of the Stone Foundation, which
has made education grants to groups such as the Academy for Urban School Leadership – a
school management organization which orchestrates school turnarounds and receives support
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This term has been used by Diane Ravitch to describe a sort of 21 st century philanthropy
related to education. The term is described in her 2010 book The Death and Life of the Great
American School System, where she refers to a particular group of foundations including the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Eli and Edythe Broad Foundation, and the Walton Family
Foundation as the “Billionaire Boys Club.”
156
http://home.lausd.net/apps/pages/index.jsp?uREC_ID=178743&type=d&pREC_ID=367410
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http://studentsmatter.org/our-team/advisory-board/.Accessed July 13, 2014
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http://classroomstruggle.org/2013/04/08/tony-smith-leaves-oakland-in-shambles/
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from both the NewSchools Venture Fund and the Gates Foundation.159 He also heads Teach Plus,
an advocacy organization for “reform-minded teachers” which promotes test-based teacher
evaluations and merit-based compensation plans and receives support from both the Gates and
Broad foundations160.
Diane Ravitch (2010) notes the growing influence of what she calls the “Billionaire Boys club”
of large philanthropic foundations. Ravitch points out that after a long hiatus following the
‘School Wars’ of the 1960s, large philanthropies returned to education reform in the late 1990s,
but with a radically different program. In contrast to the older foundation approach – which
allowed grantees to spend grant money on their own priorities – new ‘venture philanthropists’ set
their own agendas and sought out organizations and individuals aligned with their goals. She
further points out that as the three largest education-focused foundations – the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, the Edith and Eli Broad Foundation, and the Walton Family Foundation –
converged on similar priorities (along with many smaller funders), cash-starved school districts
as well as state and federal education agencies began to align their agendas with those of the
foundations. Ravitch problematizes this state of affairs:
“There is something fundamentally antidemocratic about relinquishing control of the
public education policy agenda to private foundations run by society’s wealthiest people;
when the wealthiest of these foundations are joined in common purpose, they represent
an unusually powerful force that is beyond the reach of democratic institutions…The
foundations demand that public schools and teachers be held accountable for
performance, but they themselves are accountable to no one.” (Ravitch, 2010, pp. 200201)
Although focused on India, Arundhati Roy (2012) gives an interesting historical perspective on
corporate philanthropy in the US. She notes that when the first corporately-endowed foundations
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http://auslchicago.org/about
http://www.teachplus.org/page/partners-27.html
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– the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation – appeared in the early 20th century,
critics raised serious questions about the legality and unaccountability of such institutions. Roy
connects early corporate philanthropy with attempts to sway US foreign policy and to influence
domestic policy in developing countries in ways that would favor corporate profits. Like
Ravitch, she also notes the irony of opaque, unaccountable organizations demanding
transparency from foreign governments.
Picciano and Spring (2013) offer detailed description of this phenomenon in American education
in their description of the ‘Education-Industrial Complex.’ They argue that control over
education policy has become dominated by a network of individuals who move between posts in
government, non-profit foundations and for-profit firms. These ‘flexians’161 use their influence to
promote school reforms which emphasize private sector partnerships and the application of
technology to education. As such, they tend to oppose teachers’ unions and support top-down,
data-driven policies like Value-Added assessment. Picciano and Spring argue that the growing
influence of foundations and the increasing privatization shift power away the democratic
processes that have historically governed public schools. Instead, democratic governance is
replaced by a ‘personalized bureaucracy’ in which school policy is determined by a closed group
of individuals on a first-name basis with each other (Picciano & Spring, 2013, p. 38).
As the above description of Students Matter and the roster of expert witnesses indicate, the
tendencies toward privatization and foundation influences were on display in the Vergara v.
California trial. We now turn to consider the testimonies of expert witnesses in the trial
alongside the research on which they were based.
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Picciano and Spring borrow the term flexian from Janine Wedel (2009).
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Research Basis of Two Expert Witnesses162
Raj Chetty was the first expert witness, called by the plaintiffs on the third day of the trial. 163
Chetty’s co-authored paper with John Friedman and Jonah Rockoff focuses on the measurement
of teacher quality and the long-term impacts of effective (and ineffective) teachers.
The research for these papers first took shape as an Internal Revenue Service white paper on the
impacts of income tax credits. Using New York City school records from the 1990s linked with
tax records, that paper found that a $1,000 increase in the amount of a family’s tax credit was
associated with an increase in student test scores between 6 and 9 percent of one standard
deviation.164 They then correlated test scores with earnings in early adulthood. These results
showed that a one standard deviation increase in student test scores in a single grade correlated
with 9 percent increase in earnings at age 28. Combining these findings, they suggest that tax
credits are more than offset by the long-term earnings gains they afford (Chetty, Friedman, &
Rockoff, 2011).
The IRS paper evolved into a National Bureau of Economics working paper which shifted the
focus to teachers. The first part of the Long Term Impacts paper is devoted entirely to the
question of bias in Value-Added measures – whether VA estimates are driven by the causal
impact of teachers or by student sorting. First, the authors devise a novel test using the concept

Eric Hanushek’s role as the architect of Value-Added Assessment has already been
considered in the preceding chapters; I also consider his testimony below.
163
Video of Chetty’s testimony is available online at http://vimeo.com/85786192
164
All test score gains cited in the various iterations of Chetty et al. are phrased in terms of
standard deviations rather than as raw test scores. This is because in the two decades of data they
use, the school district (New York City) underwent numerous testing changes which make the
raw test scores incomparable. Indeed, as I note, in an earlier chapter, changes in testing
instruments are one outside factor which compromises the validity of test-based teacher
evaluations.
162
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of forecast bias.165 They correlate the changes in grade average teacher value-added with the
changes in grade average test scores. They find a very high correlation between these two
variables.166 They find that estimates of teacher value-added in a given year are not affected by
the addition of other highly predictive variables (parent characteristics and lagged test scores).
Their second (and more robust) test – a quasi-experiment analyzing teacher turnover events –
found that when a high- or low-value-added teacher arrives at or departs from a school, the
average effect of same grade-level teachers on student test scores can be considerable and vary in
the direction of her estimated value-added – e.g., a high-VA teacher positively impacts her
grade’s average test scores when she arrives. These findings lead them to conclude that teacher
value-added is an accurate predictor of a teacher’s contribution to student test scores.
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Forecast bias is a very technically elaborate procedure in the case of measuring teacher
effects. The method begins by conceiving of changes in teaching staff as experimental treatments
administered to a grade full of students. The hypothesized effect is derived from a jackknife
estimate (leaving out the year before and the year of the change) of teachers’ combined impacts
on student test scores in all other available years. So if a grade of teachers had student test score
data for 10 years – say 1991 through 2000 – and one wanted to hypothesize an effect for changes
between 1993 and 1994, one would average the data from 1991, 1992, and 1995-2000, leaving
out the years in question, which the authors argue are measured with error that is related to
student outcomes (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 2011a, p. 21). This seems suspect because it
uses data from subsequent years in a teacher’s career to estimate her effect on students in the
past. In the real world, schools would not be able to use a teacher’s future performance to predict
her current ability. All the averaging of effects across grades is also not aligned with how valueadded is being used in policy.
166
The figures presenting their estimates of forecast bias make use of “binned scatterplots” – for
which the authors helped developed new software. This technique takes the thousands of points
(in this case 60,000) that would be plotted on a graph and groups them into a user-determined
number of bins (in this case 20), which are then assigned the average values of the x and y
variables depicted on the axis of the graph. These binned averages become points on the
scatterplot. Binning reduces the cluttered appearance of scatterplots based on large datasets. It
can also help easily communicate the functional form of the relationship between variables. But
binned scatterplots do not communicate the strength of the relationship between two variables
because they tell us nothing about the R-squared value or proportion of variance explained
(Stepner, 2014). Further, the visual effect of reducing a graph that would have thousands of
points to one with only twenty data points is important; it makes relationships appear much
clearer.
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The second part of the paper utilizes the unique features of the data to assess the long-term
impacts of teacher quality – as measured by value-added – on students. They begin with the
finding that a one standard deviation increase in teacher value-added increases students’ test
scores by 10 percent of one standard deviation. This is an important step because the long-term
impacts findings are based on the correlation between those outcomes and a one standard
deviation increase in student test scores, not in teacher VA – a one SD improvement in student
test scores would necessitate an impossible ten standard deviation improvement of teacher VA.
So the authors simply divide their findings by ten to approximate the impact of a one SD
improvement in teacher value-added. The primary outcomes discussed are college attendance at
age 20 and earnings at age 28. The authors report that on average, a one standard deviation
increase in teacher value-added in a single grade increases a student’s probability of attending
college by 0.49 percentage points, and increases student earnings at age 28 by $182. These are
modest findings given that, in terms of policy, a one standard deviation increase in teacher valueadded would require schools to affect a 34 percent increase in overall teacher quality, however
defined.
These findings are accompanied by various extrapolations which require strong assumptions
about how teachers are related to test scores, and how test scores are related to long-term
outcomes. For example, the $182 earnings gain is extrapolated to a policy of “deselecting” (read
firing) the bottom five percent of the value-added distribution from the teaching force and
replacing them with average teachers.167 They argue that such a policy would increase each
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The authors note that teachers in the bottom five percent of the distribution are on average
only two standard deviations below the mean, suggesting that the distribution of teacher valueadded is clustered closer to the mean. Their use of the bottom five percent follows from
Hanushek’s earlier research on teacher replacement. They also assume in their calculations that
the replacements would not be new teachers, but those with average experience (Chetty,
159

student’s lifetime earnings by $9,422 – but under difficult assumptions including that: a) higherVA teachers affect all students in the same way, b) earnings gains would be plausible if all
students got higher-VA teachers, and c) that replacements of average quality are readily available
at any time.
Long Term Impacts received much attention even as a working paper – including front-page
coverage in the New York Times and significant mention in President Obama’s 2012 State of the
Union Address. Still, many authors have raised questions about the findings of Chetty et al. in
this study. Richard Rothstein (2012) suggests that the focus on teachers’ abilities to raise test
scores elides other important aspects of teaching. Combining the findings of Long Term Impacts
with those of the Measures of Effective Teaching study (discussed below) he contends that this
narrow focus ignores other ways teachers impact students which could in fact have more
dramatic long-term impacts.
Dale Ballou (Ballou, Review of The Long-Term Impacts of Teachers: Teacher Value-Added and
Student Outcomes in Adulthood, 2012) argues that although the authors find no forecast bias in
the estimation of teacher value-added, they fail to address this same type of bias in their
assessment of long-term impacts:
“Even if we could be assured that the value-added model perfectly measures a teacher’s
contribution to student knowledge [test scores], it would remain problematic to attribute
long-term outcomes to the impact of teachers… [it must be established that] high valueadded teachers are not more likely to have been assigned students who were for other
reasons destined for greater long-term success.” (pp. 5-6)
Just as the authors tested for bias in value-added measures by checking for the impacts of parent
characteristics, the same tests should be used to establish that the effects of teachers on long-term

Friedman, & Rockoff, 2011a, p. 48). This assumption can be made in theory, but is unlikely to
hold in the actual teacher labor market.
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outcomes are not being confounded with the impacts of parental characteristics on earnings,
college attendance, etc. Ballou suggests that without these tests for bias in the prediction of long
term outcomes, not just test scores, the validity of the findings of Long-Term Impacts is called
into question.
Taking a different approach, Moshe Adler (2013) looks closely at what is actually measured in
Chetty et al.168 He raises two major issues with the findings. The first concerns the lynch-pin
linking the two studies. As noted above, the thread that connects the authors’ conclusion of
unbiased measurement of value-added (part one) and the long-term impacts of teacher-value
added (part two) is that a one-standard deviation increase in student test scores is shown to
correlate with long-term outcomes. There are two problems with this connection. The first is the
fade-out of teacher effects on test scores, which Adler documents from numerous prior studies
(2013, p. 5). If test score effects don’t last, then the correlation between test scores and long-term
outcomes is improperly attributed to the effect of teacher quality. The second more serious
problem is the measurement of value-added at the teacher level and the student level. A onestandard deviation increase in teacher value-added is shown to increase students’ test scores by
10 percent of a standard deviation. Thus, to increase student test scores by a full standard
deviation would require increasing teacher value-added by ten standard deviations. Though the
authors reduce the magnitude of their reported effect size to reflect this, the problem is the
effects they actually find are based on changes in teacher quality that are nearly impossible.
Adler further supports his critique by noting that the range of teacher value-added documented in
Chetty et al. is between -0.18 and 0.18 standard deviations of student test scores – reflecting that

168

Adler is unconvinced by the critiques offered by Rothstein and Ballou. He contends that these
critiques of Chetty et al. do not decisively undercut the authors’ claims because they focus on
what is missing from their argument rather than the strength of the evidence offered.
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teacher effects on student test scores are clustered around the mean, adding to the implausibility
of assuming that teachers could account for massive changes in student test results. 169
The second broad aspect of Adler’s critique is the selective focus on outcomes. Long-Term
Impacts finds a statistically significant impact of teacher value-added on student earnings at age
28. They also measure earnings at age 30, but state that “the 95 percent confidence interval for
the estimate [of earnings at age 30] is very wide.” This is a dubious way of saying that the impact
on earnings at age 30 was not found to be statistically significant (Adler, 2013, pp. 3-4).
Unfortunately, one would need to read deep into the paper to discover that; appendix table 6
shows that the point estimate is $206 with a standard deviation of $195.170 Nonetheless, the
authors assume that the earnings gains found at age 28 would persist when they estimate both the
lifetime earnings impact of high value-added teachers and the impact of deselecting the bottom
five percent of teachers. In sum, Adler finds that the evidence offered in Long-Term Effects is
thin given the scope of its claims.
Thomas Kane was the second expert witness called by the plaintiffs in Vergara. His testimony
focused first on the results of the Measures of Effective Teaching project (funded by the Gates
Foundation), for which he was principal investigator 171. He also testifies based on his study of
the distribution of ‘bad teachers’ in Los Angeles in terms of students’ ethnicity. While the MET
study report stresses the need for multiple measures of teacher ability, value-added assessment
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This range is cited in numerous figures in the Long-Term Impacts paper (Chetty, Friedman, &
Rockoff, 2011a, pp. 60-67).
170
Chetty et al. claim that the sample size of 30-years olds is too small to generate a reliable
estimate, but Adler argues that over 61,000 student records provide more than enough statistical
power (Adler, 2013, p. 4).
171
In addition to Kane, the other authors of the MET study report were Daniel McCaffrey and
Trey Miller from the RAND Corporation, and Douglas Staiger of Dartmouth College (Kane,
McCaffrey, Miller, & Staiger, 2013).
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serves as the study’s benchmark quality metric.172 Further, the latter portion of Kane’s testimony
relies solely on Value-Added measures of and specifically his replication of Chetty’s argument
about long-term impacts. But given the prominence of the MET study, it is important to consider
in its entirety. I focus here on three MET study reports.
The MET project brought the weight of randomized control trials (RCTs) to bear on the question
of test-based teacher assessment. Since the passage of the Education Sciences Act in 2002,
RCTs have been regarded as the gold standard for educational research. The Gates Foundation
has been particularly important in funding education-focused RCTs – the foundation funded the
MET project for $45 million. The MET RCT included over 1,000 teachers across more than 300
schools in six geographically diverse school districts. 173 It attempted to fulfill one assumption of
value-added assessment which is never met in real school settings: random assignment of
students to teachers. Randomization of students had to take place within school, grade and
subject – requiring a complex process assignment procedure.174 In addition to existing state

In the first of the MET study’s reports, the authors lay out three premises including that
“whenever possible a teacher’s evaluation should include his or her students’ achievement gains”
and that “any other components of the evaluation should be demonstrably related to student
achievement gains” (Kane & Cantrell, 2010, pp. 4-5). Rothstein (2011) notes that these
assumptions are problematic for a project studying effective teaching – as they rule out in
advance the possibility that test score gains may be a poor measure of teaching ability. Baker
(2013) has a similar critique, noting that using Value-Added as the outcome measure of quality
makes it almost certain that prior Value-Added will be the best predictor of quality. Goldstein
(2015) connects these assumptions to the Gates Foundation’s already-stated policy priorities and
to its close ties with the Obama Administration, which had already endorsed the practice of testbased teacher evaluations.
173
The initial pool of teachers was over three thousand, but attrition by both teachers and
students whittled that number down to 1,181 (Kane, McCaffrey, Miller, & Staiger, 2013, p. 45).
Nonetheless, the MET study is still the largest educational experiment ever conducted (Rothstein
& Mathis, 2013, p. 5).
174
Rosters of students were randomized among a block of teachers who taught the same grade
and subject in a school. For example, students would be randomly assigned among three fourth
grade teachers in a participating school.
172
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tests, MET employed a number of new instruments to measure teacher ability in different ways
(project-specific achievement tests, student surveys and standardized assessment of teaching
practices).
The first portion of the project focused on correlating value-added assessment with other
measures of teaching using non-experimental methods. This was also the first stage of the RCT;
teachers who agreed to participate in the study were ranked (according to their value-added
scores in 2009-2010) as ‘more effective’ or ‘less effective’ prior to being randomly assigned a
roster of students in 2010-2011.
Among their findings, the report highlights that teacher value-added is relatively stable across
classrooms and across different testing instruments. Correlations between two sections taught by
the same teacher in the same year ranged between .09 and .38 depending on the subject and
instrument used. For elementary school teachers who do not teach multiple sections, value-added
in one year correlated modestly with the prior year (.40 for Math and .20 for English).
Correlations between the state tests and the MET-administered tests were .377 for ELA and .221
for Math (Kane & Cantrell, 2010, pp. 23-25).175 The authors adjust these last figures by
exploiting data on teachers who have multiple sections to estimate the correlation between
‘persistent teacher value-added’ on the different assessments – which are reported as .54 for
math and .38 for English Language Arts (ELA) (Kane & Cantrell, 2010, pp. 18-21).
This first report concludes by using non-experimental methods to compare teachers with the least
evidence of effectiveness (measured by value-added) to those with the most. This analysis is
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This report required careful reading. Though the text of the report claimed these correlations
were listed in Table 5, they were in fact reported in tables 7 and 8 (Math and English were
reported separately).
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confined to those teachers who taught more than one classroom in 2009-10, as it uses valueadded ranking in one class to predict value-added in the other. They report differences between
teachers in the top and bottom quartiles of the effectiveness distribution and find between a 0.07
and 0.33 standard deviations in average test score gains between these two quartiles (the
magnitude of difference varies by instrument). For ease of interpretation, the authors convert
these differences to estimated months of learning based on a scale developed by Kane (2004).176
Using a “rule of thumb” They report that the average difference between high-effectiveness and
low-effectiveness teachers is between 2 and 12 months of learning (Kane & Cantrell, 2010, p.
27). The findings from this analysis serve as the precursor to the random assignment study.
The MET project’s final report, Have We Measured Effective Teaching?, was released in January
2013, and features the results of the random assignment study. The report begins by describing
the algorithm used to rate teachers prior to randomization – which includes 2009-10 value-added,
classroom observation ratings, student survey scores, and teacher characteristics (Kane,
McCaffrey, Miller, & Staiger, 2013, pp. 10-11).177 It then demonstrates that the observed growth
gains were close to their predictions using a binned scatterplot.178
From a methodological standpoint, the most significant outcome of the study may be its high
rates of attrition and non-compliance. The original intent was to randomly assign students to
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The authors acknowledge that this scale is based on only one outcome measure, and that this
conversion to months is not appropriate for the two state tests, which are not scaled vertically
(Kane & Cantrell, 2010, p. 27).
177
Following the general logic of the MET study – where score gains are the priority – the
outcome that these factors predict is test score growth. Teachers with the highest predicted
average test score growth are those designated highly effective.
178
This is a consequential presentation choice. Teachers were sorted into groups of 40,
dramatically reducing the number of points on the regression line and thereby hiding the amount
of divergence from the line (Kane, McCaffrey, Miller, & Staiger, 2013, pp. 4-5).
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2,642 teachers using a very complicated process and requiring a number of preconditions. 770
teachers were either not eligible for randomization because of job changes; 281 were dropped
from randomization because they had did not have another teacher in the same school-gradesubject with whom to exchange rosters; a further 441 teachers were excluded because the school
in which they taught was excluded from the study. Thus, only 1,181 teachers were randomly
assigned students. But the random assignment was further challenged by subsequent noncompliance. Across all six participating districts, between 34 and 73 percent of randomized
students did not remain with their assigned teacher. Further, non-compliance appeared to be
systematic: teachers who were part of randomization had students with higher average test scores
, were more likely to be white, less likely to be African American, and less likely to be classified
as either special education students or English-language learners (Garrett & Steinberg, 2015).
The authors examine and acknowledge that even among randomized teachers, there was some
sorting of students to teachers – suggesting that student roster changes made after randomization
were not themselves random (Kane, McCaffrey, Miller, & Staiger, 2013, pp. 16-17).179 They also
note that because students were not randomly assigned to schools, the findings are limited to
whether value-added measures are biased within schools, and cannot say whether value-added
was biased between schools.180 Using a final sample of 27,255 students, they proceed to assess
the question: Does a one unit increase in predicted teacher effectiveness translate into a one-unit
difference in observed student achievement?

179

Steinberg and Garrett (2015) re-analyzed the MET data and found that indeed this sorting has
a significant impact on measured teacher performance, following Rothstein’s (2010) criticism of
value-added models.
180
As my analysis in Chapter 2 shows, school level variables are important determinants of
teacher value-added scores, suggesting that between-school bias may be significant.
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Thus the MET project uses random assignment to assess the treatment effect of teachers.
However, owing to the high non-compliance rate, the analysis relies on an alternative method of
identifying teacher (treatment) effects: Instrumental variables (IV). 181 This shifts their focus to
the effect of treatment on those students who remained in the randomization blocks – what the
literature on experimentation calls “compliers.” Compliance varied by district; in one
municipality, a student’s assigned teacher had no correlation with their actual teacher’s
effectiveness.182 Nonetheless, in their analyses, the authors find support for their hypothesis
among the specified population – concluding that the average effect of being assigned to a more
effective teacher reflects measures of that teacher’s effectiveness (Kane, McCaffrey, Miller, &
Staiger, 2013, p. 38).183
After the random assignment study was complete, the MET project also released a paper which
addressed the use of multiple indicators in teacher evaluations (Mihaly, McCaffrey, Staiger, &
Lockwood, 2013). In addition to scores on state tests and project-specific tests, the MET project
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In RCTs with considerable non-compliance, simple outcome comparisons of the treatment
and control groups are regarded as unreliable. IV methods are one approach to identifying
treatment effects in such circumstances. IV attempts to estimate the average effect of the
treatment on those who actually received treatment. The modern approach to IV was developed
by economists working with non-experimental data in so-called natural experiments (Angrist,
Imbens, & Rubin, 1996). Researchers working on random assignment studies have since adopted
this method (see for example Hedges, 2008). Using IV methods requires that strong assumptions
be met especially when dealing with “weak instruments,” such as RCTs with very high noncompliance, like the MET study (Staiger & Stock, 1997; Imbens, 2014).
182
Imbens and Angrist (1994) outline conditions required to adequately estimate local average
treatment effects. Among them is the “no-defiers” or “monotonicity” assumption, which states
that the treatment needs to affect the outcome in only one direction, such that treatment is always
better (or always worse) than control. In the case of MET, where teachers were randomly
assigned to classrooms, it seems likely that a high-value-added teacher would not always affect
all students in the same direction (e.g., positively impact achievement for everyone). This
violates the no-defiers assumption and problematizes their estimation of LATE.
183
They are careful to note that the findings among English teachers are considerably imprecise,
but do not mention that results among middle school students were also more imprecise.
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conducted student surveys in all participating classrooms and collected multiple videotaped
lessons for all participating teachers.184 Each lesson was rated using general and subject-specific
rubrics. These two sources of data were each used to construct standardized scales which were
incorporated into composite estimators of teacher quality.
This report, though written in a technical style, provided perhaps the some of the project’s
clearest findings. First, the authors report that all three measures of teacher quality (value-added,
observation ratings, and student surveys) are somewhat unreliable –the same measure fluctuates
from year to year. Second, they show that different instruments of the same ‘mode’ (e.g.,
observation scores for two different rubrics or value-added measures for two different tests) are
far more correlated than with each other than they are with any other mode (e.g., value-added
with observations). They interpret this to mean that each indicator is capturing a relatively
unique aspect of teacher effectiveness.185 Finally, they demonstrate that the optimal weighting of
a composite estimate of teacher quality depends almost entirely on the outcome one wants to
predict. If, for example, one wishes to predict teacher observation scores, the optimal predictor
will put preponderant weight on another observation score. Their evidence leads them to
conclude that decisions about how to rate teacher effectiveness are not matters of picking the
most statistically reliable indicators, but rather of deciding which aspects of teaching are the
most important outcomes, and that if one outcome is chosen, little is gained by using a composite

Goldstein (2015) notes that MET’s protocol of filming teachers at work generated
controversy in the media.
185
Looking at the data supporting this point (Table 3 on page 24 of the report), another
interpretation is possible. The average correlations between the two subjective measures –
student surveys and teacher observations – are somewhat higher than those between value-added
and either subjective measure. One interpretation of this is that while observations and surveys
address what happens in classrooms between teachers and students, test score gains are
determined by a combination of endogenous and exogenous forces.
184
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estimate (Mihaly, McCaffrey, Staiger, & Lockwood, 2013, p. 39). If any composite measure is to
be used, the authors suggest equally weighting each of the three modes of assessment.
Nonetheless, much of the report focuses on how to optimally weight and reliably predict teacher
quality when value-added is the outcome of interest. This focus was chosen based on “the current
policy focus on improving student test scores” (p. 25).
While recognizing the scope and importance of the MET study, critics have raised questioned the
presentation and interpretation of its findings. When considering the RCT specifically, such high
levels of attrition raise serious concerns about generalizability of those results. After
problematizing the assumptions laid out in the first MET report [see footnote 28 above],
Rothstein (2011) critiques the report’s assertion that different test instruments consistently
identify effective teachers. Individual teachers’ between-test correlations averaged .54 in
mathematics and .37 in ELA, indicating that many teachers identified as effective by one test
would be ranked below average by the other test.186 Rothstein also challenges the authors’
estimation and correlation of a stable component of value-added, which can be inferred by
statistical procedures, but not definitively ascertained. Further, reporting correlations between the
stable components of value-added measures overstates the precision of VA estimates (Rothstein
J. , 2011, pp. 3-5). The MET study’s admittedly imprecise method of converting test score gains
into months of student learning has been criticized by as a way of inflating the value of
objectively small differences in actual test performance (Rubinstein, 2014; 2013; DiCarlo M. ,
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Language is conveniently flexible among MET reports. The authors call a correlation of 0.54
between value-added measures “moderately large” (Kane & Cantrell, 2010, p. 9). However,
when correlating value-added with subjective measures – observations and student surveys –
0.53 is called “weakly correlated” (Mihaly, McCaffrey, Staiger, & Lockwood, 2013, p. 28).
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2012).187 A larger criticism of the early MET findings focuses on the difference between highstakes evaluation and research. The value-added data collected were not used for decisions about
dismissal or tenure; if they were, the data would likely be very different. Thus although the study
is intended to validate value-added assessment for personnel decisions, it is unable to address
that issue (Rothstein J. , 2011, p. 7).
The random assignment component of the MET study has also been subject to scrutiny.
Rothstein and Mathis (2013) argue that although the study is large in scale, the voluntary opt-in
by districts and schools meant that even the intended sample was not representative of the US K12 system. Participating schools within the six MET districts were on average higher-performing
than non-participating schools. Further, student non-compliance with the study was far from
random; students who remained in the study as assigned 188 were on average higher-performing
than those who shifted from their assigned teacher. The authors of this review point out that the
subgroups that were under-studied in the MET experiment are precisely the subgroups which
raise questions about bias in value-added assessment (pp. 5-6). Owing to these limitations, they
argue that the study does little to improve on Kane and Staiger’s 2008 random assignment study
in Los Angeles and does not resolve the question of whether value-added measures are biased
based on student sorting. Furthermore, the statistical VA model used in the MET reports is far
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This method of converting average test scores to months of learning can be traced back to a
study by Eric Hanushek (1992). It has also featured prominently in research on the effectiveness
of charter schools (Center for Research on Educational Outcomes, 2012) and of alternative
teacher certification methods (National Center for Educational Evaluation, 2013).
188
The MET project final report analyzes all students who were randomly assigned, even though
a substantial proportion (14 percent) of those did not remain with their assigned teacher (Kane,
McCaffrey, Miller, & Staiger, 2013, p. 14).
170

more comprehensive than those being used for consequential evaluations – which further limits
the utility of the results (pp. 7-9).
Critics regard the Composite Estimator findings as much more interesting, perhaps because they
are less controversial. That no two modes of evaluation were highly correlated suggests that
decisions about evaluation are necessarily value judgments, not matters of technical precision.
Notably, the What Works Clearinghouse, a federally funded program which assesses the strength
of education research and focuses on experimental and quasi-experimental methods, did not
assign a rating to the MET study. WWC said that though the study utilized random assignment, it
did not “test a specific policy, intervention or practice” (What Works Clearinghouse, 2013).189
But this is not exactly the case. The MET project poses and provides an answer to an ‘RCTready’ question – what is the causal effect of a one unit change in measured teacher
effectiveness? So it is interesting that the study was not rated. But the WWC standards suggest
an explanation. The review process focuses on Intent-to-Treat (ITT) analyses of effects – which
were not provided in the MET reports.190 And the MET study population differed substantially
from the general population on certain key traits (baseline test scores, ELL and Special
Education status). For the WWC, this compromises the use of the alternative instrumental
variables (IV) approach. Further, in its use an alternative effect measure, the study does not
include a baseline equivalency measure of SES, which is a requirement for meeting WWC
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Despite this claim by WWC, it reviewed parts of the Chetty et al. long-term impacts study
(What Works Clearinghouse, 2012).
190
Two of the study’s lead authors have used ITT estimates of treatment effects in a smaller
study of teacher effectiveness conducted in Los Angeles (Kane & Staiger, 2008). The MET study
was an elaboration of the design used in that paper (Rothstein & Mathis, 2013).
171

standards when there is high attrition. Thus it is likely that if the WWC were to review the MET
project as a random assignment study, it would not meet their evidence standards.
Two key witnesses in the Vergara trial –Thomas Kane and Raj Chetty – each made significant,
high-profile contributions to value-added research. These contributions feature prominently in
their expert testimony. But they are not without significant limitations or criticisms. 191 Thus we
now turn to examine the expert testimony to see how their research is translated into trial
evidence.
Expert Testimony in Vergara- Raj Chetty

In considering the expert testimony of Thomas Kane and Raj Chetty, I examine transcripts of
their testimony and the demonstrative exhibits used in their presentations. The transcripts are
uncertified drafts and were accessed from a website established by the California Teachers
Union during the trial. The charts and diagrams used by expert witnesses were accessed through
the Students Matter website.
Raj Chetty testified in the Vergara trial over the course of two days – January 29th and 30th 2014.
He was examined by Theodor Boutros for the plaintiffs and cross-examined by James Finberg
and Nimrod Elliot for the defense. The evidence related to Chetty’s testimony was his National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper released in 2011 (Chetty, Friedman, &
Rockoff, 2011a) and slides based on that research.192 The early part of the testimony – 35
minutes – was spent elaborating on Chetty’s career as an economist – including his degrees,
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Other criticisms were made of Chetty et al. and the MET project, but I focused on those
which were available before the trial.
192
Chetty’s papers were admitted as plaintiffs’ exhibits 7, 8, 9, 11 and 15. The slides were
admitted as plaintiffs’ exhibit 677 (p. 582).
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awards, involvement with government officials, and research interest in public economics (p.
436-455). Before proceeding into his testimony on value-added measurement, Chetty also
connected VA research to the use of “Big Data” in solving policy problems. He justifies this as
promoting a scientific and non-ideological approach to social policy – perhaps not considering
the fact that his role as an expert witness in a trial seeking to undermine teachers unions is a
profoundly ideological choice (p. 461).193
His testimony on value-added methodology focused on so-called intuitive concepts rather than
technical details. For example, measuring gains in learning by subtracting average fourth grade
test scores from average third grade test scores (p.478) is an intuitive method. But [as I showed
in chapter one] it is a technically fraught approach to isolating an individual teacher’s
effectiveness – since there are effectively two teachers’ effects being estimated under a typical
testing schedule. Chetty’s discussion of demographic controls or ‘fairness variables’ in VAA
argues that prior year test scores are the only important control (p.482), a claim which is still in
dispute among VA researchers, especially given that non-random student sorting is prevalent in
most schools districts (cites).
The discussion then shifts to the quasi-experimental tests for bias reported in the Long Term
Impacts paper. In explaining how teacher turnover creates a natural experiment, he refers to
random assignment as “a gold-standard scientific experiment” (p.488). This presages the
testimony given later by Kane, but also belies the trouble with compliance in such studies. He

“So at a high level what I’m interested in as an economist, what motivates me is trying to
bring a scientific approach to bear on public policy issues. I think too often in our public policy
debate; decisions are made on the basis of ideology or political interests rather than what I think
can be really scientific answers.” This is consistent with what Chetty argues in a New York Times
Op-Ed (Chetty, 2013).
193
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then describes the quasi-experimental observations of moments in which a highly effective
teacher (top 5 percent of the VA distribution) enters a grade. Chetty’s description of his own
findings at this point is inaccurate – he attributes the growth in test scores solely to the highly
teacher effective teacher (pg. 489).194 On the other hand, the Long-term impacts paper itself
reports that this is the growth in average test scores across the entire grade, not just in the
classroom of the newly hired instructor (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 2011a, p. 61). This is a
consequential difference because it is not necessarily clear that the newly hired teacher is on her
own responsible for the growth – one could imagine that instructors can and do collaborate,
especially when a staff member is new to a school. The same point can also be made in reference
to the next few minutes of his testimony, which concern the entry and exit of highly effective or
ineffective teachers (p. 490-500) The year Chetty analyzes is also of consequence – New York
City (the data source) changed its reading test instrument between the 1995 and 1996 school
years. As a result, the proportion of students who scored at or above grade level in reading
dropped from 47.5 percent to 41.6 percent – leading local officials to caution against overinterpreting the change in test scores (Newman, 1996).

“Now what happens as soon as that teacher enters, test score immediately jump up, and they
continue to stay high for subsequent cohorts of children who are taught by this highly effective
teacher [emphasis added]” Chetty is clear that these figures are taken from the Long Term
Impacts paper, which is listed as exhibit 7 for his testimony (p. 492). He clarifies later on that the
level of analysis is the grade rather than the teacher, but his clarification is far more technical:
“So let’s say there are four teachers teaching in a particular grade, and one of them is a highly
ineffective teacher who leaves, we’re not saying look at the test scores of that one teacher. We’re
saying let’s average the test scores of all the fourth-graders. Now, 25 percent of them were
exposed to the highly ineffective teacher. Now we’re going to compare that to all fourth graders’
test scores on average after that teacher leaves, and the average teacher quality that those
students face in the next year will be higher…the idea is that on average the entire grade has
better teachers and that’s the nature of the experiment.” (pg.500)
194
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The next part of Chetty’s testimony focuses on forecast bias. This concept [described in footnote
23 above] is very sophisticated and relies on a complex estimation procedure, which the witness
and examiner make no attempt to describe.195 The demonstrative evidence is the binned
scatterplot charts presented in the Long-term Impacts paper, which nicely show points clustering
around a best fit line, but compress nearly 60,000 data points into only twenty, giving a false
sense of consistency (slides 214-01 and 214-02). The reported slope of the best fit line (0.98) is
very near a perfect correlation, and looks more perfect because the outliers among the 60,000
points are compressed into the binned average points.
The testimony then turns to the actual long-term impacts cited in the paper, beginning with
college attendance and earnings. A major omission of the testimony is the way “long-term
impacts” are actually determined. The authors infer the long-term impacts of teachers based on
the correlations between test scores and later outcomes. This is at the heart of Ballou’s (2012)
critique of their study discussed above. To know that teachers have such long-term impacts, one
first needs to determine non-spuriousness – whether other variables which correlate with teacher
value-added are also correlated with long-term outcomes.
Chetty’s exhibits include three charts taken from the Long-Term Impacts paper, which are again
the binned scatterplots – though this time 20 data points stand in for 1.1 million student
observations, which Chetty points out in his testimony (p. 515). This means that 55,000 student

“So let me describe how we construct it. On the x-axis are changes in average value-added of
teachers across consecutive cohorts of students. So like we were using in the [quasiexperimental] example before, this would be the difference in the average value-added of
teachers in 1996 minus 1995 in a given school in a given grade in a given subject, okay. And on
the y-axis is the change in the actual test scores for the students between 1996 and 1995 or
between the next year and the previous year generally.” This description omits the detail that
average teacher value-added for a grade-subject in ‘1996 minus 1995’ is estimated without data
from the years 1996 and 1995, and further likely includes data from years 1997 and later.
195
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data points are being compressed into one (slide 204-01). Further, even though Chetty’s
testimony mentions highly effective and highly ineffective teachers (the top and bottom 5
percent of the distribution); the lowest bin on the chart’s x-axis indicates an average ranking in
the 15th percentile, while the highest point is at the 90th percentile.196 The chart’s y-axis is equally
important to consider, as the range of teacher impacts on college attendance is less than 2
percentage points. Chetty argues that this represents the impact of a single teacher, and that the
effects of teachers are cumulative, arguing that the college attendance effect could be “10 or 15
percentage points,” calling the potential effects “roughly additive.” (p.517). Value-added
research – including Kane and Staiger’s Los Angeles experiment – has found that teacher effects
fade out drastically (Kane & Staiger, 2008; Jacob, Lefgren, & Sims, 2010). Nonetheless, Chetty
argues that this cumulative benefit can also result in cumulative harm in the case of successive
ineffective teachers. This point about cumulative teacher effects is reiterated in his testimony
regarding college quality and student income.
The discussion of teachers’ impacts on students’ college quality begins by establishing the
measure used. Chetty and his coauthors gauged a college’s quality based on the mean earnings of
its graduates 12 years later.197 Chetty refers to this measure as simultaneously indicating a

196

The chart illustrates a point made in Chapter 2; value-added rankings are not normally
distributed – teacher VA scores tend to cluster in the middle of the distribution. Indeed, five
binned data points are clustered around to the 50th percentile. Yet Chetty goes on “You can
directly see from this chart real data with these 1.1 million children. A child who is assigned to a
teacher who’s in the bottom 5 percent of the distribution, a highly ineffective teacher, based on
value-added metrics, has a 36 percent chance of attending college in this school district
compared with approximately 38 percent for a child who is assigned a highly effective teacher in
the top 5 percent of the distribution.” (pg. 516)
197
At this point in the testimony, Chetty indicates his involvement with the Obama
administration’s controversial attempt to rank colleges based on student’s mean post-graduation
earnings. The initial plan, which would have tied college funding to these ratings, ultimately
failed in Congress, but the Department of Education’s “college scorecards “ still do report this
statistic (Fain, 2013; Stratford, 2015).
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college’s selectivity and its value-added (p. 521). He argues that a single highly effective teacher
can increase her students’ average college quality by two to three percentage points or $500 in
additional average post-graduation earnings when compared to a highly ineffective teacher. The
eighteen points in the middle of the chart are not discussed, as the differences between their
effects on college quality are far less dramatic than two percentage points.
Chetty’s testimony then focuses on the earnings impacts of highly effective and highly
ineffective teachers, using two charts. The first chart (slide 205-01), drawn from Long-Term
Impacts, focuses on students’ reported earnings at age 28, shows far more variation than those
related to college outcomes. As such, the best fit line looks flatter than in the three previous
figures – the points associated with the two highest ventiles are no higher than some near the
median. Chetty explains this as statistical noise – despite the analysis being based on over
360,000 observations – and instead directs attention to the trend line.198 It is of interest that he
does not cite the $182 difference between the bottom and top five percentiles, which is perhaps
the most cited figure from the paper. He is saving dollar amounts for a larger idea.
The next chart deviates from those included in Long-Term Impacts. It presents a normal curve
with the bottom 5-percent highlighted. He proposes that if schools were to ‘let go’ of teachers in
this lowest value-added ventile and replace them with average teachers, that the data suggest this
would improve the lifetime earnings of each child by $50,000, and multiplies this figure by 28 –
the average class size in the data – to produce a classroom-level effect of $1.4 million. The

He does concede that it is possible that “teachers in the very upper tail of the distribution, the
top 1 percent or the top 2 percent of the value-added distribution might not be having as
substantial effects on students’ long term earnings as you might predict based on their impacts on
test scores.” This point tacitly reveals the methodology of the Long Term Impacts study, which
was described above, but not discussed explicitly in the testimony.
198
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$50,000 figure is said to represent a 2 to 3 percentage point increase in lifetime earnings, and is
further exploited by comparing it to the impact of the “Great Recession” which reduced GDP by
between 6 and 7 percent. Thus he argues that the “feasible policy” of removing and replacing
low value-added teachers with average ones would have an effect “on the same order as ending
the financial crisis again and again, year after year.” (p. 529)
This point needs detailed explication. As noted earlier, these effect estimates assume little fade
out of teacher effects over time – a fourth-grader is nine years old and the testimony discusses
income measured at age 28.199 Further, the testimony did not include the authors’ measures of
income effects at age 30, which were not significantly different from zero. Even the paper did
not examine income at other age points under 30 where participation in the labor force is
robust.200 This “feasible” policy of effectiveness-based layoffs was first mentioned by Eric
Hanushek in the propaganda film Waiting For Superman. But for such a policy to be feasible,
school systems would need to have a reserve army at least five percent of the size of their teacher
labor forces available every year and adequately divided by grade and subject specializations.
Chetty’s testimony then briefly moves through three other outcomes examined in Long-Term
Impacts: teen pregnancy, neighborhood quality, and retirement savings (slides 206-01 through
206-03). He argues that being assigned to highly ineffective teachers increases the likelihood that
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Chetty discussed fade-out briefly in the testimony. He acknowledges the fade out of test
scores documented in the value-added literature and argues that this is why they chose to study
long-term impacts directly (pg. 537). But this holds only if one accepts studying teachers’ effects
on earnings via her average marginal effect on test score growth as a direct measure.
200
For example, the most recent Baccalaureate and Beyond (B&B) survey indicates that about
80 percent of recent bachelor’s degree recipients were employed by age 26 and that a large
majority of these held full-time jobs (Cataldi, Siegel, Shepherd, & Cooney, 2014). Labor force
participation among two-year college students and high-school graduates who did not attend
college is probably comparable. This suggests that Long Term Impacts could have investigated at
least three other age points with large sample sizes.
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female students will have children at or before age 19, reduces the quality of the neighborhood
that students live in at age 28, and negatively impacts the probability of students having
retirement savings accounts by age 28. (pgs. 529-532) At this point, Chetty again quickly reveals
the arbitrary analytic choices made in the study – focusing their analysis on outcomes for 28
year-olds. Chetty says that this choice was made “simply because we don’t have an adequate
number of children who are beyond age 28 in our data.” (pg. 532) As Adler (2013)noted in his
critique of this study, this inadequate number of students is over 61,000 – quite a robust figure by
most standards. The next slide (205-02) returns to the earnings outcome and tracks the authors’
estimated impacts over time from ages 20 to 28. Chetty uses this slide to show that teacher
effects on student’s earnings trend upward.201
The next set of comments in Chetty’s testimony respond to three criticisms of value-added
measures made by other researchers: that VA cannot disentangle the many factors which
influence student test scores, that VA scores are affected by the students to which teachers are
assigned, and that VA measures fluctuate from year to year. To the first point, he begins by
agreeing that many things can affect student test scores; he then makes an analogy to basketball
to argue that even though many factors affect performance, policy should try to control what it
can.202 To the second point, Chetty argues that his teacher-switching quasi experiment as well as

But this slide also reveals the authors’ selective presentation of their own data. The chart ends
at age 28, but includes all prior data points. This is inconsistent with the paper, which presented
earnings estimates for age 30, but for no other age points. The y-axis is the percentage point
impact on earnings of a teacher one standard deviation above average. The authors correctly
explain the negative impacts before age 23 – many students are still in college (testimony pg.
533). After that, we see that the largest single-year jump in the earnings effect occurs between
age 27 and 28, and that between ages 24 and 26, the average effect is about 1 percentage point.
One possible explanation for not including these findings in the paper or the testimony is that
these effects did not achieve statistical significance.
202
“There are many determinants of a basketball player’s ability. One of the most important is
perhaps a player’s height. If you are 5’2”, your odds of making it to the NBA are not great
201
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Kane and Staiger’s random assignment study in Los Angeles have proved that value-added
measures are unbiased if they control for prior test scores. Though many researchers agree that
the Long-Term Impacts paper showed that value-added was capable of capturing teacher
contributions to test scores, some have still raised objections to their technique of estimating bias
(Rothstein J. , 2015). Further, reviews of the random assignment study in Los Angeles showed
that important groups of students were likely excluded. To the final point, the unreliability of VA
measures, Chetty later responds that simply finding a low correlation between value-added

relative to if you are 6’6” or 7 feet tall…Now does this mean that you shouldn’t be concerned
about coaching a basketball player, like should we be interested in trying to improve coaching?
My view is the fact that there are other important determinants of a player’s ability doesn’t mean
that you should not pay any attention to things you can manipulate.” (p. 540) This is a weak
defense of value-added as a policy tool; as the proper analogy would be if some coaches got
teams full of 5’2” players while others got teams full of 6’6” players and we nonetheless had a
policy of firing those coaches with the lowest average point totals. Chetty makes extended
analogies to baseball and basketball statistics to support numerous points in his testimony, so it
seems appropriate to unpack the limits of such an analogy.
There is a deep affinity between value-added assessment in education and statistics in sports
management. Baseball analysts have long kept track of certain basic statistics – runs scored,
batting average, bases stolen, earned run average, etc. But beginning in the 1980s, some baseball
researchers began applying the tools of statistical inference to “search for objective knowledge
about baseball” (Grabiner, 1994). The resulting approach – known as Sabermetrics – created new
statistics for the analysis of the sport which measure players’ contributions accounting for their
positions and other aspects of their role on a team. The most famous application of these
principles was on the Oakland Athletics professional team in the 1990s, which was documents
by Michael Lewis in the book Moneyball. One statistic – value over replacement player (VORP)
– is precisely the same operative idea behind value-added. A replacement player is defined by
certain average characteristics for backup players, and active players’ contributions to their
teams are quantified by their deviation from this average (Woolner, 2001).
In baseball there are acceptably talented players far in excess of the available positions on major
league teams (1,200 roster positions are available in all). In such a situation, it makes sense to
create management policy based on the assumption that average players are available to replace
your starting players – especially at a league minimum salary of over $500,000 per year.
However, with a teaching labor force of 3.1 million where salaries average $55,000 per year, a
value over replacement teacher strategy is hardly tenable. Further, baseball has only one
“important” outcome – winning games. Nonetheless, VORP combines numerous statistics to
measure how players contribute to that goal. Education reformers instead seek to use one
measurement – student test scores – to assess teacher contributions to an undetermined number
of socially important outcomes.
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scores from one year to the next is not enough to render the data invalid. He instead returns to his
dollar-value calculations of the impact of using value-added as a policy tool and says that,
regardless of how accurate the measure is, an effectiveness-based layoff policy would produce
$1.4 million in additional income for students, so it is worth it.203 His response to this criticism
also relies on sports analogies; he notes that batting averages are unreliable and that despite
basketball players’ average performances, people tend to focus on outliers (p. 554). So with the
exception of the question of forecast bias, for which his study provides an answer, Chetty’s
response to criticisms of VA measures is that whatever their flaws, they should be put into
practice. Broadly, he hinges his belief in the validity of value-added methods on the teacher
switching quasi-experiment featured in Long Term Impacts. We have seen that this is a strong
but not infallible piece of evidence. It also does not by itself prove teachers’ long term impacts or
confirm value-added as standalone measure of teacher quality.
The plaintiffs finally ask Chetty to comment on two LAUSD policies – a 16-month teacher
probation period and the “Last-in-First-out” (LIFO) teacher retention policy. Chetty’s comments
on these policies both use VA methods as a reference point and invoke to the theorized policy of
firing teachers in the bottom five percent of the effectiveness along with the hypothesized
lifetime income benefits it would afford to students. He argues that the probationary period
should be 3 years instead of 16 months, since the additional years of value-added data would
more precisely identify the bottom of the distribution for more finely-tuned teacher layoffs –
though he uses evasive terms “deselecting the bottom five percent” (p. 567).204 Lengthening the

“…and that’s the critical point here. The measure is not perfect. Qualitatively it’s correct that
there is inconsistency, but, that, in my view, a 1.4 million-dollar gain is still very substantial and
does not undermine the value of the measures.” (p. 553)
204
The term “deselecting” was first used to describe this policy by Eric Hanushek (2009).
203
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probationary period, he argues, would increase students’ lifetime earnings by $163,000 (Slide
208-03).
Chetty’s comments on LIFO make use of data analysis commissioned by the plaintiffs rather
than Long-Term Impacts – thus it is based on analysis of LAUSD data which are significantly
smaller (500,000 students over three years from 2009-2011) than the New York City data (2.5
million students over twenty years). The claims he makes about the impacts of different policies
also require many assumptions about school policy. For example, the court is asked to imagine
that Los Angeles is asked to lay off five percent of its teacher labor force (p. 573). This is done to
contrast the possibility of laying off teachers based on effectiveness ratings against doing so
based on seniority. He notes the LIFO policy results in layoffs across the value-added
distribution, including many ‘above average’ teachers and some in the top five percent of the
distribution. 205 Of the latter group of high value-added teachers who would be affected, Chetty
argues that “we should be doing everything we can to keep these superstars of the teaching
profession in our school district.” (p. 575) Again returning to sports analogies and says that
seniority-based layoffs would be akin to cutting Michael Jordan from the basketball team if he
didn’t do well in his first year. This is dubious; an effectiveness-based layoff policy would be as
likely (if not more so) to cut a player who didn’t do well. Here his argument against LIFO
complicates his position on extending the probationary period. If probationary periods – during
which teachers can be fired with little recourse – were extended to three years, many new
teachers might be “deselected” before their “superstar” status could be determined.

Chetty testifies that about “roughly five percent” of the teachers who would be laid off under
a LIFO policy would be in the top five percent of the value-added distribution (p. 575). But if his
demonstrative chart of two largely overlapping normal distributions (slide 201-3) is to be
believed, that percentage is substantially smaller.
205
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Chetty goes on to describe the earnings impacts of switching to a layoff policy based-on the VA
distribution. This combines the analysis of test score data in Los Angeles with the earnings
impacts estimated in New York City – which by fiat makes the assumption that such impacts can
be inferred from one municipality to another. He argues that the impact of removing teachers in
the bottom five percent of the VA distribution would increase students’ lifetime earnings by $2.1
million for every teacher laid off (p. 579). After briefly addressing the disproportionate effects of
LIFO policies on poor and minority students – based on Thomas Kane’s research – Boutros ends
his examination of Dr. Chetty.206
Expert Witness Testimony in Vergara – Thomas Kane
Dr. Thomas Kane testified over two days from February 5th to February 6th 2014.207 He was
examined by He states that his primary research interest since 2006 has been teacher
effectiveness, and that from 2008 to 2012 he was on leave from Harvard to work as deputy
director of K-12 programs at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (Feb 5 PM Session,
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The cross-examination is shorter and far less focused, so I only discuss it briefly. James
Finberg, the first cross-examining attorney for the defense, begins by confirming that Chetty has
never actually taught or been an administrator in a K-12 classroom (p. 587). But he seemed too
unfamiliar with VA methods or with Chetty’s testimony to effectively cross-examine. After
failed attempts to talk about Chetty’s Long-Term Impacts study, Finberg questions Chetty on inschool and out-of-school factors other than teacher effectiveness that could impact student
achievement, establishing from Chetty’s research that smaller class size and teacher experience
were also shown to be correlated with better long-term student outcomes (p. 595-602). He further
confirms from Chetty’s own research that cities in California including Los Angeles were ranked
high on a social mobility index, and that the quality of local schools was one important factor in
determining levels of social mobility (p. 606-609). Nimrod Elliot, the second cross-examiner,
confirms Chetty’s hourly retainer rate as an expert witness, $825 per hour and that the portions
of his expert testimony on LIFO policies were conducted as an expert witness and not subject to
peer review (p. 610). His final questions clarify some of Chetty’s model specifications on the
LIFO analyses.
207
Since there were no readily available transcripts, I rely on a video of Kane’s testimony from
the Courtroom View Network. References refer to the date and time of the session and the time
stamp of the video. Citations to the slides are the same as done with Chetty’s testimony.
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2h43m).208 It was during this time that he worked on the MET project with the specific goal of
developing “systematic, replicable measures of teacher effectiveness.” (Feb 5 PM Session,
2h47m).209
The first remarks Kane makes with respect to teacher evaluation concern standard classroom
observations, which he regards as “perfunctory.” (Feb 5, PM, 2h48m) He then gives the main
point from the five MET study reports – that they have identified stable, unbiased measures of
teacher effectiveness and that those measures correlate with observed student achievement gains
(Feb 6, AM 0h1m). He mentions a number of his teacher effectiveness studies, including a
replication of Chetty’s Long Term Impacts (Bacher-Hicks, Kane, & Staiger, 2014) and the
random assignment study in Los Angeles which he referred to as a miniature MET project (Kane
& Staiger, 2008) (Feb 6, AM, 0h7m).
Kane was retained to comment on five topics, three of which are conceptual in relation to teacher
effectiveness, and two which are specific to Los Angeles schools (Slide 356-01). His opinion on
Los Angeles is that the district shows wider variation in teacher effectiveness than do many other
cities and that Black and Hispanic students are disproportionately assigned to ineffective
teachers. But he begins by discussing teacher effectiveness generally and the MET study in
particular.
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Kane connects his selection to head the MET study to his work with Doug Staiger and Robert
Gordon, “Identifying Effective Teachers Using Performance on the Job” (Gordon, Kane, &
Staiger, 2006).
209
He describes systematic and replicable measures later on in his testimony and clarifies that
this refers to student surveys and scored teacher observations in addition to student test scores
(Feb 6 AM 0h21m). Kane generally seems more careful in his comments about Value-Added
models.
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The first few minutes of testimony are primarily drawn from a Gates Foundation Policy and
Practice Brief on Ensuring Fair and Reliable Measures of Effective Teaching.210 Kane starts his
opinion by saying that is essential for school districts to measure teacher effectiveness. He
supports this by saying that measurement is essential so that teachers can “develop their own
effectiveness” through feedback, and that not doing so would be like “running Weight Watchers
without bathroom scales or mirrors” (Feb 6, AM 0h18m). He advocates direct measures of
student achievement gains where possible and other data – observations and student surveys –
which are known to be related to student achievement gains (Slide 359-01). He distinguishes
between these measures and others – such as teacher credentials and certifications – which have
been shown to be uncorrelated with student test score gains (Feb 6 AM, 0h26m).
Kane and Lipschutz (the plaintiff’s attorney) engage in a discussion of Campbell’s Law (Slide
360-01).211 The quote from Assessing the Impact of Planned Social Change refers both to the
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Rothstein and Mathis (2013) point out that these policy briefs do not provide the level of
detail of the full papers and give the impression that random assignment was unproblematic.
211
The slide quotes “The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decisionmaking, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort
and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor…Many commentators, including
myself (1969b), assume that the use of multiple measures, all recognized as imperfect, will
alleviate the problem, although Ridgeway (1956) doubts this.”
The quotation is misleading. The ellipsis – which is intended for use when the meaning of a
quote is unchanged by the omission – omits ten pages of text. In those ten pages, Campbell
discusses at length the “highly corruptible” nature of student achievement tests (Campbell, 1976,
p. 61), the phenomenon known as “creaming” – where the most difficult cases are excluded from
accountability metrics (p. 60), and the need to have practitioner organizations cooperate in the
measurement process using the example of a teachers’ union (p. 63).
In the same paper, Campbell explicitly urges evaluation researchers to refuse to conduct the sort
of research that Kane and Chetty have advanced. His point is worth quoting at length – and
without substantive omission: “I recommend that we evaluation researcher methodologists
should refuse to use our skills in ad hominem research. While the expensive machinery of social
experimentation can be used to evaluate persons, it should not be. Such results are of very
limited generalizability… (5 lines down) This prohibition on ad hominem research should also
185

corruption of quantitative indicators and to Campbell’s support for using multiple measures – but
the attorney pushes Kane’s testimony to focus on the value of value-added as a single
quantitative indicator (Feb 6 AM, 0h36m).212
Nonetheless, Kane makes an interesting point here; triangulation of multiple sources of data
around a concept is an important way to validate findings, and perhaps to improve evaluation
policy. But one also needs to question how much the MET project really promoted ‘multiple
measures.’ As we saw above, the measure of an important measure is, for MET, its correlation
with Value-Added. Kane emphasizes this both in the MET reports and in his expert testimony.
So if all the measures are conceptually bound to a single measure, how many measures do we
really have?
The testimony then turns to the MET findings on multiple measures – Value-Added, Student
Surveys, and Classroom Observations. Kane’s remarks here center on whether the combined
metrics developed in the MET project perform better than existing methods of making teacher
tenure and retention decisions. Similar to other proponents of VA, Kane evaluates value-added

be extended to program clients. We should not be evaluating students or welfare recipients but
alternative policies for dealing with their problems.” (Campbell, 1976, p. 56)
212
The exchange is important. “Now does Campbell’s law mean that you cannot measure teacher
effectiveness using Value Added Measures? No. Why Not? The implication of the first statement
is that if you used just Value-Added, there’s a danger that it would become distorted. But the
second part of Campbell’s Law is implying that the way to alleviate that problem is to collect
multiple measures that would allow you to lessen the chance that teachers or principals or
whomever would improperly try to distort the behavior you’re trying to incentivize. But even if
you used only Value-Added measures, would that provide you any insight into a teacher’s
effectiveness? Yes. If one only had a Value-Added measure, one could characterize differences
in effectiveness, but one wouldn’t want to use that as the sole measure and apply it in an
evaluation system because the measure may no longer be measuring the things that you think it
is. But if you take an existing data set and apply Value-Added to that existing data set where
Value-Added is not used for high-stakes purposes, can you use Value-Added to assess teacher
effectiveness? Yes.”
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not on its own strength, but on its comparative merits (see for example (Harris D. N., ValueAdded Measures in Education: What Every Educator Needs to Know, 2011)). The chart which
informs this testimony demonstrates a circular logic; existing measures of teacher quality are
compared with the MET composite based on their respective correlations with student test score
gains – one component of the MET composite. This same circular logic is evident in one of
MET’s three culminating reports (Mihaly, McCaffrey, Staiger, & Lockwood, 2013), where the
authors find that each measure of effective teaching is only strongly correlated with itself.
On the same point (Slide 365-01; Slide 366-01) Kane begins to use a misleading measure of
student achievement to support his position on the use of VA measures. His slides convert
standardized test scores to months of student learning (Feb 6 AM, 0h50m-56m). Later in his
testimony, one chart indicates that this procedure of converting test score gains to months
follows Hill et al. 2008 (Slide371-01). That paper – originally released as a technical report
released by the research firm MDRC – estimates average annual student test score growth by
grade level; it never endorses the practice of converting test score gains into months of learning
(Hill, Bloom, Black, & Lipsey, 2007).213 As noted above, this conversion was first used by
Hanushek (1992) and has been subject to criticism.
The next section of Kane’s testimony focuses on the MET random assignment study. As with
Chetty’s testimony, random assignment is described as the only way to make causal claims based
on research (Feb 6 AM, 1h05m). He then relies on slides which plots predicted and observed
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Specifically, Hill et al. includes a table which shows the average student test score gains by
grade level across six nationally-normed math tests and seven nationally-normed reading tests (p.
3). Because the MET study focuses on grades 4 through 8, Kane averages the annual test score
gains across those five grade levels (.420 standard deviations) and then divides by twelve to
calculate the average month of student learning – .035 standard deviations (author’s calculation
based on Hill et al. 2007 and Kane et al. 2013).
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student achievement gains (Slide 369-01, 370-01). Unlike the previous slides, predicted teacher
effectiveness is only measured by value-added. The chart is a binned scatterplot like those
featured in Chetty’s testimony; in this case, each of the twenty points represents 40 teachers,
meaning that the plot could have instead featured 800 points (Feb 6 AM, 1h10m-13m). This is
different from Chetty’s charts insofar as it would have been feasible to plot 800 points without
too much clutter; however, it would likely have been a far less persuasive picture. In both slides
(Math and ELA), the slopes of the regression lines are much more shallow than those in Chetty’s
Long Term Impacts papers. Kane ultimately states his opinion based on this evidence: that
teacher probationary periods should be extended. He does this relying on an odd analogy to
dating.214 Contrary to Kane’s emphasis on multiple measures, his discussion of the benefits of
extending the probationary period for new teachers focuses solely on the additional years of test
score data which that extension affords (Feb 6 AM, 1h38m).
Kane’s testimony on his second topic – differences in teacher effectiveness – relies on his study
of teachers in the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), which replicates the first
section of Chetty et al. and relies solely on VA measures of effectiveness (Feb 6 AM 1h56m). He
defends this study against his emphasis on multiple measures, arguing that the point of the
LAUSD study was to validate VA measures, not to recommend VA as a standalone teacher
evaluation policy. It is important to note that in the paper based on these data, Kane and his

“Now do you have an opinion about whether a year and a half is enough time for a school
district to gather the evidence…to make an informed judgment about a teacher’s effectiveness?
My opinion is that it’s not long enough; it’s analogous to telling people that they can have a
maximum of one-and-a-half dates before they decide to get married. Certainly after one date it’s
possible to identify matches that won’t work out, but I don’t think it’s possible after one-and-ahalf dates to be really confident that this commitment you’re making is worthwhile. If we limited
people to one-and-a-half dates before making marriage decisions, we’d have a lot of bad
marriages” (Feb 6 AM, 1h34-36m). This analogy is simply too absurd to seriously consider, but
Kane insists on this logic, returning to it after being cross-examined (Feb 6 PM, 1h48m).
214
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colleagues do not mention the need for multiple measures as they justify the validity of VA
measures as a policy tool (Bacher-Hicks, Kane, & Staiger, 2014). The testimony notes three
findings from the LAUSD study: that teacher effectiveness measures are predictable, that the
effects of teacher assignment are larger than those found in New York, and that ineffective
teachers are disproportionately assigned to Black and Latino students (Slide 364-01). The first
finding is supported by a binned regression plot similar to those used in Chetty’s testimony
(Slide 351-01, cf. Slide 214-01) and similar statements by Kane (Feb 6 AM, 2h00m).
The argument regarding the effects of teacher assignment on learning is supported by charts
comparing the effect size differences in the LAUSD study to those in Long Term Impacts and the
MET study (Slides 371-01 and 372-01). Specifically, Kane notes the learning differences
between the bottom 5 percent and average teachers, using the same months of learning
conversion described above, across the three studies. This makes the effect of teacher assignment
in Los Angeles look far more dramatic than in other municipalities; the chart shows students
with the lowest VA teachers losing 9.5 “months” of ELA learning and 11.7 “months” of math
learning – an entire school year. This is compared to 6.6/7.0 months in the New York (as found
by Chetty et al.) and 4.8/6.7 months in the six MET districts. The prosecutor emphasizes this
comparison with the following exchange:
“That means that I lose 11.73 months or an entire year of learning relative to students
assigned to the average teacher. How is that possible, Dr. Kane? How could a student
lose an entire year of learning in one year? By not learning very much…So what is the
conclusion we should take from this slide? Although there are differences in all three
districts associated with being assigned to a bottom fifth percentile teacher rather than the
average teacher, the differences are larger and the consequences are larger in Los
Angeles…” (Feb 6 AM, 2h06m)
Kane makes two final points regarding the LAUSD study. The first is that Black and Latino
students are assigned to teachers who have on average lower VA scores. The second is that those
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students are more likely to be assigned to teachers in the bottom five percent of the VA
distribution. His demonstrative slide again uses the months of learning metric. Kane refines the
point by suggesting that the “maldistribution” of teachers in Los Angeles is widening racial
achievement gaps. But in making this point he also notes that students in the data who started a
year with lower test scores were more likely to be assigned to low VA teachers. 215 Inadvertently,
this reinforces arguments for student sorting made by Rothstein (2010)and others (Garrett &
Steinberg, 2015). In describing the reasons for the maldistribution of teachers, he says that
policies which make premature tenure decisions or make it hard to fire ineffective teachers could
lead to what he calls a “Lemon Accumulation Machine.”216 He further says that low VA teachers
tend to settle in schools with higher proportions of black and Latino students owing to labor
market forces (Feb 6 AM, 2h26m-28m).
The direct examination concludes after Kane briefly addresses how the MET study complements
the findings of Long Term Impacts. James The first cross-examination on behalf of the California
Teachers’ Association is conducted by James Finberg. He begins in the same way as with
Chetty, confirming that Kane has never been a teacher or administrator in a public school. But

“We also looked at differences in the effectiveness of teachers assigned to students who
started the year low on state achievement tests to those who started the year high on state
achievement tests. And the relationship we saw was that students who started the year lower on
the state tests were assigned less effective teachers one average than [sic] students who started
the year with higher achievement on state tests.” (Feb 6 AM, 2h25m) In other words, the best
teachers are assigned to the best students – one wonders how these teachers got to be the “best.”
216
He describes this phrase in more detail. “In any system where districts have to make tenure
decisions prematurely and where it is difficult to make dismissal decisions later, ineffective
teachers will tend to accumulate. It’s sort of an inevitable result of those two factors and the
regrettable implication is that ineffective teachers then tend to accumulate in the schools where
there are more vacancies. And the schools where there are more vacancies are often the schools
where there are large accumulations of African American or Latino students.” (Feb 6 PM, 0h1m)
One gets the impression from this remark that the same forces that make a school desirable to
teachers are the same environmental factors that lead to higher test scores – and consequently to
higher teacher VA ratings. I demonstrated this in Chapter 2.
215
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his cross-examination of Kane is much more substantial, lasting over an hour. As with the direct
examination, I only focus on portions which pertain to VA assessment.
The defense attorney first establishes, based on language from one MET study (The Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation, 2013), that Kane prefers evaluations which use multiple measures,
and that such evaluations produce more consistent estimates of teacher effectiveness. He then
confirms Kane’s belief that relying on a single indicator (such as state test scores) can have
negative consequences for students, teachers and schools (Feb 6 PM, 0h15m-35m).217 Relying
from the LAUSD study, the defense establishes that teacher mal-distribution was related not only
on race/ethnicity but also to prior-year student test scores, both within and between schools (Feb
6 PM, 0h38m-44m). Using Kane’s Hamilton project study (Gordon, Kane, & Staiger, Identifying
Effective Teachers Using Performance on the Job, 2006) he establishes that Kane believes that
working conditions affect teachers’ labor market decisions, that schools can get information
about teacher effectiveness using less than three years of data, and that the authors did not
advocate dismantling or substantially altering the teacher tenure system (Feb 6 PM, 0h50m1h11m). He finally utilizes the work of other scholars (Rothstein J. , 2010; Papay & Kraft,
Productivity returns to experience in the teacher labor market: Methodological challenges and
new evidence on long-term career improvement, 2015) to confirm with Kane that test score
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Across all the witnesses I considered, cross-examinations were labored by objections from the
plaintiffs. In Kane’s case, it took nearly 20 minutes to establish these two points. The defense
attempted to establish that Kane doesn’t believe multiple measures are necessary to identify
effective teaching, but the plaintiffs’ objection to this line of questioning was sustained by Judge
Treu. Generally, the judge seemed very impatient with the defense’s questioning method.
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impacts fade over time and that teacher experience is positively related to student achievement
gains(Feb 6 PM, 1h12m-1h15m).218
Kane is also briefly examined by an attorney for the State of California. She establishes that
Kane believes multiple measures to be important to prevent ‘gaming’ of the tests or cheating, and
that such would be a consequence of sole reliance on VA measures (Feb 6 PM, 1h17m). She also
establishes that the study did not consider whether individual teachers were teaching out-of-field,
which she calls “mis-assignment” (1h20m). She finally establishes with Kane many in-school
and out-of-school factors other than teachers affect student performance (1h24m).
Expert Testimony – Jesse Rothstein

Attorneys for the defense called UC-Berkeley professor Jesse Rothstein as an expert witness on
March 6th, 2014. Direct examination lasted four hours; cross examination took an additional
hour, making Rothstein’s the longest testimony among the experts on value-added. The length
of his testimony owes both to the frequency of procedural objections made by the plaintiffs’
legal team, and to the fact that Rothstein addresses both value-added models and the broader
issue teacher tenure and dismissal policies.
The substantive basis for the first part of Rothstein’s testimony is his paper “Teacher Quality
Policy When Supply Matters” (2012). The paper responds to the hypothetical policy of annually

Papay and Kraft’s (2015) study was originally released as a working paper in 2014, and
concludes based on North Carolina data that teachers continue to grow in effectiveness (as
measured by Value-Added) beyond the first three years. This calls into question the prevailing
wisdom from economists that VA levels off after three years – which is the rationale for the
probationary period proposed in Chetty and Kane’s testimonies. In a related study, they also find
that these returns to experience vary based on the level of support teachers receive in their
schools (Kraft & Papay, 2014). This again suggests that context matters, a point largely elided by
VA proponents.
218
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firing teachers in the bottom five percent of the effectiveness distribution and to that of
prolonging the mandatory teacher probation period by posing the issue of teacher supply. Given
that no municipalities have yet implemented such policies, Rothstein uses simulations to infer
how such policies would alter the teacher labor market. The idea of simulation research initially
confuses the court (Mar 6 AM, 0h23-25m) and prompts numerous objections from the plaintiffs
(Mar 6 AM, 0h23m-43m).219 In this portion of his testimony, Rothstein addresses a number of
broad concerns about high-stakes teacher evaluation policies in terms of new and continuing
teachers’ perceptions of their job security.
Following the arguments made in his paper, Rothstein suggests that potential teachers consider a
number of factors when deciding to enter the field. Since the pay is low relative to other jobs for
college graduates, teaching has to appeal to new recruits for non-salary reasons – job security
being important among them. Further, since teachers’ earnings tend to be “back-loaded” –
greater at the end of their careers – job security remains an important consideration among
continuing teachers (Mar 6 PM, 0h1m-3m). Given this, Rothstein contends that evaluation
systems and tenure policies which increase the likelihood of arbitrary or capricious layoffs serve
to reduce the attractiveness of the profession both to potential new teachers and to existing
teachers, and make it harder to recruit and retain effective educators (Mar 6 PM, 0h18m). His
early testimony only tangentially addresses value-added models. For example, he argues that the
economic returns to extending the probationary period suggested by Chetty in his testimony –
and based on the Long Term Impacts paper – would be offset by the broader teacher labor market

Chetty’s evidence on teacher dismissal policy, though based on empirical data both rely on
simulated counterfactual policies. Many early studies of VA methods similarly relied on
simulations like those conducted by Rothstein, including Hanushek’s early work. However, their
conjectures prompt no objections from the defense. As we have seen, this seems to be a
difference of style between the two legal teams.
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effects of such a policy (Mar 6 AM, 1h34m-35m).220 He then makes a case that employing VA
instead of seniority-based rules in reductions in force would negatively impact teaching in a
number of ways including increased cost of evaluations, and decreased attachment of teachers to
their schools and communities (Mar 6 PM, 0h24m-33m). In short, this section of Rothstein’s
testimony suggests that using effectiveness-based layoff policies could do substantive harm to
schools by placing too much emphasis on indicators taken out-of-context. Ironically, teacher
dismissal policies that explicitly seek to improve aggregate teacher effectiveness could end up
having the opposite effect if they in the process make teachers less willing to enter or remain in
teaching.
Rothstein’s testimony then shifts to value-added models and the testimony given by Raj Chetty
and Thomas Kane. In addition to echoing some of the caveats presented above, Rothstein’s
critique of Chetty presents two additional problems which compromise his claim that VA
measures are unbiased. First, Chetty’s concept of bias is shown to fundamentally different from
what other VA researchers. Whereas most research on value-added holds teacher ability constant
when testing for bias, the bias tests featured in Long Term Impacts allow teacher effectiveness to
grow or diminish over time. According to Rothstein’s testimony, Chetty Freidman and Rockoff
changed this specification between versions of their study, and essentially “redefined bias as
non-bias.”221 Second, he argues that Chetty et al.’s teacher-switching experiment – which was
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Rothstein also argues that a lengthened probationary period proposed by VA proponents
would harm student achievement because ineffective teachers would likely remain in the system
until they were denied tenure (Mar 6 AM, 1h10m-12m).
221
“And in the first version of the study, he found that it didn't, so he found what I would
interpret as evidence for bias. In the second version of the study based on feedback that I gave
him and I'm sure that others gave him as well, there was a new interpretation of that evidence,
and so he changed the question somewhat. So in the past, all VA studies assume that teachers
have a fixed level of effectiveness, and that what we were doing with VA was trying to measure
that; but that the teachers underlying level of effectiveness didn't change from year to year. And
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also used to prove non-bias – was not a very strong test. While the paper implies that teacherswitching only occurred between schools, many of the actual incidents of switching were grade
changes within schools (Mar 6 PM, 0h43-45m). This is a consequential difference, since VA
research (including Chapter 2 above) shows that teacher effectiveness estimates are affected by
school context. Teacher-switching within schools therefore doesn’t demonstrate the robustness
of teacher quality, and serves to contaminate Long Term Impacts’ evidence of non-bias.
The defense then asks about the strength of Kane’s random assignment studies as evidence of
non-biased VA estimates. Again, Rothstein offers two additions to the caveats already detailed
above. He notes that the mini-MET study in Los Angeles (Kane & Staiger, 2008) was a
voluntary opt-in study and that the data show the teacher pairs selected by principals to be very
similar:
“Also in that study the pairs of teachers he had were carefully selected in the sense that
principals were allowed to nominate teachers to participate in it, and many of the
principals who they asked to participate declined to participate, and so one of the
concerns is that the pairs of the teachers they were looking at in that study were more
similar to each other than our normal pairs of teachers. They're teachers for whom the
principal doesn't care which students are assigned to which teacher. And so that's a
setting where I would expect there to be relatively little bias, and it doesn't tell you much
about the broader setting.” (Mar 6 PM, 0h48m)
Although Rothstein acknowledges that although the MET study was far larger and therefore
“less selected,” he contends that the non-compliance was systematic in ways which would tend
to reduce estimates of VA bias. He further notes that even among the compliers, there was

the Chetty et al. evidence suggested that that wasn't true; some teachers are becoming more
effective over time, some teachers are becoming less effective over time. And so he changed the
bias question to ask whether models from this year predict next year’s impacts as well we would
expect if the teachers are becoming more or less effective over time, and there was no bias
beyond that. So in other words he redefined what previous research would have called bias as
non-bias, and once you redefine that, he found what he calls evidence of non-bias.” (Mar 6 PM,
0h42m).
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evidence of bias in English Language Arts (Mar 6 PM, 0h51m). Ultimately he feels that although
MET is an important study, non-compliance precludes the researchers from being able to
generalize their findings.
The next section of Rothstein’s remarks focuses on volatility in Value-Added scores, and is
based on an article he co-authored with Linda Darling-Hammond and others (Darling-Hammond,
Amrein-Beardsley, Haertel, & Rothstein, 2012).222 Rothstein reiterates that the reliability issues
with VA scores undercut the face validity of these measures and opens up the teacher evaluation
process to legal challenges from teachers. Based mostly on his own work (Rothstein J. , 2010),
he states that teacher effects as measured by VA are subject to dramatic fade out after the first
year (Mar 6 PM, 0h58m-1h02m). He is also asked to evaluate Kane and Chetty’s conversion of
test score impacts into “months of learning”; he contends that this measure is misleading because
“nobody has ever actually done the study of ‘what is the impact of keeping the kids in school for
two more months or two fewer months’.” ((Mar 6 PM, 1h09m).
The capstone of Rothstein’s testimony came at the very end, and did not rely on simulation, but
on an extant counterfactual to the challenged tenure statutes: charter schools. Rothstein testified
that if the challenged statutes were harming student achievement, then charter schools – whose
teachers generally do not benefit from those statutes – would out-perform traditional public
schools. However:
“…they don't on average perform better than the traditional public schools, and that
suggests that these regulations are not the cause of less than desired performance in the
traditional public schools." (Mar 6 PM, 1h58m-59m)

This paper’s contentions about the volatility of VA scores has already been discussed in
Chapter 2.
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The plaintiffs’ cross-examination built on their frustration with Rothstein’s simulation
methods.223 The plaintiffs attempt to undercut Rothstein’s testimony by showing that despite his
claims about teacher labor force policies, he lacks empirical evidence about California’s policies.
They also get Rothstein to testify to the value of VA models for research purposes, including his
own. Nonetheless, they were unable to unseat the charter school evidence, leading to them to
call another witness as a rebuttal.
Expert Testimony: Eric Hanushek

Eric Hanushek was called by the plaintiffs in a rebuttal. Specifically, he was called to rebut
expert witness testimony offered by the defendants – specifically Jesse Rothstein.224 His
testimony shows the links between many concepts and events presented in this and other
chapters. Indeed, the defense refers to Hanushek as “the father of Value-Added.” Hanushek was
an expert witness in the 1973 Serrano v. Priest case, which was the precursor to Vergara in
relating school funding to systemic inequality. In that case, he testified for the defense
(California Public Schools) that teacher effectiveness mattered far more than school funding in

The plaintiffs’ cross-examination shows the difference that highly-paid counsel makes. Every
point in their cross-examination was researched to correspond with Rothstein’s pre-trial
deposition. By contrast, defense cross-examinations seemed far less planned. Indeed, the strategy
of undercutting Rothstein’s simulation study could have been used against Chetty, who relied on
data from New York, and Kane who relied on an RCT with high non-compliance.
224
The defense objects repeatedly to the plaintiff’s use of Hanushek as a rebuttal witness,
arguing the plaintiffs were simply trying to get the last word, rather than to make an authentic
rebuttal. The defense attempted to undercut the validity of value-added assessments as a teacher
evaluation metric, just as the plaintiffs attempted to establish its validity in order to make the
case of harm done to students by California teacher tenure policy. The judge ultimately admitted
Hanushek as a witness, asking the plaintiffs to focus on specific testimony of defense witnesses
(Mar 24 AM, 0h36m-39m). For the purposes of my argument, the rebuttal shows that Vergara
was as much about Value-Added methodology as about California teacher tenure.
223

197

determining student achievement (Mar 24 AM, 0h15m-16m).225 He served as an expert witness
in twenty school funding equity cases since the 1970s; his amicus brief in Horne v. Flores, an
Arizona funding equity case from 2009, was cited by Justice Samuel Alito in the Supreme
Court’s majority opinion.
The theme of Hanushek’s remarks on VA was that the defense’s case made value-added out to
be flawed for use in high stakes decisions, but that this misstates the purpose of VA altogether.
Hanushek summarily refutes the various critiques of VA offered by defense expert witnesses
(volatility of measures, bias, perverse incentives, etc.), saying that these criticisms are “irrelevant
to some uses of value-added, and misleading with regards to others.” (Mar 24 AM, 0h26m). For
example, he argues that economists use VA to gauge the difference between average teachers
and ineffective teachers in the aggregate, not to evaluate individual teachers, and that this “main
use” is unaffected by bias in VA measures (Mar 24 AM, 0h28m). In essence, Hanushek attempts
to refute criticism of the policy uses to which VA is being put by reasserting the research
purposes for which he created it. In principle, this is an acceptable position. However given the
focus of the case and the hypothetical VA-based policy which Kane and Chetty rely upon to
establish specific harm to students, this is misleading testimony.
Hanushek’s first substantive testimony regards his claim that firing the bottom five percent of
value-added teachers would bring US educational attainment up to the level of Finland. He
testifies that his five percent proposal implies using multiple measures for high stakes decisions,
and that he would not support a system based only on VA (Mar 26 AM, 0h40m). However, his
published work on this policy proposal is based solely on Value-Added measures of teacher
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More recently, Hanushek wrote a book on the subject of funding and achievement (Hanushek
& Lindseth, 2009).
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effectiveness, and actually advocates firing between five and ten percent of teachers each year
(Hanushek E. A., 2009).
The next important point he makes is a response to earlier testimony by Jesse Rothstein that
firing teachers would not generate the achievement gains promised by Hanushek and others
(Staiger & Rockoff, 2010). This is based on Rothstein’s own simulation study (2012), which was
later published in the American Economic Review. Hanushek critiques Rothstein’s study by
arguing that:
“...economists sometimes use very simplified models to study different outcomes, and
that’s what this is, and in fact a constructed model to show a specific thing in this
case…perhaps the best analogy is that if I sat here and put a rabbit into my hat and then
turned around and reached into my hat and pulled out a rabbit, you shouldn’t be
surprised. He has constructed a model that tries to relate characteristics of teacher
contracts to a stylized version of the teacher labor market and their implications for
student outcomes, but it takes a strong a specialized view which has no bearing on the
reality that we’ve seen…” (Mar 24 AM, 0h52m-53m)

Ironically, much early work on Value-Added relied on simulation data, and the very same
critique of simplified modeling and circular logic can and has been leveled at past and present
VA research. Hanushek further argues that Rothstein is wrong about the teacher labor market,
stating that there is a “reserve army of people looking to enter teaching.” He criticizes
Rothstein’s reliance on the Tennessee STAR experiment to infer class size effects on
achievement, since the effect is only found in Kindergarten and first grade and other studies of
class-size reduction show no effects on achievement (Mar 24 AM, 0h57m). But the STAR
experiment was a large random assignment study (the largest educational experiment ever prior
to the MET project), which according to many analysts found significant effects across grade
levels. For Hanushek to diminish its findings would be akin to dismissing Kane’s study on
Value-Added. On the issue of teacher-pupil ratio, Hanushek’s research takes Rothstein’s role,
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picking apart the evidence by meticulously mapping out the educational context (Hanushek E.
A., 1999). The plaintiff’s end their examination of Hanushek on this point.226
The teachers’ union’s cross-examination of Hanushek first focuses on VA models. The defense
establishes that Hanushek sees potential issues with the use of VA models, particularly the
possibility that reliance on student achievement gains may lead to ‘teaching to the test’ or
cheating (Mar 24 AM, 1h25m). They then establish that Hanushek views other factors – schools,
neighborhoods, peers, families – as pertinent to student achievement (Mar 24 AM, 1h29m). In
terms of the teacher labor force question, the defense unsuccessfully attempts to establish that
Hanushek’s five percent policy would increase the risk of working as a teacher.
The next piece of the cross-examination focuses on a series of studies by the Center for Research
on Educational Outcomes (CREDO) which compares charter school and public school
performance. In direct examination, Hanushek referred to a CREDO report on Los Angeles
charter schools to argue that charter schools outperform traditional public schools (Center for
Research on Educational Outcomes, 2014a). This was in response to Jesse Rothstein’s testimony
that changing the teacher tenure policy could harm student performance. Since charter schools
have much less robust tenure rules, Hanushek uses the LA report to claim that this doesn’t
necessarily hold true. The defense challenges Hanushek’s credibility by citing contrary evidence
from a statewide CREDO study of California charter schools (Center for Research on
Educational Outcomes, 2014b). Hanushek says this report did not inform his opinion on the
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On cross-examination, Hanushek states that he views the results of the STAR experiment to
be unreliable, and that although he objects to Jesse Rothstein’s use of its findings in his study, he
does not object to similar use of STAR data by Raj Chetty et al. in Long Term Impacts (Mar 24
AM, 1h31m). Curiously, the defense attorney does not pursue this point any further – given that
it could characterize Hanushek as politically driven in his interpretation of research.
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subject because he was not familiar with it because it was only recently published (Mar 24 AM
2h05m). This is a dubious claim; upon further questioning, we find out that both studies were
primarily authored by Hanushek’s wife, CREDO director Margaret Raymond.227 Although not
mentioned in the case, the timing of the report was clearly not an issue either; the California
CREDO report was published only one day after the Los Angeles report. The defense attempts to
establish the same credibility problem by referring to other CREDO studies with similar, but is
unable to successfully connect those studies to Hanushek’s testimony. The defense’s last attempt
at this strategy cites on Hanushek’s long one-sided history as an expert witness in school funding
equity cases, but the court does not allow this line of questioning (Mar 24 PM, 0h39m). After a
brief re-direct examination, Hanushek leaves the stand and the defense rests.228
Expert witness testimony in Vergara proved that the trial was as much about Value-Added
methods as it was about teacher tenure. In attempting to establish specific harm done to students
by California’s tenure policies, the plaintiffs posited value-added as a counterfactual mode of
assessment. Their witnesses, Raj Chetty in particular, converted teachers’ hypothesized impacts
on student test scores into months of learning lost and million-dollar income shortfalls. They
further claimed that using value-added in retention, promotion and dismissal policies would
mitigate the harm done to students by ‘grossly ineffective teachers.’ In doing so, they had to
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Hanushek founded CREDO in 1998 at the University of Rochester before relocating it to
Stanford in 2000.
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Seeking to get the last word, the plaintiffs re-examine Hanushek. They confirm that his
testimony regarding charter schools does not affect his opinions regarding the effects of teachers.
Like Thomas Kane, Hanushek translates student test score gains into days of learning (Mar 24
PM, 0h48m-49m). The re-direct examination ends after referring to a number of charts from the
CREDO Los Angeles charter study which focus on minority student achievement (Mar 24 PM,
0h50m-55m). The defense attempts to re-examine Jesse Rothstein in rebuttal, but his testimony
is not admitted by the court after successful objections by the plaintiffs (Mar 24 PM, 2h19m2h34m).
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validate value-added before the court. This validation relied on two major trends in social policy
science. Chetty’s Long Term Impacts study leveraged so-called Big Data; and Kane’s Measures
of Effective Teaching project featured the largest random assignment study ever conducted in
education research. As I have shown, both Chetty and Kane presented their research unburdened
by important caveats that have been raised by critics. As an expert for the defense, Jesse
Rothstein gave voice to these criticisms, troubling the foundation of the plaintiff’s case.
Rothstein contends that using value-added methods beyond their intended research purpose for
high-stakes decisions has the potential to do harm to school systems. To challenge the
testimonies of Kane and Chetty, he argues that such measures are too biased and too volatile to
be used as an alternative to existing teacher evaluation and tenure systems. 229 He also
demonstrates that existing tenure rules could not be the cause of poor student achievement, since
charter schools are not subject to those rules and achieve similar results. To rebut his testimony,
the plaintiffs relied on Eric Hanushek, the “father of Value-Added” and a veteran of politicallycharged education research, to buttress their argument. After another day of closing arguments
and two months deliberation, the judge ruled.
Outcome and Press Coverage of Vergara
Oral arguments in Vergara ended on March 27th, 2014 and the case officially concluded on April
10th. Judge Treu handed down a 16-page ruling on June 10th. He ruled in favor of the plaintiffs
that the “challenged statutes” (seniority-based reductions in force, the two-year probationary

Rothstein’s testimony was weakened by the fact that some of his research relies on
simulations. In the middle of direct examination by the defense, Mr. McRae argued before the
judge: "Your Honor, the difference with all of our experts is that their studies were actually
based on DATA [my emphasis] where they went in and did countless numbers of examinations
with actual students and actual test scores and wasn't again just plucked as 'in vacuo' an
abstraction 'if you do this, will it have that effect?'” (Mar 6 PM, 1h14m-15m)
229
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period for tenure, and various due process protections) caused students to be exposed to ‘grossly
ineffective teachers’ and thus violated their constitutional rights to a good education. Though
much of the decision relies on testimony on teacher dismissal processes, its definition of grossly
ineffective teachers relies on Value-Added studies conducted by Chetty and Kane. Treu’s first
and most dramatic point refers to these studies:
“Evidence has been elicited in this trial of the specific effect of grossly ineffective
teachers on students. The evidence is compelling. Indeed, it shocks the conscience. Based
on a massive study, Dr. Chetty testified that a single year in a classroom with a grossly
ineffective teacher costs students $1.4 million in lifetime earnings per classroom. Based
on a 4 year study, Dr. Kane testified that students in LAUSD who are taught by a teacher
in the bottom 5% of competence lose 9.54 months of learning in a single year compared
to students with average teachers.” (Vergara v. State of California, 2014, p. 7)

Despite the many technical nuances of the expert testimony, the ruling is curt on the question of
identifying ineffective teachers. Treu assumes that grossly ineffective teachers exist and
ascertains a number of them.230 The sparring between Jesse Rothstein and Eric Hanushek over
the performance of charter schools – though important to both sides during trial – was not
mentioned in the ruling. Indeed, despite his lengthy stay on the witness stand, Rothstein’s
testimony is not referred to once, even negatively. The judge’s very short opinion – only 4,000
words long – drew criticism from the teachers’ unions who intervened in the case. They charged
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The frequency of grossly ineffective teachers in Los Angeles is based on the testimony David
Berliner, another defense expert. In cross-examination, Berliner estimated that somewhere
between 1 and 3 percent of active teachers are grossly ineffective. This figure was extrapolated
in Treu’s ruling to a range of 2,750 – 8,250 teachers (Vergara v. State of California, 2014, p. 7).
Berliner later argued that his testimony on the proportion was mischaracterized in the ruling
(Murphy, 2014).
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that it lacked any thorough or reasoned consideration of either the statutes in question or the
larger context in which they function (Weingarten, 2014; Weingarten & Pechthalt, 2014).231
The Vergara ruling received much press attention, which I now turn to analyze. I collected 53
documents in all: 17 stories came from major news outlets within two days of the ruling, eight
editorials and opinion pieces from those same sources, 15 stories from high-visibility online
sources (like The New York Times and Washington Post blogs, and online magazines Slate and
The Atlantic), and 13 additional pieces from up to two weeks after the ruling and/or from less
visible news outlets.232 I consider what aspects of the ruling and the reaction received the most
attention; I then conclude by assessing how value-added was translated from expert testimony to
ruling to press coverage.
News media love good headlines. In his ruling, Judge Treu used two key phrases (both in the
quoted paragraph above): ‘grossly ineffective teachers’ and, referring to the impacts of said
teachers, ‘shocks the conscience.’ These were by far the most oft-cited phrases in the news
coverage. 20 of 25 major news stories and editorials included the first phrase; 14 of 25 included
the latter. Of all 53 pieces, 30 used the former and 22 the latter. Further, a number of stories
repeatedly used the grossly ineffective teacher phrase. Across articles from major news outlets,
some version of grossly ineffective was used 30 times; in all 53 pieces, the phrase appears 60
times.
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The ruling was very short when compared to other education law cases. The 1971 Serrano v.
Priest opinion was 15,000 words long; the opinion in the 1976 iteration of that case was 28,000
words. The 2010 Doe v. Deasy opinion was approximately 10,000 words.
232
I coded and analyzed these documents using Atlas-ti qualitative data analysis software.
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These ‘sound-bites’ from the ruling are used rather uncritically. The phrase ‘grossly ineffective
teachers’ was used by the plaintiffs throughout the trial and is directly related to their reliance on
value-added – grossly ineffective means the bottom five percent of the VA distribution. Treu’s
conscience-shocking evidence also relies on VA measures; it refers to the suggested difference
between being assigned a bottom 5th-percentile teacher as opposed to an “average” teacher. Eight
of the 25 major outlet pieces (and 10 stories overall) also referred to Treu’s potentially dubious
estimate of the number of grossly ineffective teachers. Yet only one major new story (and six
overall) make any mention of value-added methods. Similarly, few stories mention Raj Chetty or
Thomas Kane – the researchers who produced this evidence – despite their names being cited in
the judge’s opinion. Expert witnesses for the defense – Jesse Rothstein and David Berliner –
were each mentioned in only three stories out of 53.
As would be expected, the challenged employment statutes in Vergara received more attention
than value-added; but this was largely driven by a few data points. LA Schools superintendent
John Deasy was the most often referenced witness, mentioned in seven of the major outlet stories
and 12 pieces overall. This is likely because the case was about California tenure rules and
because Deasy testified about the potential cost of teacher dismissal. The figure cited in the
ruling – $50,000 to $450,000 per teacher – was referenced in news coverage more often than
Deasy himself (nine major outlet stories). California’s two-year probationary period was
mentioned in 14 out of all 53 pieces. Nonetheless, none of the actual substance of the trial
received as much attention as did the quotable phrases discussed above.
The two parties to Vergara – Students Matter and the two California teachers’ unions – received
somewhat similar amounts attention. Nearly all the major news stories mentioned Students
Matter (17 of 25) and at least one involved union (19 of 25). However, only 9 of 25 news stories
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gave background on Students Matter, which is an important omission given that the organization
financed the case. Given that the ruling was in favor of the plaintiffs, 12 of 17 major news stories
(not including editorials) covered the statements and press releases from the teachers’ unions.
Judge Treu’s terse ruling may be partly responsible for the lack of depth in press coverage
following Vergara. There was simply not much information to report in the 16-page opinion. But
given the potential impact of the ruling, and the fact that both plaintiffs and defendants
maintained extensive online presence throughout the 3-month long trial – providing links to both
admitted evidence and witness testimony – there was reason and opportunity to expand coverage.
Very few stories, even in California, gave readers substantial background, specifically on the
concept of ‘grossly ineffective teachers.’ Without context, the value-added definition of effective
and (grossly) ineffective teaching is reified by both the ruling and the subsequent press coverage.
This chapter has shown how value-added, a methodologically-contested technique, is deployed
tactically and simplistically in a public forum like a trial. Despite defense experts introducing the
complexity and contingency of this technique, the judge was persuaded by exaggerated and
debatable data points. Thus value-added data – complex and fraught as it was – was simply
transformed into ‘grossly ineffective teachers’ whose negative impacts ‘shocked the conscience.’
When Vergara was covered in the press, this evidence was turned into ‘sound byte’ coverage
with little or no context. In the conclusion, I will consider the implications of this translation for
theorizing the relationship between technology and policy in education.
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Chapter 7: Understanding Value-Added: Reason, Rationality and Politics in the
Social Sciences
The preceding chapters have made two broad arguments. The first was to show that the
assumptions of value-added assessments (VA) are at odds with many of the practical realities of
the schools and classrooms these techniques are intended to evaluate. The second was to argue
that this disconnect threatens the intended social functions of education. To substantiate the
divergence between VA in theory and schools in practice, I demonstrated three empirical
problems with VA measurements using data from New York City.
Second, by examining the history of innovations in US educational assessment, I argued that the
politics of school reform are impacted by technical ‘upgrades,’ particularly as they coincide with
claims of educational decline and consequent national peril. To understand VA in this context, I
traced the history of its technical evolution and related this to concurrent political developments
in the educational sphere. Making use of expert testimony in and press coverage of Vergara v.
California, I showed how VA research on teacher effectiveness was simplified to make VA
methods appear objective and neutral and then stylized to fit a political agenda of educational
privatization and top-down management.
My intention in this project has been to use value-added assessment as a case study in the
relationship between technology – defined as both research methodology and the tools employed
in research – and social policy. To conclude, I return to social theory to consider different
perspectives on the connections between social science, technology and politics, specifically as
they relate to education. More simply, I ask under what conditions and by what mechanisms does
education come under the influence of often unsound science and technology?
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Two broad positions must be explored. The first argues that science and technology, regarded
neutral and objective, are corrupted and deliberately deployed by actors in the political sphere.
The second contends that ideology and power are inherent in science and technology. This latter
position implies that technology need not be corrupted or politicized, as its very application
contains a priori ideological assumptions. Let us begin by consider the theoretical underpinnings
and specific examples of each position.
Value-Neutral Science
Understanding the value-neutral view of science requires going back to Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason, in which he argues that reason corresponds to a class of knowledge which is
independent of judgment or experience.233 In outlining what part reason plays in our knowledge
of reality, Kant describes mathematics and the laws of natural science (by which he primarily
meant physics) as capable of producing synthetic a priori knowledge – synthetic in the sense that
they combine two or more concepts and a priori in the sense that each constituent concept is
defined axiomatically. The statement “8+3=11” is such a piece of knowledge, as ‘8’ and ‘3’ are
always what they are, and their sum is a synthesis of the two. 234 But Kant, deeply influenced by
the skeptical tradition of Hume, is careful to say that our knowledge of the natural world is
necessarily limited. Since experience is mediated by our faculties of sensibility and
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One can indeed trace the value-neutrality question much further back. Walsh (2013), quoting
Samuel Coleridge, contends that the fact/value, is/ought divide originates with Plato and
Aristotle. Though he traces the general spirit of philosophy back to the Greeks, Husserl
(1954/1970) credits Descartes with the earliest claim to this legacy.
234
Kant’s view of science is nuanced and contained in many works over his career. What is
important in the context of this discussion is that Kant’s definition of science as distinct from
‘systematic arts’ is very restrictive and almost entirely bound up with the use of mathematics.
Thus his famous line in Metaphysical Foundations “in any special doctrine of nature there can be
only as much proper science as there is mathematics therein.”
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understanding, which organizes sensory experience according to intuitions and principles (e.g.,
cause and effect), Kant argues we are unable to know the actual contents of the universe
axiomatically – the things themselves. Thus, while Kant is appropriately careful to delimit our
knowledge of the external world, the idea that knowledge can be generated independent of
experience (through reason alone) opens up space for a value-free science.
Rationalist and positivist philosophy since Kant, itself influenced by scientific and technological
advance, argued that the world in itself is indeed objectively knowable. Combining Hume’s
empirical principle that all we can know is the sense data of experience with the rationalist view
that reason is primary in acquisition of knowledge, logical positivism – associated with the early
20th century Vienna Circle – asserts that knowledge of reality is possible through the
construction of verifiable logical statements based on empirical observation. This philosophical
perspective stands in opposition to any metaphysics and implicitly to the mediated experience of
the world proposed by Kant (and by Hegel in The Phenomenology of Spirit). This rejection of
metaphysics furthers the possibility of a value-free science by asserting that empirical
observation reliably describes the world as it is.
But positivism as a worldview was formulated earlier by the ‘father of sociology,’ Auguste
Comte. Relatively obscure other than for his coining of the terms ‘sociology’ and ‘positivism,’
his influence is largely ignored or disavowed by social scientists whose approach was anticipated
by Comte’s program for positive philosophy (Lenzer, 1998).
Comte was deeply concerned with the revolutionary political climate which characterized his
times – which he called moral and political anarchy. In response to this ‘crisis,’ he devoted his
life to using the tools of science to facilitate an orderly society. Contrary to the liberal
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philosophers of the time, Comte located the source of social unrest in an excess of individual
freedom (be it of a king or the revolutionary masses) rather than the tyranny of government.
Specifically, he felt that the critical spirit of political philosophy needed to be replaced with a
positive spirit. Comte thus sought to resolve the conflict between the individual and society in
favor of society, and specifically in favor of non-arbitrary power grounded in positive political
science. In the service of this project, he sought to found an objective ‘social physics’ which
would allow the “preponderance of observation over imagination” in political affairs (Comte,
Plan for the Scientific Operations Necessary for Reorganizing Society, 1822/1998, p. 36). Comte
further sought to directly attach his efforts to those in power – offering his services to the
Russian Czar Nicholas I and to the Ottoman Emperor (Pickering, 2009, pp. 77-80).235
While this context sounds like the opposite of value-free, Comte’s positive social science was to
be free of all “admiration or reprobation of phenomena;” while he refers to the critical spirit of
liberal philosophy as “directly contrary to that which ought to reign in scientific politics”
(Comte, Plan for the Scientific Operations Necessary for Reorganizing Society, 1822/1998, p.
54). Comte details his philosophy of science in the six-volume Cours de Philosophie Positive.
Reflecting his value-free ethos, and anticipating later developments in social science
methodology, he argues that social science must emulate the techniques of the natural sciences
and places mathematics at the foundation of all other sciences:
“In the present state of our knowledge we must regard mathematics less as a constituent
part of natural philosophy than as having been, since the time of Descartes and Newton,
Comte’s early formulation of his positive political science suggests collaboration with the
existing ruling classes:
“The governing classes, clearly perceiving [through positive knowledge of social science]
the end that they are called on to realize, can reach it directly…They will by anticipation
combine measures for overcoming opposition with others calculated to facilitate the
acceptance of the new order of things by their opponents.” (Comte, 1822/1998, p. 46)
235
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the true basis of the whole of natural philosophy…as being the most powerful instrument
the mind can employ in the investigation of the laws of natural phenomena. Geometry
and mechanics must, on the contrary, be regarded as true natural sciences…But these two
physical sciences…will be more and more, employed rather as method than as doctrine.”
(Comte, View of the Hierarchy of the Positive Sciences, 1853/1998, p. 100) 236
Comte’s subsequent move toward a secular religion based on his social and political theory was
rejected by most of his contemporaries – and helps explain his obscurity in modern discourse on
social science methodology. Nevertheless, Comte’s spirit of detached, objective inquiry into
social phenomena was extended by canonical sociological thinkers, perhaps the most significant
of whom is Emile Durkheim. Durkheim’s (1895) The Rules of Sociological Method, in which he
tries to carve out a distinct space for sociological inquiry, rests on Comte’s value-free, antimetaphysical, and rationalistic principle.237 His position on the role of social scientists in
political affairs is that they should play, if anything, an advisory role (Lukes, 1982). Durkheim
does however, move from Comte in his preferred techniques of inquiry and assumptions required
for the study of ‘social facts.’
Max Weber (1864-1920) was thoughtful about the role of social scientist in society and made an
attempt to distinguish the objects of social scientific study from the value they imply. In his
influential 1904 essay Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy, Weber begins with the
observation that “an empirical science cannot tell anyone what they should do” (Weber,

Recognizing some limitations, Comte did note that social physics – only later renamed
sociology – was not yet fit for mathematical analysis, if only because mathematical education
was still inadequate to produce the models needed for these “difficult researches.” His ultimate
vision is that mathematical reasoning will absorb and eliminate “the only part of the old
philosophy that could even appear to offer any real utility, the logical part.” (Comte, 1853/1998,
p. 177) Thus we see that Comte’s positivism sought to create a value-free social science through
the application of natural scientific and ultimately mathematical methods, placing him very much
in the tradition which informs much of contemporary social science.
237
Indeed, Durkheim cites Comte’s Cours de philosophie positive as “the only original and
important study which we possess on the subject [of sociological method]” (Durkheim,
1895/1982, p. 48).
236
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1904/1949, p. 49). In an apparent reference to Comte, he declares that “only positive religions –
or more precisely expressed, dogmatic sects – are able to confer on the content of cultural values
the status of unconditionally valid ethical imperatives (p. 57). From these basic principles, Weber
suggests that what we now call ‘policy science’ is impossible because problems of social policy
cannot be resolved based on facts alone, and indeed because policy decisions must be worked out
based on debating cultural values (p. 60).
Weber thus acknowledges a fact/value distinction which constantly presents itself to the social
scientist. The objects of social science are inherently meaningful for Weber, thus precluding the
possibility of ‘presuppositionless’ investigation (p. 76). Given this, he lays out two primary
responsibilities for the social scientist. The first is that one must always make clear one’s value
judgments in two ways – specifically the standpoint from which one’s analysis departs and
moments in writing when discussion shifts from scientific analysis of fact to evaluation of policy
(pp. 59-60). The second responsibility is that one must attempt to remain value-neutral in
analysis as much as possible. In practice, what this entails is paying attention to evidence which
contradicts the dominant formulations or analytic constructs that one uses in analysis.
This latter imperative is connected to Weber’s main methodological construct: the ideal type.
Weber demands that social scientists pay attention to empirical events which do not agree with
the ideal types which drive their formulations. He further points out how tempting it can be to
“do violence to reality in order to prove the real validity of the construct” (p. 103) and how
scientists can often confuse their analytic ideal types with their own subjective ideals (p. 98). But
he nonetheless holds out the possibility that social science can use value-laden standpoints as
analytic tools while refraining from using them as evaluative principles. Thus, although he holds
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a more pessimistic view, Weber still maintains that social science can be distinct from any
particular value set.238
Holding aside for the moment the criticisms of positivism beginning in the early 20 th century
(these will be discussed below, as they constitute the basis of the other broad position), the idea
of value-free, politically detached science continued under the auspices of ‘post-positivism.’239
As a response to various critiques, post-positivism concedes that empirical observation and
analysis is necessarily “theory-laden,” and that we cannot attain certain truth through scientific
inquiry, only (and at best) conjectural knowledge (Trochim, 2006). Regardless of this
epistemological position, post-positivism methodologically produces the same purportedly
‘objective’ knowledge claims as its positivist forbears. Further, the philosophical move to
contingent knowledge did not prevent the growing emphasis on mathematical and analytic
methods which increasingly shaped social science in the mold of the natural sciences. Phillips
and Burbules (2000) note that the philosophical criticisms that turned positivism into postpositivism are largely ignored in texts on research methods, and thus implicitly turn observation
and empirical data into unmediated (and value-free) truth.240 Introducing a volume of essays on
positivism and alternative epistemologies across the social sciences, Steinmetz (2005) contends
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This view did not prevent Weber from holding social scientists accountable for making
political choices. But he insisted that these choices should be made specifically in their roles as
citizens, since social scientists “are the least fitted to presume to save the individual the difficulty
of making a choice, and they should therefore not create the impression that they can do so.”
(Weber, 1949, p. 19)
239
Post-positivism is elsewhere called anti-positivism and non-positivism; my use of the former
is arbitrary.
240
One popular research methods textbook which features such an elision was co-authored by
Eric Hanushek, whose highly politicized research career has been discussed throughout the
preceding chapters (Hanushek & Jackson, 1977). Hanushek’s introduction singles out
Economics as more rigorously deductive than other social sciences, but even contemporary
methods texts in sociology present the relationship between theory and empirical data as
untroubled by social forces (Healey, 2012).
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that despite varying trajectories depending on the discipline, social science methods are still in
the midst of a “positivist haunting” (p. 3).
This omission from texts on methodology partially reflects a pragmatic orientation on the part of
researchers, who ignore questions of objectivity and ultimate truth for the sake of ‘getting down
to business’ (for examples in education research, see Miles & Huberman, 1984; Howe, 1988).241
A related explanation for is that as research became more policy-oriented (and government
funded) over the course of the 20th century, the assertion that the ‘normal’ functioning of society
constitutes empirical fact was elevated from theoretical claim to required assumption. 242
Mirowski (2005) traces the relationship between logical positivism and operations research (OR)
in the United States and argues that the immense funding and relative autonomy afforded to
researchers working on defense contracts came at the cost of questioning the uses to which their
work was put. Indeed, the trajectory of educational research methods traced in the preceding
chapters exemplifies the ascendancy of the postpositivist, analytic paradigm and the extent to
which claims of objectivity are taken for granted.
The dominant assumption of a value-free scientific enterprise is also reinforced by the
mainstream sociology of science, which largely eschews questions of power or interest. Robert
Merton’s program for the sociology of science focused on empirical markers of scientific activity
– publications and biographies – and on reward systems within the sciences, rather than
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Weber (1904/1949) would contend that this sort of ignoring of value judgment cannot lead to
value-neutrality, but only to unacknowledged value-judgments which nonetheless make their
way into the evaluation of the ‘facts’ (for example see pp. 82,94).
242
Both Comte and Durkheim express versions of the ‘normative is natural’ claim. Comte argues
that society as it currently exists is a manifestation of fundamental laws that govern the progress
of civilization (Comte, 1822/1998, pp. 42-44). Durkheim’s fundamental distinction between the
‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’ is a more measured version of the same concept.
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examining at how scientific findings are deployed outside the profession, or on how outside
forces determine what is studied (Merton, 1973).243 Related tendencies in the history and
philosophy of science focus on its internal dynamics – that is, how scientific knowledge
accumulates and changes over time. Karl Popper’s (1959/1968) The Logic of Scientific
Discovery and Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions are among the best
known works in this tradition. But both the sociology and history of science largely take for
granted the isolation of scientific research from the corrupting influence of politics.244 Whatever
the causes, and despite important critical upsurges – variously named ‘Science Wars’ and
‘Paradigm Wars’ –, versions of positivistic practice claiming value-free status are generally
dominant across the social sciences (Steinmetz, 2005a).
Science as Value-Laden

Positivism and its epistemological descendants all rest on the assumption that scientific inquiry
can describe the world as it is without consequential mediation by human values. But this
position gave rise to many criticisms which claim that science immanently contains its own value
system. We even see a germ of this critique in Weber, though he addresses this primarily to

243

In a later essay which appeared in the same volume, Merton does attempt to outline the
relationship between applied research and policy (Merton, 1973a). Among the insights offered in
that paper, Merton does attempt to understand how policy research is utilized, and includes the
possibility of co-optation of research by politicians (p. 75).
244
Kuhn’s description of how knowledge accumulates does differ from positivistic accounts of
scientific progress. Once a ‘paradigm shift’ occurs, Kuhn argues that the language used to
describe objects of study changes so drastically that the facts discovered under one paradigm are
incommensurable with those of another. Hence Kuhn’s critique is placed within the antipositivist tradition. But demonstrating its isolation from politics altogether, Kuhn’s account does
not even consider the role of academic politics in thwarting important theoretical developments.
Looking at String Theory in physics, Lee Smolin (2008) argues that the failure of much work in
physical science is due to boundary maintenance and careerist tendencies among university
physicists.
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clinical science (medicine) and technology (engineering), arguing that these applied sciences
assume evaluative standpoints in advance and proceed with specific goals in mind – patient
health in the former case and productive efficiency in the latter (Weber, Objectivity in Social
Science and Social Policy, 1904/1949, pp. 85-86).
Significant critiques of positivist social science arose from phenomenology, the Frankfurt School
and later from French social theory. Each in its own way seeks to reassert the subjective
dimension of scientific inquiry and the technology it produces.
Edmund Husserl’s Vienna Lecture245, delivered in 1935 characterizes his attempt to account for
the failure of European Sciences (and more broadly of European humanity), which he believed
had fallen victim to a posivistic spirit which had “decapitated philosophy” (1954/1970, p. 9) and
left even the positive sciences (e.g., phsyics and mathematics) in a crisis of meaning despite their
practical accomplishments. This lecture also outlines his phenomenological approach to knowing
and understanding the world.
Husserl accepts the successes of the physical and biological sciences and attributes these
successes to the application of theoretical reason to empirical reality and to the search for
universal laws, “the result of [which]…was a true revolution in the technical control of nature”
(Husserl, Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity, 1954/1970, p. 271). But he argues
that humanistic disciplines cannot seek to uncover such natural laws because humanist objects –
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I take Husserl as representative of the phenomenological critique of positivism and value-free
social science. The Vienna Lecture was the precursor to Husserl’s final book-length attempt to
outline his phenomenology, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology. I refer to this (both the Vienna Lecture and The Crisis) among his works
because it speaks directly to the theme of this chapter. Other phenomenological critiques are
certainly worth considering (see for example, Merleau-Ponty, 1964/1968).
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Freud’s pscyhe or Weber’s social values – are bound up with individual subjective experience.246
Abstraction from nature (rather than from spirit) thus cannot lead the humanist to an exact
science.
To explain what he calls the crisis, Husserl first traces the history of the European Sciences back
to Ancient Grece.247 The worldview which originates with the Greeks is the pursuit of infinite,
unconditional and durable ideas – what Husserl calls the theoretical attitude (p. 280). This
contrasts with other forms of human pursuit which although like science, were concerned with
successful production, did not seek infinite truths, only more immediate ends. He calls this the
natural or practical attitude. But it is the further transition from the theoretical attitude of
philosophy (for example, Plato’s disinterested pursuit of the forms) to that of science (which
applies ideal norms to empirical matters) which for Husserl constitutes the decisive shift, not
only among the scientific community, but also in the general population through scientific
education (pp. 285-287).
The stumbling block which turns this historical progression into a crisis lies in what Husserl calls
naïve rationalism, ‘naturalism,’ or ‘objectivism.’ While acknowledging that scientific pursuit
requires systematic focus on specific objects, Husserl contends that this periodic focus must be

This is the essential implication of Husserl’s concept of the lifeworld. Rather than there being
some objective world that we all experience in exactly the same way, Husserl argues that what
we regard as the external world occurs to us as phenomenon. This impression of the world can be
socially founded, and it is precisely a malaise of this impression which Husserl exposes in the
Vienna Lecture.
247
Husserl defines Europe not in a geographical sense, but in the spiritual sense of a shared
experience of the world (lifeworld). This leads him to include the United States and other British
and European colonies in the concept, as they share European institutions and societal goals
(Husserl, Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity, 1954/1970, p. 273). He distinguishes
Greek philosophy from earlier wisdom (Egyptian, Babylonian)
246
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tempered by reflection.248 He argues that the discoveries of math, geometry, and physics were so
successful (in producing tools and predictions) that without appropriate reflection
mathematical/geometrical reason was applied to the whole of natural and psychic (psychological
and moral) experience. Thus, “in…the constantly objectivist attitude, everything spiritual
appeared as if it were [simply] spread over [the surface] of physical bodes” (Husserl, 1954/1970,
p. 291).249
Further, the one-sided pursuit of natural and spiritual laws leads the scientist to forget the
subjective experience which grounds his pursuit of universal laws and instead to leads him to
idealize his experience of the world as ‘apodictic’ or objectively self-evident (Husserl,
1954/1970, pp. 294-297). ‘Objectivism’ is then the naïve belief that our individual experience of
the world, however rigorously investigated, is unconditional and generally applicable. Husserl
proposes transcendental phenomenology – a systematic inquiry into subjective experience – as
the necessary groundwork for all natural and humanistic sciences to overcome the objectivism
that characterizes the European sciences.
The pheonomenological critique offered by Husserl is fundamental; from it we understand the
basic problem of naturalizing (making objective) subjective experience – it obscures value-laden
choices made in the process of inquiry. But to probe the specific values which underwrite this
objectification, we turn to the Frankfurt School critique of positive science. This critique is

“The true philosopher must always devote himself to mastering the true and full sense of
philosophy, the totality of its horizons of infinity. No line of knowledge, no single truth may be
absolutized and isolated…Only through this constant reflexivity is a philosophy universal
knowledge” (Husserl, 1954/1970, p. 291).
249
In a separate essay, Husserl discusses in detail the assumptions required in the
mathematization of nature. Therein he demonstrates that what we call assumptions are
perceptions which we turn into logical (self-evident) propositions.
248
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exemplified in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightment (1944/2002), but is grounded
in the concept of ‘reification’ advanced by Georg Lukacs (1923/1971).
Like Husserl, Lukacs engages Kant’s problem of epistemology250 and critiques the subject-object
split which characterized positive natural and social sciences in the early 20 th century. A further
similarity is that he shows how this split in the sciences affects the rest of social life. But Lukacs
argues that this artificial split – especially in the social sciences – reifies human relations
following the model of capitalist class relations.251 Specifically, he connects the emergence of
objective science with that of the commodity form – arguing that the subjective stance of human
social relations is fundamentally altered by the increasing dominance of the commodity form:
“Only in this context does the reificiation produced by commodity relations assume
decisive importance both for the objective evolution of society and for the stance adopted
by men towards it. Only then does the commodity become crucial for the subjugation of
men’s consciousness to the forms in which this reification finds expression and for their
attempts to comprehend the process or to rebel against its disastrous effects and liberate
themselves from servitude to the ‘second nature’ so created.” (Lukacs, 1923/1971, p. 86)
Lukacs thus connects the critique of objective science with the Marxist critique of capitalism by
implicating bourgeois values as the basis of inquiry. Frankfurt school theorists take his argument
further as it relates to science and technology. Max Horkheimer (1932/1999) argues that science
is limited by its existence as a mode of production under capitalism – with its products being
social values and useful applications for industry. He regards modern science as superficial in its
ahistorical focus on improving existing conditions and in its seemingly arbitrary – but in reality
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Lukacs uses Kant as an exemplar of bourgeois thought which divides the world of thought
and intelligible forms from the world of objects. He also connects the mathematization of natural
and social phenomena (and the specialization which comes along with it) with the split effected
by the commodity form (Lukacs, 1923/1971, pp. 110-121).
251 Reification as a concept is developed by Lukacs, but originally comes from Georg Simmel
who first proposed it in his “Philosophy of Money.”
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ideological – choice of research tasks (p. 211).252 Horkheimer’s prognosis for science is similar
to Lukacs: since the crisis of science is “inseperable from the general crisis,” (p. 212) only a
revolution in the broad social conditions within which science operates is capable of freeing
science from its crisis.
This persepective on science is further explored in Horkheimer’s collaboration with Theodor
Adorno on the concept of Enlightenment. Adorno and Horkheimer contend, similar to Husserl,
that rationality is taken to an absurd extreme in the age of modern science. This overemphasis on
rational (specifically mathematical) calculability refelects and reinforces a system of domination
over nature, and promotes suspicion of alternative conceptions and data that stands beyond
calculation.253 Like Lukacs they see the cultural dominance of science as the outcome of an
historical development in which the rationalism of the Enlightenment had to displace the
ideological dominance of religion. But they pessimistically regard the process as nearly
complete; for them, enlightenment rationality has all but disposed of its epistemological others
and become self-maintaining.254 This dominance has a corrosive effect on the critical power of
enlightenment insofar as individuals model themselves on such standardized behavior and are
unable to conceive alternatives to or criticisms of the existing order (Horkheimer & Adorno,

Horkheimer seems to address Husserl’s position directly when he says that: ‘Science in the
pre-War years had a number of limitations. These were due, however, not to an exaggeration of
its rational character [e.g., positivism] but to restrictions on it which were themselves
conditioned by the increasing rigidification of the social situation.” (Horkheimer, 1932/1999, p.
209)
253
“The manifold affinities between existing things are supplanted by the single relationship
between the subject who confers meaning and the meaningless object, between rational
significance and its accidental bearer.” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944/2002, p. 7)
254
“Knowledge does not consist in mere perception, classification, and calculation but precisely
in the determining negation of whatever is directly at hand…mathematical formalism…arrests
thought at mere immediacy…The more completely the machinery of though subjugates
existence, the more blindly it is satisfied with reproducing it.” (Horkheimer & Adorno,
1944/2002, p. 20)
252
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1944/2002, p. 22). In their analysis, the productive values inherent in science are already largely
taken for granted in society and thereby further insulated from critical scrutiny.
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Horkheimer and Adorno take the insights of Lukacs as a point of departure, they go beyond
positing science as an agent of capitalist domination and afford independent ideological power
Enlightenment rationality.
Other exponents of the Frankfurt School add important insights regarding the value content of
science as it becomes further linked to technology. Marcuse (1941/1982) defines technology not
as productive tools (technics), but as a social process which shapes consciousness. As individuals
come to identify with both technics and this structuring social process, they succumb to the fetish
of technique – the willing hierarchichal coordination of activities for maximum expedience.
Echoing Weber, Marcuse argues that under the sway of ‘technological rationality’ man values
efficiency above all, and regards individualistic and critical values as obstacles to efficient
production. But while Weber confined this value to specialities like engineering, Marcuse sees
the notion of efficiency pervading throughout human social life. We increasingly view the world
through the lens of what Lewis Mumford calls ‘matter-of-factness’ – in which:
“Individual distinctions in the aptitude, insight and knowledge are transformed into
different quanta of skill and training, to be coordinated at any time in the common
framework of standardized performances.” (Marcuse, 1941/1982, p. 142)
Marcuse is ambivalent about technics – machines and productive tools themselves. He believes
these can serve the ends of liberation or exploitation.256 But his view of technology and

“The technical process, to which the subject has been reified after the eradication of that
process [thought] from consciousness is free from…meaning altogether, since reason itself has
become merely an aid to the all-encompassing economic apparatus.”
256
Marcuse develops his position on the liberating potential of modern technics in Eros and
Civilization (1966/1955). There, he argues that technical progress has enabled mankind to
overcome scarcity and the need for toil. Thus, he sees the continued compulsion to work as
255
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technological rationality is far more pessimistic, as he believes the ideology of efficiency is
particularly well-suited to absorbing critical protest and thus to preserving the existing order.
This theme dominates his later classic work, One-Dimensional Man (Marcuse, 1964/1991).
There he argues that the domination of nature and society are reinforced by a productive
technological apparatus which has dispensed with metaphysics and become totalitarian
(Marcuse, 1964/1991, pp. xlvi-xlvii). The Frankfurt School critique of technology thus relates
the idea of value-neutral science to the maintenance of the exploitative productive relations of
capitalism. In the evolution of this analysis, science also emerges as an relatively autonomous
cultural force which shapes consciousness.
French social theory took a different path in understaning the politics inherent in science.
Poststructuralism257 – a label used to refer to many primarily French social theorists of the 1960s
and 1970s – offers its own critique of the knowledge produced by science. But unlike the
Frankfurt School or phenomenology, poststructuralism do not offer an alternative grounding for
pursuing scientific truth. Some of the best known works in this tradition come from Michel
Foucault, and perhaps the most appropriate for the present purpose is The Order of Things. In his
‘archaeology’ of the human sciences – which focuses on the unconscious elements which shape
the production of scientific knowledge258 – Foucault posits science and scientists as subject to

surplus repression and thus believes that it is possible to reduce working time to its necessary
minimum.
257
Poststructuralism of course must be a reaction to the tradition of structuralism. The latter is
closely associated with the work of Claude Levi-Strauss who argues that there exist “vertical
structures,” social formations which transcend space and time. These vertical structures are
described in terms of Levi-Strauss’ famous binaries like ‘the raw and the cooked,’ and ‘the
sacred and the profane’ (Levi-Strauss, 1963). Poststructualists reject such transhistorical
concepts and argue that all ordering concepts should be understood as historically constructed.
258
“…it is rather an inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory
became possible; within what space of order knowledge was constituted; on the basis of what
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forces beyond their control. Each historical period is determined by certain ‘epistemes’ which
condition how knowledge is concieved and thus shape scientific discourse (Foucault, The Order
of Things, 1994/1970).259 This archaeological approach also characterizes Foucault’s
examinations of medicine, prisons and sexuality. In tracing each of these social formations, he
emphasizes historical changes (both in the traditional and Marxist senses of that term) in the
associated discourse: the language used to describe and delimit madness, crime, and sex.
An overarching theme of these diverse studies is Foucault’s concept of a ‘regime of truth’:
“[A] form of power which applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes
the individual marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity,
imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize…” (Foucault, 1982, p. 781)
This concept is the critical link between power and the knowledge produced by science.
Although Foucault doesn’t regard power as residing with any specific person or institution, he
emphasizes that modes of knowledge are constitutive of the forms of surveillance and
domination This makes realtively clear the political nature of science – the prevailing
contemporary mode of knowledge. 260 Furthermore, the larger point of his work – that knowledge

historical a priori…sciences could be established…rationalities be formed , only, perhaps to
dissolve and vanish soon afterward.” (Foucault, The Order of Things, 1970/1994, pp. xxi-xxii)
259
Foucault’s approach to the history of science – with its emphasis on discontinuity and
contingency – comes from the influence of Gaston Bachelard through Georges Canguilhem.
Bachelard developed the concept of the ‘epistemological break’ which is central to Foucault’s
histories. Foucault’s early focus on medicine and his attention to discourse seem to be a product
of Canguilhem’s influence.
260
Notably, Foucault looks at 19th century schooling and testing as evidence of this point:
“Similarly [to the judicial penalty] the school became a sort of apparatus of uninterrupted
examination… [it became] a perpetual comparison of each and all that made it possible both to
measure and to judge…the examination is at the center of the procedures that constitute the
individual as effect and object of power, as effect and object of knowledge.” (Foucault,
1977/1995, pp. 186-192)
223

production is not set apart from its social context – entails the certainty that science cannot be
disinterested.
Louis Althusser, a contemporary of Foucault similarly influenced by Bachelard’s discontinuous
history of the sciences, is much clearer about the relation between science and power. He argues
that in moments of crisis for the sciences, the ‘spontaneous philosophy of of the scientists’ is
revealed (Althusser, 1990/2012, pp. 115-116). This spontaneous philosophy is present, though
dormant, in non-crisis periods as well, though most scientists would not recognize it as such.
Like Foucault, Althusser regards the spontaneous philosophies of scientists as historically
contingent and as consitutive of the limits of science (p. 128). But he goes further and identifies
them, in the last analysis, with the dominant practical ideology of the historical period:
“…but they are used to furnish arguments or guarantees for extra-scientific values that
the philosophies in question objectively serve through their own practice, their 'questions'
and their 'theories'. These 'values' pertain to practical ideologies, which play their own
role in the social cohesion and social conflicts of class societies.” (Althusser, 1990/2012,
p. 130).
Althusser thus clarifies the relation of science and politics by arguing the philosophy which
underwrites science at a historical moment is determined by the dominant ideology. 261 Bringing
him closer to the Frankfurt School tradition, he would regard science (and for that matter,
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Similar to Husserl, who distinguishes between the natural and human sciences, Althusser sees
values and ideology as more important in the latter (which he argues lack a true subject matter):
“What we might call scientific ideologies and philosophical ideologies assume an extreme
importance in the domain of the human sciences. Not only do these ideologies exist and have
great importance in our world, but they directly govern the scientific practices of the human
sciences. They take the place of theory in the human sciences.” (Althusser, 1990/2012, p. 92)
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education) as one of the ideological state apparauses which shapes individual and social
consciousness.262
I am left with the question of how science operates as an agent of power in shaping
consciousness. The criticisms of value-free science above – particularly Marcuse and Althusser –
have hinted at an answer; once science becomes the primary arbiter of knowledge in society, it
becomes hostile to other epistemological forms. But the works of Paul Feyerabend and Stanley
Aronowitz provide much more clarity on this question by focusing on the question of scientific
method.
Feyerabend is most recognized for his ‘anarchic’ account of scientific progress in Against
Method (Feyerabend, 1975/2010). He argues against scientific exceptionalism, demonstrating
that science does not proceed according to a single pre-determined set of rules, nor is it guided
exclusively or even primarily by rigorous observation. Rather, he contends that science, like
other cultural and ideological formations, makes use of all means at its disposal to advance its
propositions. Scientists also suspend what many regard to be the key tenets of their enterprise –
falsifiability of theory and grounding in observation.263 His account shows that scientific
progress would not have been possible without the eclecticism. Feyerabend utimately views

Paul Feyerabend – discussed directly below – contends that Althusser accepts the ideology of
science, as Althusser accepted the Marxist dialectical method as a positive science (Feyerabend,
1975, p. 177, see also Aronowitz, 1988, p. 180).
263
Feyerabend makes case studies of key moments regarded as points of great scientific progress
(the Copernican Revolution, Einstein’s relativity, etc.). For example, he argues that Galileo
helped overturn the geocentric model more through his ability to persuade than through his data
or logical theories. As such, Against Method takes a different approach to the same data treated
by Thomas Kuhn in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
262
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science as not too dissimilar from myth or magic in its methods – an interesting point which we
will consider again below.
Feyerabend’s view of science as far from value-free is implicit in this argument; if scientific
methods are not distinct from other methods, then they are equally subject to political and
ideological biases. Indeed, he argues that methodological choices are based on ethical decisions
(Feyerabend, 1965, p. 219). But his work is much more specific on the point of how science
actually operates as power – and this point focuses on methodology:
According to the fairy-tale the success of science is the result of a subtle, but carefully
balanced combination of inventiveness and control. Scientists have ideas. And they have
special methods for improving ideas. The theories of science have passed the test of
method. They give a better account of the world than ideas which have not passed the test
(Feyerabend, 'Science.' The myth and its role in Society, 1975, p. 167).
This special position afforded to scientific methods is important. If scientific methods are
percieved as objective, then science – afforded the unique position of being value-free – thus
becomes an objective measure of all ideologies (p. 169). Widespread belief in the objectivity of
scientific methods leads to the use of scientific knowledge as the basis of important political
decisions without recourse to democracy – since science produces untainted facts rather than
ideologically-driven opinions.
Stanley Aronowitz (1988) brings together many of the ideas discussed above to synthesize an
argument about the political force of science in modern society. With Lukacs and the Frankfurt
School, Aronowitz contends that the rationalist model of science is linked to the domination of
nature and of man. Similar to Feyerabend’s pluralistic epistemology, he begins with the premise
that “the power of science consists, in the first place, in its conflation of knowledge with truth”
(p. vii).
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Making the case that scientific discourse has become hegemonic, Aronowitz shows that even
critical theorists of science – for example Althusser and Marcuse – see scientific methods and
their attendant technologies operating beyond social determination. They thus regard science as
potentially liberating, but for their current use in the service of domination (pp. 165-180). This
exclusion of scientific method from scrutiny is in part because intellectuals share what Alvin
Gouldner calls a ‘culture of critical discourse.’ Aronowitz argues that this critical discourse is
consciously and vigorously distinguished from ‘common sense’ by professional intellectuals.264
The further and more substantial point is that “as scientific discourse permeates the state and
civil society, scientific culture spills over beyond the laboratory,” affecting decision-making
processes in all spheres of social life (p. 9). To the extent that scientific discourse – specifically
its emphasis on objective methods – becomes hegemonic, non-scientists generally don’t question
the knowledge claims made by scientists. These claims become truth itself. Moreover,
approximations of the scientific ideal, controlled experimentation and mathematical calculation,
become the standard of practice for political and industrial leaders.265 Finally Aronowitz argues
that the remaining bastions of critical science – those portions of academia where the research
programs are not in line with normative scientific activity (p. 320) and don’t indoctrinate new
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Gouldner (1979) sees the role of this class as yet to be determined. He sees intellectuals as
having revolutionary potential (as Althusser regarded science and Marcuse regarded technology),
but still morally ambiguous and internally divided between those technically and humanisticallyoriented. Steven Brint (1996) explores the internal divisions among ‘experts’ and argues that
intellectuals are not so politically engaged and that many are in quite politically conservative.
265
In this regard, Aronowitz also discusses government and foundation funding of so-called
independent researchers to study/validate preselected policy options. But he also insists that
these research mandates themselves are evidence of the independent power of scientific ideology
– as political and economic powers feel compelled to cloak their decisions in the veneer of
scientific method (pp. 326-336).
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researchers – science all but completely merges with power as a single version of science
becomes the arbiter of natural and social truth.
On Mathiness and Policy

Most if not all the scholars (positive and critical) cited above discuss the role of mathematics in
the practice and ideology science. Comte regarded mathematics as first among the sciences and a
methodological precursor to positive science. Husserl wrote on the ‘mathematization of nature’
in his phenomenology. Althusser regards mathematics not as a tool of the sciences, but as an
active participant in their constitution. And given the depth of Value-Added’s mathematical
content, one must account for the particular place of math in the politics and practice of science,
and particularly in economics – from which Value-Added hails.
Economics leads the social sciences in its capacity to influence policy. The president maintains a
council of economic advisers, not sociological advisers. The Congressional Budget Office and
the Federal Reserve are two government institutions dominated by economists. Indeed, we saw
above how an economistic mindset came to dominate federal education policy beginning in the
1970s; that trend has not abated. Thus ,the role of math in the internal dynamics of economics is
particularly important to understand.
It is well-known that economics is dominated more than most social sciences by sophisticated
mathematical modeling. A casual glance at a mainstream economics journal will show that even
what economists call theory is essentially equation-building.266 Economics did not begin this
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As Levinowitz (2016) notes, Deirdre McCloskey and Robert Nelson both see mathematics
used in economic theory as a way to stake a claim to scientific status. As I’ve pointed out above,
Raj Chetty (2013) has gone out of his way to emphasize the objective scientific credentials of his
discipline.
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way, but it was pervasive enough by the early 20th century that no less than John Maynard
Keynes wrote in his general economic theory that:
“Too large a proportion of recent ‘mathematical’ economics are merely concoctions, as
imprecise as the initial assumptions they rest on, which allow the author to lose sight of
the complexities and interdependencies of the real world in a maze of pretentious and
unhelpful symbols.” (Keynes, 1936, p. 297)
But recent work on the influence of mathematics in economic theory regards this overemphasis
on modeling as politically suspect and counterproductive to economics as a discipline. Paul
Romer, an economist who has made notable contributions to the theory of economic growth,
recently argued that his sub-field is being dominated by ‘mathiness’ which he defines as:
“[using] a mixture of words and symbols, but instead of making tight links [between the
two] it leaves ample room for slippage between statements in natural versus formal
language and between statements with theoretical as opposed to empirical content.”
(Romer, 2015, p. 89)
He distinguishes mathiness from mathematical theory, specifying that the latter makes tight links
between mathematical symbols and the language used to describe them. Such also allows theory
to be closely connected to the empirical evidence used to support it. Romer cites Gary Becker’s
human capital theory as an example of strong mathematical theory and good science. He
contends that unfortunately, economics also has a tendency toward ‘academic politics;’ in the
context of this research, we would call this ideology. 267 The problem for Romer is that mathiness
allows ideology to “masquerade as science” (p. 89), since the proliferation of mathematical
economics makes it hard to separate the proverbial ‘wheat from the chaff.’ He worries that
prolonged exposure to poorly-specified mathematical models without solid foundations will turn
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What Romer is doing in this argument is a well-established tradition. Althusser (1990/2012)
points out that scientists react to crisis in their discipline by trying to root out what they see as
poor practices.
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economic theory into something like card tricks, where everyone expects sleight-of-hand but
nobody takes it seriously (p. 93).
Other economists have taken the sleight-of-hand metaphor further when commenting on
mathiness. Whereas Romer’s mathiness refers specifically to macroeconomic growth theory,
Paul Pfleiderer (2014) makes a similar case for finance and economics more generally. He posits
a distinction between ‘bookshelf’ and ‘real-world’ economic models, noting that while all
economic models are unrealistic to a degree, bookshelf models are not intended to correspond to
reality and should be regarded as similar to thought experiments. The practical distinction
between the two is that bookshelf models contain assumptions that seem impossible in the real
world Take as two examples: ‘there are no information assymetries between buyers and sellers’
or more to our point ‘teacher effects on student academic performance continue undiminished
forever.’ Pfleiderer argues that when such bookshelf models are advanced as support for policy
prescriptions in the real world, they become ‘chameleons.’ The problem is that once economists
are criticized for the dubious assumptions made by such models, they retreat to the position that
their models are not intended to correspond to reality. 268 One of the primary ways that chameleon
economic theories succeed in penetrating into policy discussions is that they are often cloaked in
complex mathematics:
“A simple model with dubious assumptions that drives the results is likely to be
recognized for what it is. A much more complex model with many assumptions including
the aforementioned dubious assumptions, is more difficult to evaluate.” (Pfleiderer, 2014,
p. 28)

Eric Hanushek’s testimony in Vergara v. California is exemplary of such a chameleon
posture. When challenged about the application of VA to the real world, Hanushek replies that
nobody ever suggested that Value-Added Assessment be applied as the sole metric of teacher
quality (other than he for his entire academic career).
268
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Ultimately, Pfleiderer argues that all theoretical models – plausible, absurd, and chameleon –
must be evaluated on the strength of their assumptions, and that defenses such as models being
‘true pending empirical falsification’ or that some dubious assumption ‘is standard in the
literature’ have to be challenged.
Where does all this mathematical economics lead us? Alan Levinowitz (2016) compares presentday economists’ fetishization of mathematical models with similar valorization of
mathematically-sophisticated astrology in ancient imperial China. Like modern economists,
Chinese astronomers possessed enormous influence in the imperial court, which believed that
ever-more accuarate calculation of celestial motion (Li) would provide a guide for policy
decisions; but also like modern economics, many basic assumptions of astrology are dubious –
something that no amount of sophisticated calculation can fix. Nonetheless, the allure of their
models gave the Li-calculating astrologers access to power and quite large sums of research
funding from the Emperor (Levinowitz, 2016, p. 5). Levinowitz thus argue that, then as now,
“when mathematical theory is the ultimate arbiter of truth, it becomes difficult to see the
difference between science and pseudoscience.”
While I would stop short of calling economics a pseudoscience, it is safe to say that the highlevel mathematics it employs grants an imprimatur of objectivity which allows its assumptions to
go relatively unquestioned. We saw this at numerous points in the debate over value-added
assessment. It was precisely this assumptions-versus-data contest that we saw in Vergara. Jesse
Rothstein’s work on “Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters” –which was the substance
of his expert testimony – tested the assumptions of Value-Added-based teacher dismissal policies
against the real-world characteristics of the teacher labor market. The plaintiffs lawyers protested
that all this was specualtion, arguing that Thomas Kane and Raj Chetty had presented “actual
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data” to support their claims, without mentioning that these data – via the modeling strategies
empoyed – are products of their underlying assumptions. What seems clear from the trial verdict
is that the data presented by Chetty, Kane and Hanushek were enough to ‘shock the conscience’
of the presiding judge and those of the media outlets, while Rothstein’s critiques of model
assumptions could not moderate the shock.
Bringing it all together – Value-Added and moments of “Methodological Politics”
We’ve outlined two broad positions above; the first is that science and technology constitute a
value-free enterprises capable of conveying relatively unmediated truths about nature and
society. This position is the implicit operating assumption of most mainstream social science.
Various critical perspectives share the view that science has inherent ideological content which is
primarily associated with technical efficiency and top-down control of natural and social forces.
Despite the singularly humanistic enterprise that constitutes its object, much education research
shares the implicit assumption of value-neutrality. In his work on the politics of charter school
research, Henig (2008) argues that even though this body of research was put to overtly political
uses by both charter school proponents and their opponents in the teachers’ unions, the processes
of data collection and analysis remains shielded from political influence. 269 This claim is tenuous
even in Henig’s own analysis; he concedes that private philanthropies – which play a large and
growing role in funding education research – are very specific about the questions sponsored
research asks, the modes of inquiry by which they are answered, and the ways research findings

This is a version of Reichenbach’s (1938/1977) distinction between the “context of
discovery” and “context of justification.” Henig argues that the discovery of objective
knowledge about charter schools remains a value-neutral process even if the reasons for first
inquiring about them were infused with politics.
269
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are presented. If funders – most of whom have very overt ideological positions – determine what
is asked, how it is answered, and how the answers are reported, what of this process is valuefree?
Regarding federally-funded education research, Margaret Eisenhart (2005) contends that
‘scientific’ research stands apart from moral and political questions. Responding to criticism of a
2002 National Research Council Report, Scientific Research in Education – on which she
collaborated and which defined scientific research in primarily quantitative and experimental
terms – Eisenhart says political and moral questions are best left to ‘philosophers’ and ‘critical
theorists’ (p. 54) since science focuses on gathering empirical evidence about ‘what works.’ This
position is similarly poorly-founded; even the NRC definition of scientific research is admittedly
determined by the opinions of congressional leaders, and the political resonance of (quantitative
and experimental) research (2005, pp. 52-53).270 Again, if funding sources private and public
determine a validity hierarchy for research methods (quantiative/experimental vs.
qualitative/descriptive) and specify the nature of research questions (emphasizing those which
create interventions on pre-determined outcomes) at the outset, education research can hardly be
described as standing apart from value judgments.
The persistent claims to value-neutrality perhaps represent the aspirations of social scientists
powerfully articulated by Max Weber, even though Weber himself understood this as an ideal
and knew that social science could never stand apart from value judgments. But, as the critical
tradition outlined above suggests, ‘objective’ research in education seems to carry and conceal its

Baez and Boyles (2009) argue that the language of ‘scientific research in education’ in the No
Child Left Behind Act, which greatly influences the NRC report, is an instance of political
interests using science to subvert politics.
270
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own particular value set. Indeed, the recent fashion for discovering “what works” in education
implies that research is only supposed to find more efficient means of producing alreadyaccepted outputs which are themselves determined by the political process. This was precisey the
danger alluded to by John Dewey in Education as Engineering (2009) and by Walter Lippman in
his critiques of intelligence testing discussed in detail in chapter 3 above.
But the more interesting question that the above study sheds light on is how the value set of
objective research plays out in moments of technological innovation. Critical scholarship on
science indicates that allegedly value-neutral, and specifically mathematically sophisticated
research is vested with an imprimatur of objectivity. We’ve seen that knowledge stated in
numbers and equations recieves special treatment in literal courts – Frederick W. Taylor’s
congressional testimony in 1912 or the Vergara v. California trial in 2014 – and in the ‘court of
public opinion’ as we saw with the Boston School Committee report in 1845. Today, even
politically progressive forces in education argue for more comprehensive data systems and
research-proven interventions, believing that they provide unmediated truth (Education
Opportunity Network, 2013).
This fetishization of mathematical methods and quantitative data in general seems to be
amplified by novel techniques; innovations are accompanied by millenialist hopes that education
will be once and for all be rendered productive, efficient, accountable, and fundamentally equal
for all students. We saw this sort of hope with the emergence of large-scale experiments and
systems analysis in the 1970s and we see it again today. In such moments, we forget Weber’s
assertion that policy cannot be decided by simple recourse to facts; cultural values remain
essential to establishing social priorities.
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Thus, while Raymond Callahan (1962) and Jal Mehta (2013) ascribe the success of top-down
education reformers to the relative weakness of teachers’ organizations, these successes are
equally well-explained by the unwarranted moral and political power afforded to science and
technology at moments of innovation. As Morozov (2013) and Aronowitz (1988) suggest, the
logic of domination is smuggled in and democratic politics are crowded out by the belief that
difficult educational problems can be solved with seemingly innocuous technical improvements
to the mechanisms of control. But we see that these technical changes are always accompanied
by new pushes for administrative centralization. Whether it is the move for professionalized
superintendency in the 19th century or the gutting of teacher tenure protection in the 21st century,
technology is politics carried out by other means.
Further, the examination of the Vergara trial in chapter five adds another micro-level layer to the
issue of objectivity in science and policy that complements this idea of technology as politics by
other means. The expert witnesses in that trial would all claim to be doing value-free science
rooted in objective empirical methods. But given the very political implications of the case – the
elimination of teacher tenure protections – the experts’ opinions vis-à-vis this consequence, are
expressed in peculiar forms.
Take a few examples. Raj Chetty’s testimony for the plaintiffs features an abundance of sports
analogies: baseball statistics and Kobe Bryant’s height and why coaching athletes still matters.
Sports methaphors allow Chetty to talk about the quantitative accuracy of a technique like ValueAdded in terms set apart from its real consequences in the very fraught terrain of California
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public schools.271 Tom Kane’s discussion of the test score impacts of ‘teacher deselection’
similarly veils the true potential effects of VA-driven teacher evaluations – teachers will be fired
and lose their livelihoods based on unreliable and perhaps invalid measures of their abilities. In
his testimony for the defense, Jesse Rothstein discusses abstract assumptions about teacher
supply at length, critiques Chetty’s unorthodox definition of forecast bias, and underscores the
high rate of attrition in the Measures of Effective Teaching Project random assignment study.
These are strong methodological arguments, but they fail to capture what’s at stake. In order to
refute these criticisms, Eric Hanushek comes full- circle to the origins of this technique and
recasts VA as a research method used by economists, not as a policy tool with consequences.
Value-added as a decision-making policy is held at arm’s length despite the fact that such was
the very substance of the Vergara trial.
These exchanges point to what I regard as a ‘methodological politics.’ Chetty, Kane, Rothstein
and Hanushek each have very clear positions on the appropriateness of VA as a tool for highstakes teacher evaluations. Yet, their testimonies become a back-and-forth of statistical minutae;
instead of teachers’ livelihoods, experts debate standard error calculations and the definition of
forecast bias. This may be an artifact of the highly scripted nature of expert testimony, and of the
particularities of economics as a discipline (described briefly above), but the exaggerated nature
of these exchanges is a useful way of looking at science as a political force. In essence, experts
who all purport to be pursuing value-neutral truth attempt to best each other with statistical
sophistication and force their opponents to accept their value judgments as the necessary
consequence of their ‘objective’ data and methods. If one accepts the methods by which Chetty

Promotional materials for value-added assessment go back to the technique’s origins in
agricultural research and talk about VA in terms of trees growing.
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empirically adduced Long Term Impacts, or the ‘gold standard’ of experimental design employed
in Measures of Effective Teaching, one must therefore accept the implication that teachers ought
to be evaluated by student test score gains. This style of discourse obscures the implications of
scientific knowledge in favor of abstract technical discussion. But politics are only obscured, not
altogether absent; the political contents remain intact, as does the appearance that science stands
apart from such matters. Thus with Marcuse, we might argue that:
“The analysis is ‘locked;’ the range of judgment is confined within a context of facts
which excludes judging the context in which the facts are made, man-made, and in which
their meaning, function and development are determined.” (Marcuse, 1964/1991, pp.
115-116)
Placing Value-Added Assessment in context of the history of innovations in educational
assessment provides perspective on how science manifests as power in determining policy. At
the larger level, science proceeds as a form of politics to the extent that new technologies are
percieved as merely technical innovations free of inherent biases. Yet, historical examination
shows that the use of these techniques is always accompanied by an attendant push for
increasingly centralized control over schooling. The perceived neutrality of scientific methods
and the tools they produce allows this admisitrative control to be smuggled in. On a smaller
scale, debates over policy are displaced into debates over technique, constituting what I have
called a methodological politics. In the case of value-added, the real stakes of evaluation policies
are submerged beneath expert opinions on the precision and validity of measurement techniques.
More importantly, the distinction between fact and value is blurred, and experts who engage in
such discourse seem caught in a bind. Their commitment to the ideal – or the appearance – of
objectivity colors the very political consequences of their work, resulting in a contest over
methods and data rather than interpretations and implications.
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Something else gets lost in abstract discussion of teacher evaluation policy – education.
Schooling is a structured interaction between teachers and students which is supposed to educate
the latter. Having worked with K-12 students throughout the course of this research, it behooves
me to keep them in mind; at some points I have done so. Chapter one assessed how the workings
of schools and classrooms would have to be transformed to meet value-added model
assumptions, and placed this possibility in context of the necessarily contentious relationship
between teachers and students. There I argued that overemphasis of tests and their results would
vitiate the important moral content of education. Similarly, the history of assessment technology
explored in chapter three repeatedly invoked the hazards of measurement-driven instruction for
both teachers and students. These are important topics, but insofar as this analysis has been
confined to schooling as a process rather than education as its goal, it is necessary but not
sufficient.
Education is not reducible to schooling; it is rather the socially agreed-upon goal which
schooling – concurrent with other social institutions (notably the family, media, and popular
culture) – is supposed to achieve. Education is successful to the extent that it reproduces agreed
upon values, knowledge and capacities among future generations. Understanding the impact of
evaluation technology on education as distinct from its impact on schooling requires defining
these shared goals – what is to be taught and learned.
A comprehensive statement on K-12 curriculum is far beyond the scope of this project, but some
general outlines can be traced. Curriculum has been and continues to be a ‘third rail’ in US
politics, particularly when the time comes to discuss evolutionary biology, sex education, and
certain aspects of American history. In addition, the notion of a national curriculum runs up
against the idea of ‘states rights,’ making it a wedge issue for conservatives. The ‘Common
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Core’ standards – the most recent attempt at K-12 curriculum policy – bear the imprint of both of
these forces; these standards primarily focus on mathematics and reading, and many states
(especially in the south) either banned the standards altogether or never adopted them in the first
place.
In the absence of any sustained explicit negotiations, curriculum is defined by assessments and
thus by textbook publishers and test-makers. While many industrialized countries use
comprehensive content examinations as the capstone of students’ compulsory education, the
closest US equivalents are the SAT and ACT college entrance exams. Even students who apply
to open-admissions and community colleges are faced with some version of the SAT/ACT.
Despite numerous revisions intended to align these exams with curriculum, they are still a hybrid
of basic literacy and numeracy and aptitude testing. These tests are the benchmark of US
educational assessment, and thus of the curriculum itself. Teacher evaluation systems which
emphasize test results – forcing teachers who have in the past served as a buffer zone between
students and the tests – only exacerbate this test-defined experience of schooling.
What does test-defined schooling imply for eduation in terms of values, knowledge, and
capacities? Such exams place a premium on reductive thinking and short-cuts (Hoffman, The
Tyranny of Testing, 1964/2003). They reward students who can identify the least rigorous path
to the test-maker’s wanted answer and who can temporarily suspend critical thought when faced
with two or more ‘possibly correct’ choices. Even the allegedly free-response essay portions of
these exams – which are optional in the case of the SAT and ACT – encourage writing to a
template rather than crafting original ideas. If value-added evaluation systems disproportionately
reward teachers who foster these skills in their students, then education is reduced to testpreparation. Rather than fostering critical thought and innovation, such instruction thwarts those
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goals by rewarding their opposite. Moreover, to the extent that high-stakes decisions are based
on value-added measures, teachers are prevented from acting autonomously as professionals in
the classroom and are instead forced to work within the constraints imposed by the tests.
Why is educator professionalism important? The production of educated students is not a onesize-fits-all process; and it contains both measureable and unmeasureable goals. In this process,
educators need room to adapt to the students they engage with. Early proponents of standardized
testing understood this and hence emphasized the use of exams as tools rather than as curriculum
itself (Chauncey & Dobbin, 1963). But this message fell by the wayside as policymakers
clamored for more data by which to judge students, schools and teachers. Value-added is perhaps
the culmination of this trajectory; it reduces the whole of a complex relational process to the
residual term in a loosely-theorized and poorly-specified mathematical equation.
Ultimately, what I take away from this research is that science and technology can blind us to the
very complex and contingent realities of vital social processes such as education. Insofar as
technical innovations pose enticing and easy solutions to seemingly intractable problems, they
can also temporarily corrupt the politically difficult but necessary process of devising more
lasting solutions. Schooling requires more than a series of poorly-informed panics and
technological panaceas; it needs sustained investment and a level of study whose nuance matches
its level of complexity. Simply put, to fulfill its vital social mission, education requires more
than just endless measurement.
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Postscript on Value-Added and the return of politics

Writing takes time, and history continues unabated. But in this case it seems history has helped
validate my thinking in two ways which I will mention briefly. My historical analysis in chapter
three suggested that after periods of fervor for methodological innovations, they tend to fall out
of favor. Though it is still uncertain, value-added seems to be on that path. In New York,
Governor Mario Cuomo – who was a staunch supporter of value-added assessments – has since
backed off the mandate for teachers to be evaluated on the basis of test scores – even potentially
reducing their proportional role to zero (Taylor K. , 2015). In California, the Vergara ruling was
overturned by an appeals court on April 18th, 2016 - although Students Matter plans to take the
case to the Supreme Court.
What is more important is why this is happening. One important factor is the opt-out movement,
which encourages parents to refuse to have their children sit for local, state and national-level
standardized tests. Change the Stakes – a New York City-based opt out group – lists standardized
tests’ role in evaluating teachers as among the primary reasons to resist testing. Supporters argue
that the perverse incentives created by test-based evaluation hurt instruction at both the
classroom and school level by encouraging teachers to reallocate time and discouraging teacher
cooperation. A sign of the appeal of opt-out, 20 percent of New York State students in grades 3
through 8 did not sit for testing (Harris E. , 2015). Growing opt-out numbers are also evident in
Washington, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Illinois (Stokes, 2015).
Opt-out, in light of the above research, seems a logical response to the crowding out of
democratic politics by technology in the field of education. Policymakers see the world at a
particular level and want aggregate evidence at that level to make decisions (Scott, 1998). But, as
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Feyerabend makes clear, the reliance on the so-called objective evidence in science is
fundamentally undemocratic. It is presented as unassailable truth rather than as knowledge
produced by human beings with particular values of their own, and rejects all other knowledge
claims as ideological (Feyerabend, 1975). Thus, when opt-outers declare that “my child is not a
number” and seek to revitalize the interactions of the classroom – including their own
participation – they articulate a fundamentally democratic response to a top-down
methodological politics epitomized by value-added teacher evaluations. And in targeting the
supply of data on which these evaluations subsist, opt-out demonstrates its recognition of the role
of science and its methods as critical mechanisms of power in society. Understanding full well
that my own science is not value-free, I hope they succeed.
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